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Article 3

Market Making in the Electronic Age
Mark Borrelli*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1974, an investor making his first purchase of stock might look in
the newspaper and see that IBM, one of the hottest technology stocks of
the day, is trading at $230. The investor might then call a stockbroker
to place an order to purchase 500 shares. The investor's broker would
call a representative of the firm on the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange, who would find someone else on the floor of the exchange
willing to execute, or "fill," the order. The transaction might cost the
investor $200, and be filled at a price of $2301 . Although the novice
investor may not think about the manner in which his broker fills the
order, the investor's brokerage firm has a duty of "best execution," i.e.,
an obligation to fill the investor's order in a manner most favorable to
the investor, including obtaining the best price.'
In 2000, the same investor, now much more seasoned, pulls up a realtime quote for Cisco Systems, one of the day's hottest technology
stocks, through an online brokerage account. He sees that the stock is
trading at 30 "bid," 30 "offer," 2 and places a buy order for 500 shares
through his online account, which is executed almost immediately at the
offer price of 30V4. As the stock is a Nasdaq stock, the order will not be
routed to the floor of an exchange. It may not even make it to one of
* The author is an attorney with Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois specializing in
broker-dealer and investment adviser compliance, accounting issues, and SEC enforcement
matters. The author was formerly an Assistant Regional Director with the Midwest Regional
Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He received his B.S. in Accounting with
highest honors from the University of Illinois in 1986, and his J.D. summa cum laude from the
University of Illinois in 1989.
I. Infra Part V.A (discussing duty of best execution).
2. The bid price is the price at which broker-dealers operating in a particular market are
willing to buy shares of stock, and the offer price, also sometimes called the "asked" or "ask"
price, is the price at which they are willing to sell. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-l(a)(4) (2000). The
difference between the bid and offer prices is known as the "spread." Report Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market,
Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 52 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 882 (Aug. 8, 1996), available at
1996 SEC LEXIS 2123, at *29 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Section 21(a) Report].
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the dealers who collectively "make" the Nasdaq market. 3 The brokerdealer with whom the customer places the order may itself sell the
customer the stock, at 304, which is the best offer price currently
shown on the Nasdaq market. The customer pays a commission of only
$9.99 for the trade. Two seconds after his order is executed, however,
an order to sell 500 shares at 301/8 goes unfilled. The investor, now
much more familiar with best execution, questions whether he should
have been able to buy these 500 shares at 30V8.
The electronic age has had an effect on trading that extends far
beyond commission rates. Largely driven by advances in technology,
the structure of the markets to which an investor's order may be routed
are themselves undergoing a major change. Not only do orders not
necessarily get sent to the floor of an exchange, it is not clear whether,
in five years, there will even be a floor of the exchange. As competitive
factors alter the structure of markets, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") must wrestle with the issues of
which market structures will survive and how the markets will be
regulated to ensure, among other things, that investors receive "best
execution."
This article provides a brief history of the United States securities
markets and the self-regulatory structure for these markets and furnishes
background on the structure of the nation's dominant and emerging
securities markets. 4 Next, it discusses the Congressional mandate for a
national market system, which was announced in 1975, and the progress
5
that has been made to date regarding the creation of such a system.
This article then describes the principles governing the execution of
customer orders, the rise of trading systems known as electronic
communications networks, and the manner in which the Securities and
Exchange Commission has chosen to regulate them. 6 The article
follows with a discussion of the development of Nasdaq, from a system
of disseminating quotations to a major stock market.7
Next, the article summarizes some of the major issues central to the
ongoing debate on the structure of the United States securities markets
and the execution of customer orders, including payment for order flow
3. The Nasdaq market does not have a trading floor, but rather consists of broker-dealers who
enter quotes into an automated system and purchase stock from, or sell to, customers. Infra Part
II.C (discussing the difference between the two dominant U.S. securities markets: the NYSE and
Nasdaq).
4. Infra Parts H-I1.
5. Infra Part IV.
6. Infra Parts V-VI.
7. Infra Part VII.
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and the fees charged by securities markets for market data. 8 It also
discusses problems with the current self-regulatory structure. 9 This
article encourages the Securities and Exchange Commission to
scrupulously avoid any regulations that would overtly or effectively
mandate the structure of a single central market, and instead promote
fair competition among markets by allowing Electronic
Communications Networks and other alternative trading systems to
access the facilities of the national market system. Similarly, the article
recommends that the Commission allow competitive forces to
determine the size of the fees that securities markets charge for quote
and transaction information. Finally, the article expresses the view that
a single self-regulatory organization for the securities industry is needed
in light of the conflicts of interest inherent in the current self-regulatory
system, which current market trends have exacerbated. 10
II. BACKGROUND ON UNITED STATES SECURITIES MARKETS

One of the causes of the current debates regarding the structure and
regulation of the U.S. securities markets is the fact that the accelerating
rate of development of these markets has taxed the ability of Congress
and the SEC to develop an adequate regulatory structure for them. This
section will discuss the basic regulatory structure for the securities
markets contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), the history of the U.S. securities markets, and the
basic differences between the two dominant U.S. securities
markets-the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and The Nasdaq
Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq"). It will conclude with a discussion of the
development of Electronic Communications Networks ("ECNs"), which
were not envisioned at the time of the adoption of the Exchange Act.
A. Historic Structure Under the Exchange Act
In passing the Exchange Act, Congress envisioned securities markets
in which customers transacted business through broker-dealers and
transactions were executed primarily on national exchanges. Before the
Exchange Act, broker-dealers were regulated only by the exchanges on
which they were members. After passage of the Exchange Act, the
newly-formed SEC regulated both the exchanges and broker-dealers,
which remained subject to exchange regulation as well." Shortly after
8.
9.
10.
11.

Infra Parts VHI-X.
Infra Parts VI-X.
Infra Part XI.
H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 1838 (1934).
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the passage of the Exchange Act, Congress embraced the concept of
registered securities associations that, together with national exchanges
and registered clearing agencies, are known as "self-regulatory
organizations." 12
13
Brokerage firms typically act at different times as either a "broker"'
or a "dealer"' 14 and are, therefore, referred to as "broker-dealers."
Acting as either a broker or dealer requires registration with the
Commission.' 5 A firm that receives a customer order and transmits it to
a market or third party for execution, but does not itself buy or sell the
security, is acting as a broker, and this type of transaction is known as
an agency transaction. 16 A firm that buys a security for its own account,
whether from a customer or another brokerage firm, is acting as a
dealer. A transaction in which a broker-dealer buys or sells for its own
17
account is known as a principal transaction.
The Exchange Act prohibits broker-dealers from engaging in
transactions on an exchange 18 that is either not registered as a "national
securities exchange" under Section 6 of the Exchange Act or is exempt
from registration. 19 Accordingly, any system meeting the definition of
"exchange" must register as a "national securities exchange" under
20
Section 6 of the Exchange Act or find an exemption from registration.
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(26) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
13. Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines the term "broker" to include "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." Id.
§ 78c(a)(4)(A).
14. Section 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act defines "dealer" to include "any person engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities for such person's own account through a broker or
otherwise." Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A). Section 3(a)(5) excepts from the definition of "dealer" persons
whose purchases and sales of securities for their own account are not part of a regular business,
and banks which engage in specified activities. Id.
15. Id. § 78o(a)(1).
16. See Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices, Exchange Act Release No.
43,084, 72 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2312 (July 28, 2000) available at 2000 WL 1092311, at *5
(S.E.C.) [hereinafter Execution Disclosure Proposing Release].
17. See Dissemination and Display of Transaction Reports and Quotation Information,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,251, 15 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1370 (October 20, 1978), available
at 1978 WL 19978, at *13 n.54 (S.E.C.).
18. Section 3(a)(l) of the Exchange Act defines "exchange" as follows:
[A]ny organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities
for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing
with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as
that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and the market
facilities maintained by such exchange.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(1).
19. Id. § 78e.
20. There are no substantive criteria which distinguish a "national securities exchange" from
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regulation under Section 6 of the
Exchanges are subject to substantial
21
Exchange Act and SEC regulations.
The Exchange Act provides that "an association of brokers or dealers
may be registered" under Section 15A(b) of the Exchange Act.2 2 To
become registered as a national securities association, an organization
must satisfy numerous criteria designed to ensure that it can carry out
Once registered, securities
self-regulatory responsibilities. 23
associations are subject to the stringent regulation similar to that
imposed on national securities exchanges, including a requirement that
their rules be approved by the Commission. The National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") is the only registered securities
association. Broker-dealers are required to become NASD members
unless their business is limited to transactions on an exchange. 24 As a
result, all broker-dealers must belong to at least one self-regulatory
organization.
B. History of United States Securities Markets
The NYSE traces its history to the "Buttonwood Agreement" of
1792, where twenty-four brokers agreed to trade securities under a
buttonwood tree on Wall Street. 25 A formal organization, the New
York Stock & Exchange Board, was formed in 1817.26 At this time,
stocks were traded one at a time as the president of the Board called
their names. 27 In 1863, the market changed its name to the NYSE. 28 In
an exchange. The only significance of the term "national securities exchange" is that it applies to
an exchange registered under Section 6, as distinguished from a system meeting the definition of
"exchange" but exempt from registration. Id. § 78c(a)(1) (defining "exchange"); § 78f(a)
(describing process under which "exchange" registers as a "national securities exchange"). An
example of an exchange which has received an exemption from the Commission is the Arizona
Stock Exchange, which has limited volume. Order Amending Exemption Order and Granting
Amendment to Application for Exemption from Registration as an Exchange under Section 5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 37,271, 62 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 184 (June 3, 1996), available at 1996 WL 293566 (SEC) [hereinafter AZX Exemptive
Order].
21. For example, exchanges are required to have rules which conform to the dictates of
Section 6 concerning, among other things, membership requirements, dues and disciplinary
procedures. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f. The SEC must approve all changes to exchange rules. Id.

§ 78s(b).
22. Id. § 78o-3(a).
23. Id. § 78o-3(b).
24. Id. § 78o(b)(I)(b).
25. NYSE's Historical Perspective/Timeline,at http://www.nyse.com/about/about.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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1871, the system of trading changed, so that all stocks were traded
simultaneously and the brokers for a particular stock stood in one
location. 29 Companies must meet certain financial criteria and satisfy
other requirements to list their shares on the NYSE. 3 °
Historically, the NYSE was considered the most prestigious and
liquid market in existence, although Nasdaq would clearly dispute that
claim today. Nasdaq had humble beginnings, having arisen out of a
study conducted by the SEC in the early 1960s. 3 1 The study, which was
released in 1963, recommended the development of an automated
system to address "fragmentation" in the over-the-counter ("OTC")
market. 32 The OTC market is used to describe any off-exchange
trading. Trading began on the Nasdaq on February 8, 1971, when the
33
system displayed quotes for 2,500 securities.
At its inception, Nasdaq was nothing more than a system within the
OTC market, created and operated by the NASD, through which quotes
could be displayed. Trades were made exclusively through phone calls
between broker-dealers. 34 In 1975, Nasdaq established listing standards
35
which began to distinguish it from the rest of the OTC market.
Although many investors view Nasdaq as a stock exchange, it is still
part of the OTC market and not an exchange. 36 Nasdaq bills itself as a
"stock market," and stocks are "included" in Nasdaq, rather than being

29. Id.
30. The current listing requirements can be found in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, at
http://www.nyse.com/listed/listed.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
31. Nasdaq's History & Timeline, at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/about-nasdaq.stm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinafter History & Timeline].
32. Id. Fragmentation is the dispersal of trading activity over multiple market centers. Infra
Part IX.A.1 (describing problems market fragmentation creates). The OTC market derived its
name from the days in which investors would literally hand their share certificates over the
counter to their stockbroker to determine their worth.
33. Id. The Nasdaq name originated as an acronym for the full name of the system, the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system, but the market's official
name is now The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. History & Timeline, supra note 31; Article I of Plan
of Allocation and Delegation of Functions by NASD to Subsidiaries [hereinafter Plan of
Allocation and Delegation]; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., NASD Manual
(CCH) 1101 (1998) [hereinafter NASD Manual].
34. See Desmond Smith, The Wiring of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1983, § 6, at 44.
35. History and Timeline, supra note 31.
36. Nasdaq plans, however, to register as an exchange. Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7 and 8 Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment
No. 9 Relating to the Establishment of the Nasdaq Order Display Facility and Order Collector
Facility and Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 43,863
(Jan. 19, 2001), available at 2001 SEC LEXIS 112, at *12 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter SuperMontage
Adopting Release].
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"listed. 37 There are two tiers within Nasdaq: the National Market and
the SmallCap Market. The Nasdaq National Market has more stringent
listing standards and is a more liquid market than the SmallCap
38
market.
The American Stock Exchange ("Amex") is the world's second
largest floor-based exchange, after the NYSE. Amex uses a specialist
system like that of the NYSE, 39 but has much more lenient listing
requirements. 4° There are also several regional exchanges in the United
States.41 Stocks that cannot satisfy the listing requirements of the
exchanges or Nasdaq can be traded through the NASD's OTC bulletin
board, which provides real-time quotations but has no listing
standards.42 In January 1999, the Commission approved rule changes
by the NASD that limited bulletin board stocks to those of issuers that
were current in their periodic filings under the Exchange Act. 43 The
lowest tier in the United States securities markets is the "pink sheets,"
paper and
which were formerly a list of quotations printed on pink
44
disseminated daily by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc.

37. See NASD Manual, supra note 33, Rule 4300, at 5271.
38. Id. Rule 4310, at 5275, Rule 4420, at 5391. Securities on the Nasdaq National Market are
frequently referred to as "Nasdaq/NMS" securities. Supra Part IV.B (describing designation of
securities as "National Market System," or "NMS," securities).
39. Infra Part II.C. I (describing the NYSE's specialist system).
40. The current Amex financial listing criteria can be found on the Amex website, at
http://www.amex.com/about/amex-listus.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
41. While considered "regional" by market participants, these exchanges must be registered as
national securities exchanges under the Exchange Act. Regulation of Market Information Fees
and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42,208, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 496 (Dec. 9, 1999),
availableat 1999 WL 1125152, at *2 n.1 (S.E.C.). The regional stock exchanges are the Boston
Stock Exchange, Inc., the Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, the
Pacific Exchange, Inc. and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. Id.
42. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. I to the
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to
Microcap Initiatives-Amendments to NASD Rules 6530, 6540, Exchange Act Release No.
40,878, 68 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2584 (Jan. 4, 1999), availableat 1999 WL 1746, at *1 (S.E.C.).
43. While the stated purpose of the rule changes was to address abuses in the market for small
stocks, some observers believed that the NASD feared that its association with the bulletin board
would taint the powerful Nasdaq brand name, and that it sought to "clean up" the bulletin board
to reduce the negative impact of this association. See William Hoffman, Cloudy Futurefor
Bulletin Board Market, TRADERS, Aug. 1, 2000.
44. The National Quotation Bureau later changed its name to Pink Sheets, LLC, and, befitting
the electronic age, now offers real-time quotations on some securities. See Pink Sheets, at
http://www.pinksheets.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
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C. Agency and Dealer Markets
While there are numerous exchanges and systems that can now be
classified as "securities markets," the mechanics of trade execution is
best understood by comparing the differences between the two
dominant markets: the NYSE and Nasdaq. The NYSE is the most
prominent example of an agency market, i.e., a market that charges a fee
45
for bringing buyers and sellers together and matching their orders.
Nasdaq is a dealer market, in which broker-dealers execute trades as
principals and are compensated by profits on the trades. 46 However, the
NYSE, while it is classified as an agency market, has characteristics of
47
a dealer market, and Nasdaq functions at times as an agency market.
1. New York Stock Exchange
Trading on the floor of the NYSE is essentially an auction in which
agents of buyers and sellers gather at a "trading post" and a "specialist"
facilitates the auction. 4 8 The NYSE is a continuous auction market in
which orders can be executed any time the exchange is open. The
continuous market auction can be distinguished from a call auction
market, where, at certain points in the trading day, all open orders are
executed when the auction is "called. 49 However, the NYSE uses the
call auction feature at the beginning of trading on the exchange and in
limited circumstances, such as when large order imbalances arise or
trading in a stock is temporarily halted.5 °
45. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to
Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market
Fragmentation, Exchange Act Release No. 42,450, S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1702 (Feb. 23, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 202094, at *10 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Concept Release]. Commission
releases will generally be cited to the S.E.C. Docket or S.E.C. Reporter and, for ease of retrieval
and reference to specific pages, to Westlaw or Lexis. An index of releases organized by topic is
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules.shtm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
46. Concept Release, supra note 45, at * 10.
47. Id.
48. The Floor Community/People, available at http://www.nyse.com/floor/people.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Floor Community/People]; Glossary/Specialist,available at
http://www.nyse.com/glossary/NT00018226.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
Glossary/Specialist].
49. See MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON MARKET STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP 20 (2001), available at

http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/marketstructure.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinafter NYSE
MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT]. The Arizona Stock Exchange is a call auction market. AZX
Exemptive Order, supra note 20, at * 1-2. For a discussion of the merits of a call auction system
and an argument in favor of extensive use of the call auction system in the U.S. markets, see
Building a Better Stock Market Using Call Auctions, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Mar. 20, 2000
(excerpting part of a book by Professor Robert A. Schwartz).
50. NYSE MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 49, at 20 n.26.
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Brokerage firms route NYSE orders either to the specialist's post,
through an automated order delivery system known as SuperDot, or to a
"floor broker" on the floor of the exchange. 51 There are two primary
types of floor brokers: "commission brokers," who work for a brokerdealer and execute orders for its customers, and "independent floor
brokers," who work for themselves.5 2 Independent floor brokers
execute orders for firms that do not have commission brokers or orders
53
which a broker-dealer's commission brokers are too busy to handle.
Brokers who gather at a trading post are known as the "crowd. 54 The
specialist posts 55the bid and offer prices of the trading crowd at the
specialist's post.
If an order is routed directly to the specialist through the SuperDot
system, the specialist, acting as an agent for the party placing the order,
finds a broker in the crowd willing to buy or sell the stock while seeking
to obtain "price improvement," i.e., a better price for the customer than
the current bid, in the case of a sale, or offer, in the case of a buy. 56 The
specialist also acts as an agent when a floor broker has a customer limit
order that cannot be executed at the current market level and leaves the
order with the specialist for later execution. 57 The specialist has no
direct involvement in approximately seventy-five percent of orders, for
which prices are established by brokers in the trading crowd shouting
58
out bids and offers for the stock, a process known as "open outcry."
A key function of a specialist is to fulfill his or her obligation to
maintain "fair and orderly" markets. 59 As part of this obligation,
51. Anatomy of a Trade, available at http://www.nyse.com/floor/anatomy.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2001).
52. Floor Community/People, supra note 48. Independent floor brokers are also called "$2
brokers" because they used to receive a commission of $2 on trades of 100 shares. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Anatomy of a Trade, supra note 51.
57. Floor Community/People, supra note 48; Glossary/Specialist,supra note 48.
58. Floor Community/People, supra note 48; Glossary/Specialist,supra note 48.
2104, 2104.10
59. NYSE Rule 104 and Supplementary Material, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
(1996) [hereinafter N.Y.S.E. Guide]. The following is the full text of Rule 104:
No specialist shall effect on the Exchange purchases or sales of any security in which
such specialist is registered, for any account in which he, his member organization or
any other member, allied member, or approved person, (unless an exemption with
respect to such approved person is in effect pursuant to Rule 98) in such organization
or officer or employee thereof is directly or indirectly interested, unless such dealings
are reasonably necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a fair and orderly
market, or to act as an odd-lot dealer in such security.
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specialists try to ensure that changes in stock prices are small from one
trade to the next, even if the price is moving dramatically overall.
Temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders have the potential to
cause large price variations between consecutive transactions.
Accordingly, when such an imbalance occurs, specialists buy or sell for
their own account to maintain order in the market. 6° Specialists profit
both from their receipt of commissions on orders for which they act as
61
agent, and from trading for their own account.
2. Nasdaq
The theory behind the Nasdaq market is that several broker-dealers
will act as market makers by providing quotes under which they will
buy or sell a particular stock. The competition among the market
62
makers is designed to produce the market price for the security.
Broker-dealers can participate in Nasdaq as either an order entry firm or
a market maker. 63 Order entry firms can access quotes of market
makers and participate in Nasdaq's automated services, but they do not
enter quotes for securities. 64 On the other hand, market makers place
65
bids and offer quotes for the securities in which they make markets.
Market participants 66 in Nasdaq enter or access quotes through a
workstation, the latest version of which is known as "Nasdaq
60. Floor Community/People, supra note 48.
For example, after a negative news
announcement, there may be more sell orders than buy orders for a particular stock, which
ordinarily would cause the price of the stock to immediately drop to a level where the number of
market participants willing to buy roughly matches the number seeking to sell. When this
imbalance between sell orders and buy orders arises, the specialist will step in to buy shares,
providing liquidity for sellers and easing the imbalance. Id. With one limited exception,
specialists are prohibited from buying or selling for their own account for any other purpose.
N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59,
2104, 2104.10. The exception is for transactions in odd-lots,
i.e., orders for less than the normal unit of trading. Id.
61. Neil Weinberg, The Big Board Comes Back From the Brink, FORBES, Nov. 13, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 25963943; Suzanne Woolley, The Booming Big Board, BUS. WEEK, Aug.
4, 1997, availableat 1997 WL 8271186.
62. When all of the market quotes for a stock are considered, the highest bid price by any
market maker for the stock is called the "inside bid," and the lowest offer price is known as the
"inside offer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g3(c)(3), (4) (2000).
63. Definition of a Market Maker, at http://www.nasdaqtrader.comltrader/tradingservicesl
tshome.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001); Definition of Order-Entry Service, at
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/tradingservices/marketparticipant/orderentryprocess.stm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001).
64. Definition of a Market Maker, supra note 63; Definition of Order-Entry Service, supra
note 63.
65. Definition of a Market Maker, supra note 63; Definition of Order-Entry Service, supra
note 63.
66. The term "market participants" will be used in this article to describe parties with the
ability to enter quotes or execute transactions in a particular market, which excludes individual or
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Workstation II." Participants can view quotes for any Nasdaq stocks
and enter quotes and orders through the Nasdaq workstation. 67 The
Workstation I display has two parts. 68 The top portion is used to
monitor market information for selected stocks. It has a "Market
Minder" window, through which broker-dealers can monitor the inside
quotes and last sale information for selected stocks, and a "Dynamic
Quote Window," which shows the inside bid and offer, last sale, the
day's price change, the day's high and low, and a short sale indicator for
selected stocks. 69 The bottom portion of the Workstation display
contains the Nasdaq Quotation Montage, which shows market maker
identification symbols ("MMIDs") for market makers and other
participants quoting prices, and the market participants' quote,
including the number of shares, next to the MMID.
Market
70
participants' bids and offers are ranked first by price and then by time.
Nasdaq has numerous rules governing the conduct of market
makers. 7 ' For example, Nasdaq market makers must observe Nasdaq's
normal trading hours, must maintain "two-sided," i.e., bid and offer,
quotations on the securities in which they make markets, and must
maintain quotations which are "reasonably related to the prevailing
market., 72 Nasdaq also seeks to maintain orderly markets by
73
prohibiting market makers from "locking" or "crossing" the market.
A market maker "locks" the market when it enters a bid quotation

institutional investors. The term does include, (for the Nasdaq market) in addition to Nasdaq
market making firms, electronic communications networks and some exchanges, because these
parties are eligible to enter quotes and execute orders. Infra Parts IID, IV.C (explaining
electronic communication networks and unlisted trading privileges).
67. A representation of the Workstation II display is available on the Nasdaq trader website, at
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/tradingservices/productservices/productdescriptions/
nwiidescription.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
68. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 36, at *33.
69. Id.
70. Id. The following roughly illustrates the layout of the quotation montage:

MMI

BID
20

MM3

197/

MM2
MM4

193/4
191/2

1,000

MM2

OFFER
2014

1,500

2,500
1,500
700

MM4
MM3
MMI

203/8
203/4
207/8

2,000
800
500

Id. at *4.
71. See generally NASD Manual, supra note 33, Rules 4611 to 4614, 4616 to 4625, at 56315843.
72. NASD Manual, supra note 33, Rule 4613, at 5691-95, Rule 4617, at 5781.
73. NASD Manual, supra note 33, Rule 4613(e), at 5693-94.
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which is equal to the ask quotation of another market maker, or an offer
74
quotation which is equal to the bid quotation of another market maker.
A market maker "crosses" the market when it enters a bid quotation
which is higher than the offer quotation of another market maker, or an
ask quotation which is lower than the bid quotation of another market
75
maker.
D. Electronic Communication Networks
An electronic communications network ("ECN") is an electronic
system that collects buy and sell orders for securities and allows the
orders to be executed against each other. 76 ECNs do not generally
"make markets" in the sense of acting as a principal on trades; instead,
they act purely as agents by bringing buyers and sellers together. ECNs
place limitations on the parties who may subscribe to their system, and
typically charge an access fee. ECNs display subscriber orders, much
77
like Nasdaq displays market maker quotes.
Instinet, the first ECN, actually predates Nasdaq. Instinet was
founded in 1969 as a means of allowing institutional money managers
to trade directly with each other.78 In addition to the development of the
Internet and communications technology, the development of ECNs was
spurred by the SEC's adoption of its Order Handling Rules in
September 1996. 79 While the Order Handling Rules were adopted

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The technical definition of ECN is contained in SEC Rule 1 AcI-I as "any electronic
system that widely disseminates to third parties orders entered therein by an exchange market
maker or OTC market maker, and permits such orders to be executed against in whole or in part."
17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-l(a)(8) (2000) (SEC Rule IAcl-l(a)(8)). Under Rule IAcl-1, the term
ECN does not include: (1) a system that crosses multiple orders at specified times only at a price
determined by the system; and (2) a system operated by or on behalf of a market maker that
executes orders primarily against the account of the market maker as a principal, other than a
riskless principal. Id. A "riskless" principal transaction is a transaction in which the brokerdealer technically acts as a principal but has arranged for another party to buy or sell from it,
which eliminates the risk normally associated with a principal transaction. Confirmation of
Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 33,743, 56 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 558 (Mar. 9, 1994),
available at 1994 WL 73633, at *2 n.l 1 (S.E.C.).
77. Island, one of the major ECNs, makes its order display available to the public through its
"BookViewer." The BookViewer is one of the best ways to view the operation of an ECN in real
time. See Island BookViewer, available at http://www.island.com/BookViewer/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001).
78. Instinet's History, available at http://www.instinet.com/corp-info/background/
history/shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
79. Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 62 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 2083 (Sept. 6, 1996), available at 1996 WL 506154, at *4 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Order
Handling Release]; see also infra Part V.C.2 (describing Order Handling Rules).

20011

Market Making in the Electronic Age

partially to address perceived problems created by the rise of ECNs,
they actually created an explosion in ECN activity by sanctioning the
role of ECNs in order executions, subject only to the condition that they
open their book of orders to the larger market beyond their subscribers.
III. SELF-REGULATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
In regulating the securities industry, the SEC relies heavily on a wellentrenched self-regulatory system, much of which was in place before
the agency was formed. The NYSE regulated its members from its
inception, and this arrangement was allowed to continue after the
passage of the Exchange Act, with SEC regulation overlaying, rather
than replacing, NYSE self-regulation. Shortly after passage of the
Exchange Act, the NASD was formed. The self-regulatory system
developed during a time in which the NYSE enjoyed a quasi-monopoly
and the NASD had no business other than self-regulation. As described
in this section, these self-regulatory organizations, or "SROs," are notfor-profit organizations with their own rules and enforcement staffs.
There has always been an inherent conflict in the self-regulatory system,
as the members of a for-profit industry are called upon to rein in any
propensity for illegal or unethical conduct that might be spawned by the
profit motive. This conflict is more extreme today than it has been at
any time in history because Nasdaq has evolved from a simple quotation
system into a major stock market that aggressively competes with the
NYSE. 80 Moreover, ECNs, new types of markets competing primarily
with Nasdaq, are regulated not as exchanges but as broker-dealers,
creating a situation in which the NASD operates a stock market and acts
as the first-line regulator for its competitors.
A. History
Self-regulatory organizations predate the Commission by well over
one hundred years. The stock exchanges, which were formed as early
as 1790, exercised self-regulatory responsibilities over their members
from their inception. 8' At the time of the Exchange Act's passage there
were at least twenty-one stock exchanges, and debates surrounding the
adoption of the Exchange Act included substantial discussion regarding
the preservation of their self-regulatory authority. 82 The Exchange Act

80. Infra Part VII (describing the evolution of Nasdaq).
81. See Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 480
(1984).
82. Id.
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as originally adopted, without using the term "self-regulatory
organization," gave the Commission oversight authority over
83
exchanges, which retained direct authority over their members.
The forerunner of the NASD, the Code Committee, was created in
1933 as part of the National Recovery Act. 84 After the Supreme Court
declared the National Recovery Act unconstitutional, the industry
decided to voluntarily continue the organization.8 5 The Conference
Committee worked with the SEC to develop legislation that would
clarify its powers and responsibilities, resulting in the passage of the
"Maloney Act" in 1938.86 The NASD became registered as a national
securities association under Section 15A of the Exchange Act on
August 29, 1939.87 The 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act
introduced the term "self-regulatory organization" and reorganized the
provisions of the Exchange Act concerning self-regulation. 8 8 Under the
current system, several provisions of the Exchange Act and the
regulations thereunder, such as those governing rulemaking, apply to all
self-regulatory organizations, with no distinctions made between
89
exchanges and registered securities associations.
B. Structure and Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations
90
Both the NYSE and the NASD have a mutual form of ownership.
The NYSE and NASD are both non-profit organizations owned by their
members. The NASD owns The Nasdaq-Amex Market Group, Inc.,
83. Id. at 481-82.
84. Wallace H. Fulton, The Origin of the NASD, 1933-1939/The OTC Market's Venture into
Self-Regulation, available at http://www.nasd.com/corpinfo/co ovehistr.html (last visited Mar.
19, 2001).
85. Id. The new organization was known as the Investment Bankers Conference Committee,
and later as the Investment Bankers Conference, Inc. Id. The Conference Committee had a
governing body of twenty-one elected representatives from the organization's members, and
divided the country into fourteen districts for administrative purposes. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The reorganization was accomplished by amending certain provisions of Section 19 of the
Exchange Act, which formerly applied only to national securities exchanges, so that they applied
to all self-regulatory organizations, and transferring some of the provisions of Section 15A of the
Exchange Act, which applies only to registered securities associations, to Section 19. S. REP.
No. 94-75 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat. 97); Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,501 (2000), 26,241 (1999), 26,251 (1987), 26,261 (1987), 26,281 (1988), 26,294 (1995).
The registration provisions for national securities exchanges and registered securities
organizations remain separate. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a)-(b), 78o3(a)-(b) (1994).
89. See id.
90. "Mutual ownership" is ownership by the members of an exchange, association, or other
organization.
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which operates the Nasdaq and Amex markets. As discussed in more
detail below, however, the NASD has sold a significant share of Nasdaq
to investors in a private placement of securities. 9 1 Unlike the NYSE
and the other exchanges, Nasdaq's regulatory function is carried out by
a subsidiary, NASD Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR"), which is separate
from the Nasdaq market.9 2
Both the NASD and the NYSE have large staffs of full-time
examiners, enforcement personnel, and executives to carry out their
regulatory functions. The "self' in "self-regulation" is therefore only a
reality insofar as members of the industry oversee these employees.
The NASD is overseen by a Board of Governors, which can consist of
up to thirty-five governors. 93 Seven of these governors come from
within the organization. 94 In addition to the inside governors, the board
has between sixteen and twenty-eight governors elected by the NASD's
members. 95 The by-laws also require that a majority of the governors
be "non-industry" governors, defined generally as individuals who are
neither associated with nor have significant business relationships with
96
NASD members, the NASD, or Nasdaq.
The NYSE has a board of directors with twenty-four members, all of
whom are elected by the exchange members, a Chairman of the Board
and, if the positions are filled, the Executive Vice Chairman and

91. Infra Part X.D (describing the proposed demutualization of Nasdaq and NYSE).
92. NASD Regulation also regulates the NASD's broker-dealers on matters such as sales
practices, financial responsibility, and other issues not directly related to Nasdaq trading. Plan of
Allocation and Delegation, supra note 33, at 1102-03. NASD Regulation carries out its functions
through fourteen district offices, each of which is overseen by a District Committee. Id. at 21;
NASD Manual, supra note 33, Art. VIII of By-Laws of NASD, at 1319-20. NASD Regulation's
board of directors appoints a National Adjudicatory Council, which reviews disciplinary
proceedings and makes recommendations to the NASD's board of governors on rules governing
the conduct of member firms and associate persons and other enforcement matters. NASD
Manual, supra note 33, Art. V of NASD By-Laws, at 1310-12.
93. NASD Manual, supra note 33, Art. VII, Secs. 1,4 of NASD By-Laws, at 1312, 1315.
94. These are: the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer of the NASD, the
Presidents of NASD Regulation and Nasdaq, the Chair of NASD Regulation's National
Adjudicatory Council, the Chief Executive Officer of Amex and one "Floor Governor" chosen by
Amex. Id. Art. VII, Sec. 4 of NASD By-Laws, at 1315. The National Adjudicatory Council
reviews decisions in enforcement proceedings. See infra Part II.D (discussing the NASD's
enforcement system).
95. NASD Manual, supra note 33, at 1315. The NASD's by-laws require that the Board
include at least one representative of each of the following organizations: a mutual fund or
affiliate, a company whose shares are listed on Nasdaq, and an NASD member with fewer than
150 registered representatives. Id.
96. See id.; id. Art. I of NASD By-Laws, at 1301-03. In 1999, the Board of Governors had
thirty-three members. NASD Annual Report 29-31 (1999), available at http://www.nasd.com/
corpinfo/co-ann.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
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President of the exchange. 97 Twelve of the elected directors are
"industry" directors, who are associated with member firms, and twelve
98
are "public" directors.
C. Rule-Making
Rules of all self-regulatory organizations must be approved by the
SEC, which generally publishes rule proposals for public comment
before issuing a decision. 99 The Commission may only approve a rule
change if it finds that the change is "consistent with the requirements of
[the Exchange Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable
1°
to [the self-regulatory organization] making the filing."
Self-regulatory organizations are not required to submit rule
0
proposals to members for comment, although they sometimes do.' '
NASD proposed rule changes are developed by NASD Regulation and
10 2
must be adopted by the NASD Regulation board of directors.
97. Art. IV, Sec. 2 of NYSE Constitution, N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59, § 1152.
98. At least one of the public directors must be associated with an NYSE issuer that is not a
financial institution, and one must be associated with a financial institution "that is a significant
investor ini
equity securities." Id. Of the industry directors, five must be associated with NYSE
members with "substantial direct contact with securities customers" and must live and work in the
New York metropolitan area; one must be associated with an NYSE member with "substantial
direct contact with securities customers" and live and work outside the New York metropolitan
area; three must be NYSE specialists; one must be associated with a New York-area NYSE
member with a regional operation which is not a specialist; and one must work on the floor of the
exchange but not as a specialist. Id.
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). The
Commission has proposed to streamline the process under which rule changes are submitted to it
for approval. Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release
No. 43,860 (Jan. 19, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 62908 (S.E.C.).
100. Id. Rule changes in certain routine areas may be effective on filing with the
Commission, subject to the right of the Commission, within sixty days of the filing, to abrogate
the rule filing and to require its re-consideration under the usual procedures. 15 U.C.S.
§ 78s(b)(3).
101. Compare NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-79 (Sept. 1999), available at 1999 WL
33176579, at *1 (soliciting comments on and rule amendments relating to member
communications with the public), with Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendments Nos. I and 2 thereto relating to the
Establishment of the Nasdaq Order Display Facility and Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading
Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 42,166, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 281 (Nov. 22, 1999),
available at 1999 WL 1080624, at *17 (S.E.C.) (showing written comments not solicited on
"SuperMontage" proposal). See generally Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment Nos. I and 2 Thereto Relating to
the Establishment of the Nasdaq Order Display Facility and Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading
Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 42,166, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 281 (Nov. 22, 1999),
available at 1999 WL 1080624 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter SuperMontage Proposal].
102. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-79, supra note 101, at *1. The NASD's board of
governors sometimes reviews rule changes. Id. NASD Regulation typically works with its
committees and the National Adjudicatory Council in creating proposals for rule changes. Id.
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Changes in the rules of the NYSE must be approved by its board of
directors. 103 The NYSE does not follow any established procedure in
developing rule changes, but instead consults with its members, works
with committees within the securities industry, or creates its own
committees, depending on the nature of the rule change. 104
D. Enforcement
Self-regulatory organizations have a responsibility to enforce
compliance not only with their own rules, but also with the federal
securities laws. 10 5
Employees of the NASD Department of
Enforcement in the NASD's district offices and members of the
Department of Enforcement and Market Regulation at the NASD's
headquarters conduct investigations into possible violations of NASD
rules or the federal securities laws.l°6 After approval by a Department
of Enforcement attorney and the District Director, a "case authorization
unit" within the Department of Enforcement authorizes disciplinary
actions investigated by district offices. 10 7 If a proposed enforcement
proceeding by a district office is "significant or complex" and "raises
important regulatory or policy issues," the Office of Disciplinary Policy
within the Division of Enforcement will also review the action. 10 8 The
Department of Enforcement files complaints with an Office of Hearing
Officers. 1°9 The National Adjudicatory Council reviews decisions of
hearing officers, and the SEC reviews decisions of the National
Adjudicatory Council."10
103. Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of NYSE Constitution, N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59. § 1351.
104. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Extending the Pilot Fee Structure Governing the Reimbursement of Member Organizations for
Costs Incurred in the Transmission of Proxy and Other Shareholder Communication Materials
and Amending the Components of Coordination Activities, Exchange Act Release No. 43,159
(Aug. 16, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1162239, at *7 (S.E.C.) (discussing how NYSE created
Proxy Fee Working Committee to consult with exchange on rule change); Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to Amendments to
Exchange Rule 123B, Exchange Act Release No. 42,572, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2212 (Mar.
23, 2000), available at 2000 WL 320459, at *2 (S.E.C.) (NYSE "reviewed proposed rule change
with members and organizations representing various constituencies."); NYSE NOTICE TO
MEMBERS 94-47 (Sept. 21, 1994) (Amendments developed jointly by NYSE and committee of
Securities Industry Association).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2).
106. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 97-55, at *11-12 (Aug. 1997), available at 1997 WL
1909827.
107. Id. at *13.
108. Id. at *13-15.
109. Id. at* 15.
110. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d), (e), (f). Before August 1997, District Business Conduct
Committees instituted disciplinary actions in each of the NASD's districts. See, e.g., In re
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The NYSE's Division of Enforcement, which is part of the
exchange's Regulatory Group, conducts investigations into violations of
NYSE rules and federal securities laws."' l
The Division of
Enforcement typically consults with officials within the Regulatory
Group in connection with recommendations for enforcement action, and
then presents the recommendation to the head of the Regulatory Group
for final approval. 112 Disciplinary proceedings are instituted by a
"Charge Memorandum," the equivalent of a complaint, filed by the
Division of Enforcement. 113 Litigated disciplinary proceedings are
conducted before an Exchange Hearing Panel consisting of a Hearing
Officer and two other members of the NYSE's Hearing Board." 4 The
members of the Hearing Board are industry representatives and cannot
also be members of the NYSE's board of directors. 1 5 Decisions of a
Hearing Panel can be appealed to the full Hearing Board, and decisions
16
of the Hearing Board can be appealed to the SEC."
IV.

THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM

1975 produced the most dramatic changes in the regulation of trading
in any single year since the adoption of the Exchange Act in 1934. The
first major development during this year was the deregulation of
commissions on securities trades. The second major development

Application of Sundra Escott-Russell for Review of Disciplinary Action taken by National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43,363, 73 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 953 (Sept. 27, 2000), availableat 2000 WL 1423640, at *2 (S.E.C.). The NASD adopted
major revisions to its disciplinary procedures in August 1997, which were prompted in part by an
SEC investigation of the Nasdaq market and the NASD's fulfillment of its regulatory
responsibilities. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. I to the Proposed
Rule Change, Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to
the Proposed Rule Change, and Order Extending Temporary Approval of SR-NASD-96-20 and
SR-NASD-96-29, Regarding Proposed Changes in the By-Laws and Restated Certificates of
Incorporation of the NASD, NASD Regulation, Inc., The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. and the Plan
of Allocation and Delegation of Functions by the NASD to Subsidiaries, Exchange Act Release
No. 39,326, 65 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1957 (Nov. 14, 1997), available at 1997 WL 714065
(S.E.C.) [hereinafter NASD Restructuring Release]; see also infra Part VIII.A (addressing flaws
in the Nasdaq system). The changes were designed in part to centralize the NASD's enforcement
decision-making process and to eliminate the involvement of industry representatives, through
their membership on District Business Conduct Committees, in the determination of whether to
institute disciplinary proceedings. NASD Restructuring Release, supra.
11. David P. Doherty et al., The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 637, 638 (1991).
112. ld. at 642.
113. Id. at 643.
114. Id. at 644.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 646-47.
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consisted of major revisions to the Exchange Act for the purpose of
developing a "national market system." Many of the Commission's
regulations since 1975 have been explicitly designed to foster this
development. Significant trading regulations are almost never adopted
without a consideration of their compatibility with a national market
system.
In contrast to the deregulation of commissions, which was fully
implemented over a relatively short time period, the development of the
national market system has not been completed over twenty-five years
after the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act. This section will first
discuss the deregulation of commissions and the overriding principles
governing the national market system, which were announced by
Congress in adopting Section 11A of the Exchange Act. Next, it will
discuss the progress that has been made to date in developing what are
considered some essential features of a national market system: wide
dissemination of quotation and transaction information; the elimination
of off-board trading restrictions; the "third market," or trading of listed
stocks in the OTC market; unlisted trading privileges, which allow
exchanges to trade Nasdaq stocks or stocks listed on another exchange;
and the InterMarket Trading System, which allows orders placed on one
market to be executed on another.
A. 1975-The Revolution Begins
The first major regulatory development in 1975 was the deregulation
of commissions on securities trades on May 1. The deregulation
occurred initially through the Commission's passage of Rule 19b-3,
117
which was then followed closely by Congressional action.
Regulators had never imposed fixed commission rates on the industry,
but exchange rules required members to charge fixed commission rates
for transactions executed on the exchanges. 1 18 Small investors received

117. Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No. 11,203, 6
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 147 (Jan. 23, 1975), available at 1975 WL 18377 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter
Deregulation Release]; Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 89 Stat. 976 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(e) (1994)). The amendment to Section 6 of the Exchange Act which prohibited fixed
commission rates became effective on June 4, 1975. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e). Commission Rule 19b-3
was rendered unnecessary by this amendment and was rescinded in 1988. Recission of Rules
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 26,180, 42 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 4 (Oct. 14, 1988), available at 1988 WL 240181 (S.E.C.).
118. Deregulation Release, supra note 117, at *4. Though the exchanges made some
modification to the fixed commission system over the years, these primarily allowed institutional
investors to negotiate effective reductions in their commission rates through arrangements
described as "byzantine." Fixed Commission Rates on Exchange Transactions, Exchange Act
Release No. 11,093, 5 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 439 (Nov. 8, 1974), available at 1974 WL 18573, at

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

little relief on commission rates until the passage of Rule 19b-3, which
effectively outlawed exchange rules that required members to charge
119
fixed commission rates.
The second major regulatory development of 1975, closely related to
the deregulation of commissions, was the development of rules
120
furthering a congressional desire for a national market system.
Congress introduced the overriding principles that are to govern the
national market system by adding Section 1lA of the Exchange Act,
which was included as a part of the 1975 amendments. The goals set
forth in Section 11A are:
1. Economically efficient execution of transactions;
2. Fair competition among broker-dealers, among exchanges, and
between exchanges and other markets;
3. Ready availability of quotation and transaction information to
broker-dealers and investors;
4. The ability of broker-dealers to execute orders in the best market;
and
5. An opportunity, consistent with the other goals,
for investors to
12 1
execute orders without the participation of a dealer.
While the deregulation of commissions had far-reaching effects, it
was fully implemented over a relatively short time period. The
development of the national market system, however, has not been fully
implemented over twenty-five years later, nor has anything close to a
consensus been reached on the form it should take. Since the adoption
of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, the United States
securities markets have moved slowly, and often reluctantly, towards a
national market system.
B. Transactionand Quotation Information
One of the fundamental features of a national market system is
transparency across markets, or the ability of investors to see the
transactions occurring and quotes being disseminated in several
different markets at the same time. To be most useful, the transaction
and quotation information from these markets must be consolidated into
a single stream of data that is transmitted to all market participants and
"1-2, *3 & n.18 (S.E.C.).
119. Deregulation Release, supra note 117.
120. Securities Industry Study, Report of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 92-1519, 141-42 (1972)
(defining future needs of the U.S. securities market).
121. National Market System for Securities, Securities Information Processors, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(i)-(v) (1994).
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investors. There are three primary facilities through which this
consolidation and transmission occurs: the Consolidated Tape
Association ("CTA") 122 and Consolidated Quotation System
("CQS"), 123 both of which apply to listed securities, and a single system
operated by Nasdaq (the "Nasdaq System"), which applies to Nasdaq
securities. 124 The CTA provides "last sale" information, or the price at
which the last transaction in a listed stock occurred on any market, and
122. The CTA was created pursuant to Rule 17a-15 under the Exchange Act, which was
adopted on November 8, 1972 and which essentially mandated that all transaction information for
exchange-listed securities be disseminated pursuant to a transaction reporting plan agreed upon
by the exchanges and the NASD and approved by the Commission. Collection and
Dissemination of Transaction Reports and Last Sale Data, Exchange Act Release No. 16,589, 19
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 616 (Feb. 19, 1980), available at 1980 WL 20773, at *1 n.9 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Transaction Reporting Releasel. The exchanges and the NASD submitted a
transaction reporting plan in March 1973 which provided for the creation of a "Consolidated Tape
Association" to administer the plan. Id. The Consolidated Tape Association is a committee made
up of one representative from each of the national exchanges and the NASD. Regulation of
Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42,208, 71 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 496 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at 1999 WL 1125142, at *6 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Market
Data Release]. The Commission approved the plan, which is known as the "Consolidated Tape
Association Plan," or "CTA Plan," on May 10, 1974. Id.; Notice of Commission Action
Declaring Effective a Consolidated Tape Plan Filed Pursuant to Rule 17a-15 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 10,787, 4 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 271 (May 10,
1974), available at 1974 WL 17538 (S.E.C.). The "consolidated tape" is a collection of the trade
information for listed stocks in all markets which is disseminated by a single processor designated
under the plan. Id. The term "Consolidated Tape Association," abbreviated "CTA," while the
name of the committee which administers the plan, is also used to refer to the system itself, as
distinguished from the written plan. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading
Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 39,884, 67 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2339 (Apr. 17, 1998),
available at 1998 WL 187835, at *34, *40, *55 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Reg. ATS Proposing
Release]. All national securities exchanges, along with the NASD, as the owner of Nasdaq, must
participate in the CTA Plan. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Aa3-l(b)(1) (2000); Transaction Reporting
Release, supra, at *1 n.9. The NASD's participation in the CTA Plan is required by virtue of the
trading of listed securities by Nasdaq market makers. Infra Part III.D (discussing trading of listed
securities on Nasdaq). In 1980, Rule 17a- 15 was redesignated as Rule II Aa3- 1. Transaction
Reporting Release, supra, at * 1.
123. Rule II Ac 1-1, which led to the creation of the Consolidated Quotation Plan, was passed
on January 26, 1978. Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,415,14 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 14 (Jan. 26, 1978), available at 1978 WL 20053, at
* I (S.E.C.). The Consolidated Quotation Plan is referred to most commonly as the "CQ Plan,"
but is also sometimes called the "CQS Plan." See Procedures and Requirements for National
Market System Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 16,410, 18 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1306 (Dec. 7,
1979), available at 1979 WL 17563, at *3 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter National Market System Plans];
Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *6; Reg. ATS Proposing Release, supra note 122, at *34
n.210. The term "CQS" is used more broadly to describe the system for consolidating quotes, as
opposed to the written plan. See Reg. ATS Proposing Release, supra note 122, at *34. The
original CQ Plan was filed on July 25, 1978. Procedures and Requirements for National Market
System Plans, supra, at *3. The plan was initially approved on July 28, 1978 on a temporary
basis. Id. The CQ Plan is administered by an operating committee which, while technically
separate than the CTA, is essentially the same. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *6 n. 17.
124. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *6.
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the CQS provides quotation information from all markets for listed
stocks. 12 5 The Nasdaq System provides last sale and quotation
1 26
information for Nasdaq stocks.
In 1981, the Commission introduced the concept of National Market
System ("NMS") securities by adopting Rule 11 Aa2- 1.127 The purpose
of this designation was to create an identifiable class of securities for
inclusion in the national market system and to specify the criteria for
their inclusion.' 28 At the time, the only features of the national market
system were the transaction and quotation reporting provisions of Rules
l lAa3-1 and 1 lAac-1.1 29 In addition to creating the NMS designation,
the Commission adopted an amendment to Rule 1 lAa3-1 that had the
effect of mandating transaction and quotation reporting for all NMS
securities. 130 The Commission decided that Rule 1lAa2-1 and the
amendment to Rule 1lAa3-1 would only apply to Nasdaq securities
because almost all exchange-listed securities were already part of the
CTA and CQS systems. 13 1 Rule 1 1Aa2-1 set forth "Tier I" and "Tier
II" criteria relating to the market price, volume of the security, and the
issuer's financial condition which were similar to the exchange listing
standards. 132 Nasdaq securities would be automatically designated as
NMS securities if they satisfied "Tier I" criteria and admitted upon
33
application of the issuer if they "substantially" met the Tier II criteria.'
125. U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, 51 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 1524 (July 14, 1992), available at 1992 WL 172794, at *7 (S.E.C.). While most
references to "CQS" in Commission releases are to the Consolidated Quotation System, the CQS
abbreviation is also used to refer to the "Consolidated Quotations Service," which is a Nasdaq
system. The Consolidated Quotation System is used by several markets, and is separate from the
Consolidated Quotations Service, which is an internal Nasdaq service. Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the
Obligations of CQS Market Makers to have Available Quotation Services that Provide Quotation
Information for CQS Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 37,663, 62 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
2178 (Sept. 10, 1996), available at 1996 WL 514973, at *1 n.2 (S.E.C.). The Consolidated
Quotations Service formerly disseminated quotes from both the exchanges and Nasdaq market
makers in connection with off-exchange trading of listed stocks, but now disseminates only the
market makers' quotation information. Id.
126. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *6.
127. Designation of National Market System Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 17,549, 22
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 22 (Feb. 17, 1981), available at 1981 WL 37744, at *1 (S.E.C.).
128. See id.
129. See id. at *3.
130. Id. at*l.
131. Id. at *4. In addition, the Commission was swayed by the arguments of some
commenters that applying an NMS designation to some exchange-listed securities would create
an unwarranted distinction between these securities and those without the designation. Id.
132. Id. at "16-18.
133. Id. In complying with the rule, the NASD designated numerous securities as
Nasdaq/NMS Securities, which created a distinct "National Market" segment of Nasdaq. Order
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In 1987, the Commission amended Rule 1 lAa2-1 to eliminate the
Tier I and II criteria and, instead, provide that exchange-traded or OTC
securities would be NMS securities if they were subject to a transaction
reporting plan approved by the Commission. 134 This amendment
allowed the NASD to determine which securities were NMS securities
by deciding which securities would be included in its transaction
reporting plan. However, the NASD's plan involved little substantive
change because the NASD adopted standards that incorporated the Tier
II criteria and added corporate governance requirements. 135 The real
effect of the rule was to simplify the process of designating NMS
Commission an overseer rather than a direct
securities by making the 36
participant in the process. 1
The Nasdaq System serves as the equivalent of both the CTA and the
CQS for Nasdaq securities and is also operated pursuant to Rules
llAcl-I and llAa3-1.1 37 Transaction and quotation information for
Nasdaq National Market System securities, which are eligible to trade
on exchanges, is administered under the NASD's rules as well as a plan
entered into between the NASD and three of the exchanges (the
"Nasdaq Plan"). 138 The Nasdaq System also includes transaction and
quotation information for Nasdaq SmallCap securities and other
specified OTC securities. 139 Information for these securities, which are
not traded on exchanges, is disseminated pursuant to the NASD's rules
40
only. 1
Approving Proposed Designation Plan for National Market System Securities and Notice of
Effectiveness of an Amendment to that Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 18,399, 24 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 509 (Jan. 7, 1982), available at 1982 WL 31910 (S.E.C.); History & Timeline,
supra note 31 (containing timeline showing Nasdaq's development from 1971 to 1998).
134. Designation of National Market System Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 24,635, 38
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 952 (June 23, 1987), available at 1987 WL 113117, at *1 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Designation of NMS Securities].
135. See id. at *1 n.5. Nasdaq SmallCap securities are not covered by the NASD's plan and
are therefore not considered NMS securities. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Market
2000 Report: Study I, Introduction and Historical Background, available at 1994 SEC LEXIS
132, at *44 n.77 (Jan. 1994). Nasdaq does, however, disseminate market information for these
securities. Id.
136. See Designation of NMS Securities, supra note 134, at *6 n.26.
137. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *5.
138. See id. The name of the plan is the "Joint Self-Regulatory Plan Governing the
Collection, Consolidation, and Dissemination of Quotation and Transaction Information for
Exchange-Listed Nasdaq/National Market System Securities and for Nasdaq National Market
System Securities Traded on an Unlisted Trading Privilege Basis." Id. This plan is part of a
broader arrangement under which Nasdaq stocks are traded on exchanges pursuant to "unlisted
trading privileges." Infra Part IV.E (describing unlisted trading privileges).
139. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *6.
140. Id.
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The actual dissemination of market information for listed stocks and
similar securities occurs through three systems, or "networks," which
are operated under the terms of the plans. 14 ' The CTA, CQS, and
Nasdaq Plans all provide for the collection of fees for the dissemination
of market data. 142 The plans have similar provisions governing the
receipt and allocation of revenues. 143 Under the plans, market data is
disseminated to vendors and subscribers. 144 Vendors enter into
contracts with the networks under which they pay access and
administrative fees for market data. 145 The subscribers, which are
typically broker-dealers or institutional investors, generally receive
market data from a vendor, which charges a subscriber fee that is passed
on to the network. 146 Each plan provides for the pooling of the revenues
for a particular network. 147 The direct expenses of the network are then
paid out of these revenues, and the remaining revenues are typically
distributed to the plan participants in proportion to their share of the
48
transaction volume for the network.1
C. "Off-Board" Trading Restrictions
One of the impediments to the development of a national market
system was the existence of off-board trading restrictions, which
prohibit exchange members from trading exchange-listed securities
away from the floor of an exchange. The most famous off-board
trading restriction was New York Stock Exchange Rule 394. With
some exceptions, NYSE Rule 394 prohibited NYSE members or
affiliates from effecting transactions in any NYSE-listed stocks, either
149
as principal or agent, in the OTC market.
NYSE Rule 394 survived for decades despite criticism concerning its
anti-competitive effect. 150 The SEC chipped away at the rule from 1975

141. Id. Network A includes information on common stocks, long-term warrants and
preferred stock listed or allowed to be traded on the NYSE. Id. Network B includes information
for common stock, long-term warrants, and preferred stock listed or allowed to be traded on
Amex or the regional exchanges, but not also traded on the NYSE or Nasdaq. Id. The Nasdaq
System has information for Nasdaq securities and some other OTC securities. Id. There is a
fourth network for transaction and quotation information on options. Id. at *6-7.
142. See id. at *8.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *8.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Concept Release, supra note 45, at *4.
150. See id. at *5. As early as 1975, Congress found that off-board trading rules were
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to 1980. In 1975, the SEC passed Rule 19c-1, which limited the scope
of off-board trading restrictions, and it amended the rule in 1977.15 1 As
amended, Rule 19c-1 effectively provided that the rules of national
securities exchanges must allow members to conduct over-the-counter
transactions in exchange-listed securities as an agent, as long as the
member is not acting as an agent for both sides of the trade.' 52 To
comply with Rule 19c-1 as originally adopted, the NYSE replaced Rule
394 with Rule 390, and it amended Rule 390 in 1978 in accordance with
the amendment to Rule 19c-1.153 Rule 19c-3, which was adopted in
1980, limited the reach of Rule 390 to stocks listed on the NYSE before
April 26, 1979.154 After the passage of Rule 19c-3, Rule 390 continued
to prohibit exchange members from engaging in off-board transactions
in stocks that were listed on the NYSE as of April 26, 1979, either as a
principal or as an agent for both sides of the transaction.
In February 2000, after increasing SEC pressure to eliminate the rule
altogether, the NYSE reluctantly sought SEC approval for the rescission
of Rule 390.155 The SEC received twelve comment letters on the
"unnecessary regulatory constraints."

S. REP. No. 94-75, at 20 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 198.
151. Adoption of Rule 19c-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Governing Off-Board
Trading by Members of National Securities Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, 8
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) (Dec. 19, 1975), available at 1975 WL 35469, at *1 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter
Rule 19c-1 Adopting Release]; Off-Board Agency Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,325, 13 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1289 (Dec. 30, 1977), available at 1977 WL 18372, at *1
(S.E.C.) [hereinafter Rule 19c-1 Amending Release].
152. Governing Certain Off-Board Agency Transactions by Members of National Securities
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-1 (2000); Rule 19c-1 Amending Release, supra note 151. Rule
19c-1 states that:
The rules of each national securities exchange shall provide as follows:
No rule, stated policy, or practice of this exchange shall prohibit or condition, or be
construed to prohibit or condition or otherwise limit, directly or indirectly, the ability
of any member acting as agent to effect any transaction otherwise than on this
exchange with another person (except when such member also is acting as agent for
such other person in such transaction), in any equity security listed on this exchange or
to which unlisted trading privileges on this exchange have been extended.
17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-1.
153. Under Rule 19c-1 as originally adopted, the exchanges were required to allow members
to transact off-board transactions only with "third market maker[s]" or nonmember "block
positioner[s]." Rule 19c-1 Adopting Release, supra note 151, at *1. Block positioners act as
principals for the purpose of allowing customers to buy or sell large blocks of stock at as
favorable a price as possible. See N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59, Rule 97.10, 2097.10. The
1978 amendment to the rule broadened the reach of the rule to eliminate prohibitions on all offboard agency transactions except those in which the exchange member acted as agent for both
sides of the trade. Rule 19c-1 Amending Release, supra note 151, at *2.
154. Governing Off-Board Trading by Members of National Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.19c-3 (2000); Concept Release, supra note 45, at *4.
155. Concept Release, supra note 45, at *4-5.
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rescission of Rule 390, none of which suggested that the rule be
retained. 156 The Commission approved the rescission of the rule on
May 5, 2000.157 On June 1, 2000, all remaining off-board trading
158
restrictions were rescinded.
D. The Third Market
A central feature of a national market system is competition between
markets. 159 Some competition between markets is provided by the
"third market," which is the trading of listed stocks in the OTC
market.' 6° Third market trading existed long before off-board trading
restrictions were relaxed because firms that were not exchange members
and, therefore, not subject to exchange rules, were free to trade listed
securities away from the exchanges. However, the third market was
historically limited because users needed to be able to quickly compare
third market prices with prices on the floor of the exchanges to ensure
that their orders were executed at the market price. 161 As a result,
access was limited almost exclusively to institutional investors, who
were the only investors with this communication capability. 162 The
loosening of the fixed commission rate structure and the ultimate
deregulation of commissions in 1975 actually caused third market
trading to decline because institutional investors, who had used the third
market to avoid the NYSE's fixed commission rates, had less reason to
trade away from the exchanges. 163 The adoption of Rule 19c-3 in 1980
did not, by itself, appreciably increase third market trading.' 64 By the
late 1980s, however, as improved linkages increased the transparency of
markets and high-speed communications allowed broker-dealers to
156. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,758, 72 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 889 (May 5, 2000), availableat 2000 WL 649013,
at *2 (S.E.C.).
157. Id. at*1.
158. See Concept Release, supra note 45, at *2 n.6; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
to Rescinded Rules 5 and 6, the Exchange's Off-Board Trading Rules, and to Make Conforming
Changes to Rules 25, 317, 900 and 959, Exchange Act Release No. 42,888, 72 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1352 (June 1,2000), availableat 2000 WL 719782.
159. See supra Part IV.A (describing congressionally-mandated goals for national market
system).
160. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Market 2000 Report: Study II, Structure of the
U.S. Equity Markets, available at 1994 SEC LEXIS 133, at *24 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Market
2000 Study II].
161. Hans R. Stoll, The Causes and Consequences of the Rise in Third Market and Regional
Trading, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 509, 510 (1994).
162. Id.
163. Id.; Market 2000 Study II, supra note 160, at *34-35.
164. Stoll, supra note 161, at 513.
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quickly compare prices between markets, third market volume began to
65
increase.'
E. Unlisted Trading Privileges
Unlisted Trading Privileges ("UTPs") allow exchanges to trade
securities that are not listed on the exchange, such as Nasdaq stocks or
stocks listed on another exchange. The Commission has had the
authority to grant UTPs since 1934.166 Once it received this authority,
the Commission freely granted UTPs, and exchanges frequently traded
stocks that were listed on another exchange. 167 In fact, most of the
stocks traded on the regional exchanges are listed on the NYSE or
Amex. 168 While the Commission had authority to grant UTPs in OTC
stocks as early as the 1936 amendments to the Exchange Act, this
authority was limited to stocks subject to disclosure requirements that
169
were "substantially equivalent" to those for listed companies.
However, OTC stocks were not subject to periodic reporting
requirements until 1964, and as a result from 1936 to 1964 the
Commission rarely granted UTPs for OTC stocks. 170 When the
Exchange Act was amended in 1964 to extend the periodic reporting
requirements to OTC stocks, Congress removed the Commission's
power to grant UTPs for OTC stocks. 7 ' This authority was reinstated
172
with the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act.
Even after receiving authority to grant UTPs to OTC stocks in 1975,
173
the Commission did not exercise this authority for several years.
Finally, in 1984, the Commission solicited comment on a proposal to
extend UTPs in OTC stocks to the exchanges. 174 On September 16,

165. Id.
166. Unlisted Trading Privileges in Over-the-Counter Securities, Exchange Act Release No.
21,498, 31 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 923 (Nov. 16, 1984), available at 1984 WL 52518, *2 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter UTP/OTC Release]. Section 12(f) of the Exchange Act, which governs UTPs, speaks
of UTPs being "extended" by exchanges "to" certain securities. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78(f), 12(f) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). However, because the SEC in
most cases must approve UTPs, Commission releases usually speak of the Commission's
"granting" of UTPs to exchanges "in" certain securities, and this is the terminology which will be
used here. See UTP/OTC Release, supra, at * 1.
167. UTP/OTC Release, supra note 166, at *1.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id. at *1.
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1985, the Commission announced a "policy" to extend UTPs to national
securities exchanges in certain OTC securities. 115 The Commission,
however, expressly conditioned the granting of UTPs on the approval of
a plan submitted by the exchanges and the NASD to consolidate
exchange and Nasdaq quotations for those OTC securities for which
UTPs were granted. 176 Finally, in June 1990, a joint industry plan was
agreed upon and approved by the Commission. 177 Under the joint
industry plan between the exchanges and the NASD, Nasdaq was
appointed the "Plan Processor." 178 The plan provided that the
exchanges would send quotation information and transaction reports to
Nasdaq for the securities for which UTPs were granted. 179 The plan did
not have an automatic execution feature but provided that each
exchange and Nasdaq market maker have access to the other's trading
80
post or desk by telephone. 1
F. Intermarket Trading System
The first facility that allowed orders to be executed between markets
was the InterMarket Trading System ("ITS").'
As originally formed,
ITS was designed to allow the participant exchanges to display
quotations for the same securities on the floors of different exchanges,
and allowed members of the various exchanges to quickly route orders

175. Unlisted Trading Privileges in Over-the-Counter Securities, Exchange Act Release No.
22,412, 33 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1435 (Sept. 16, 1985), available at 1985 WL 60222, at *1
(S.E.C.).
176. Id. The Commission stated that it expected the "plan to be submitted by December 1,
1985 and implemented by January 1, 1986." Id. The Commission envisioned a pilot program in
which UTPs were initially granted for up to twenty-five securities. Id. However, it was not until
April 1987 that UTPs were granted, and even then the privileges were granted to only one
exchange, the Midwest Stock Exchange, because the exchanges and the NASD could not agree
on a joint industry plan. Joint Industry Plan: Order Approving Proposed Reporting Plan for
Nasdaq/NMS Securities Traded on an Exchange on an Unlisted or Listed Basis, Submitted by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American, Boston, Midwest and
Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 28,146, 46 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 768
(June 26, 1990), available at 1990 WL 312325, at *2 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Joint Industry Plan
Release].
177. Joint Industry Plan Release, supra note 176, at *2.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *4.
181. The ITS originated as a pilot program operated by Amex, the Boston Stock Exchange,
the NYSE, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. In re American
Stock Exchange, Inc., Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Pacific
Stock Exchange, Inc., Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,661, 14
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 806 (Apr. 14, 1978), available at 1978 WL 20645, at *1 (S.E.C.). ITS was
initially operated under a joint plan filed by the participant exchanges with the Commission. Id.
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to other exchanges for execution. 182 Early in ITS' history, the
Commission encouraged the exchanges participating in ITS and the
NASD to develop a linkage between Nasdaq and ITS. 83
The
exchanges and the NASD were not quick to develop this linkage, and in
February 1981, the Commission proposed to issue an order requiring its
implementation. 184 The Commission issued this order on April 21,
1981, and in the release announcing the issuance of the order, noted its
annoyance with the failure of the exchanges and the NASD to develop
the linkage voluntarily.185 The linkage between Nasdaq and ITS, which
began on May 17, 1982, introduced a new feature to ITS because ITS
was linked with Nasdaq through Nasdaq's Computer Assisted
Execution System ("CAES"), which provided for automatic execution
of orders. 186 The ITS linkage between the exchanges did not provide
for automatic execution of orders.' 87 The linkage between Nasdaq and
ITS was initially limited to "Rule 19c-3" securities, 188 which were
securities which could not be subject to off-board trading restrictions of
any type. The linkage between ITS and Nasdaq was expanded to
include all listed securities on December 9, 1999.189
V.

ORDER EXECUTION

Any debate on market structure ultimately centers on whether
customer orders are receiving best execution. This section summarizes
broker-dealers' obligations in connection with execution of customer
182. Id. From the start, the Commission viewed ITS as a potential component of a national
market system. Id. at *2. At its inception, however, ITS did not include Nasdaq market makers
and did not allow for the automatic execution of orders. See id.
183. Intermarket Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 17,516, 21 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1519 (Feb. 6, 1981), available at 1981 WL 36427, at *3 (S.E.C.).
184. Id. at*1.
185. See id. at *5-6; Notice and Order Requiring Implementation of an Automated Interface,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,744, 22 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 845 (Apr. 21, 1981), available at
1981 WL 38002, at *6 n.44 [hereinafter Implementation of Automated Interface].
186. See Order Approving Intermarket Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 27
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 72 (Jan. 27, 1983), available at 1983 WL 35490, at *3 (S.E.C.); see also
infra Part VH.A.I (describing CAES system).
187. Implementation of Automated Interface, supra note 185, at*6 n.44.
188. Proposed Rulemaking Pursuant to Section IA of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
Amend the Intermarket Trading System ("ITS") Plan to Expand the ITS/Computer Assisted
Execution System Linkage to All Listed Securities and to Eliminate the Unanimous Vote
Provision, Exchange Act Release No. 40,260 (July 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 413812, at
*4 (S.E.C.).
189. Adoption of Amendments to the Intermarket Trading System Plan to Expand the
ITS/Computer Assisted Execution System Linkage to All Listed Securities, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,212, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 547 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at 1999 WL 1128797
(S.E.C.).
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orders, beginning with the general duty of best execution and continuing
with a discussion of additional requirements which have been imposed
by NASD and SEC decisions and rules.
A. Best Execution
A broker-dealer that receives a customer order has a duty of best
execution. This duty springs from both common-law agency principles
and from the "shingle theory," under which a broker-dealer assumes a
special duty to its customers when it "hangs out its shingle" and offers
to deal with the public. 19° A violation of the duty of best execution is
considered a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. 19 1 While investors frequently associate best execution
with obtaining the highest price for a sell order or the lowest price for a
buy order, the duty encompasses other aspects
of order handling, such
92
1
well.
as
execution,
of
certainty
as speed and
B. TradingAhead of Limit Orders
Broker-dealers act as agents when a customer transmits an order to
them for execution. They may also act as principals trading for their
own account, either because they are making a market in a Nasdaq
security or simply because they are seeking to profit from proprietary
190. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cit. 1943); Execution
Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *5. The duty under the shingle theory is similar
to, but not identical to, a fiduciary duty. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1271-73 (1995); David C. Sienko, The Aftermath of Derivatives
Losses: Can Sophisticated Investors Invoke the Suitability Doctrine Against Dealers Under
Current Law?, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 105, 121-22 (1995). Unlike investment advisers, who are
always considered fiduciaries with respect to their clients, a broker-dealer may be found to have a
fiduciary relationship with some customers but not others. See Karmel, supra, at 1273; Sienko,
supra, at 121-22; THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT
ADVISORS § 2.02[5] (2000 ed.); see also In re E.F. Hutton and Company Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 25,887, 49 S.E.C. 829 (July 6, 1988), available at 1988 WL 239506, at *11-14
(dissent of Commissioner Fleischman) (noting that the Commission has historically found that
whether a broker-dealer has a fiduciary duty to a customer depends on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the broker-dealer's relationship with that customer) [hereinafter E.F.
Hutton Release]. While the viability of the shingle theory has been questioned, the SEC
continues to espouse it, and it has not been repudiated by the courts. See Karmel, supra, at 1279;
In re BT Alex. Brown Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 42,145, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 114
(Nov. 17, 1999), available at 1999 WL 1038063, at *8 (S.E.C.). The duty under the shingle
theory is a higher duty than would exist between parties to the average commercial transaction.
See Karmel, supra at 1273-74. A violation of a broker-dealer's duty under the shingle theory is
considered a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See Disclosure
of Order Routing Release, supra, at *5.
191. Execution Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *5; see also Charles Hughes
& Co., 139 F.2d at 436.
192. Execution Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *9.
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trades. A practice that may occur as a result of broker-dealers acting as
both agents and principals is "trading ahead" of customer limit orders.
A NASD disciplinary action against E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc. in
1988, in which the NASD interpreted its rules to prohibit trading ahead
193
of customer limit orders, was the first step in limiting this practice.
Though in the E.F. Hutton proceeding the NASD argued successfully
that the interpretation of its rules of fair practice prohibiting trading
ahead of customer limit orders did not require compliance with the
rulemaking procedures, in May 1989 it nonetheless proposed a new rule
interpretation to clarify its position on the issue. 194 This interpretation

193. E.F. Hutton Release, supra note 190, at *1. The action arose out of a limit order placed
by William Manning, a customer of E.F. Hutton, in January 1984. Id. Manning placed a limit
order to sell 5,000 shares of Genex Corporation at 17 / at a time when the inside quotation for
Genex was 17 bid, 171/8 offer. Id. E.F. Hutton sold 4,755 shares of Genex from its own inventory
at 174 and 171/2 and, because the price of Genex subsequently declined, never filled Manning's
order. Id. Manning instituted a disciplinary heaing against Hutton. At the time of the Manning
case the NASD's rules allowed a customer of a NASD firm to bring a disciplinary action against
the firm. See id. at *1 n.l. The rules were later amended to eliminate this procedure. In re
Russell A. Simpson for Review of Action taken by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 40,690, 68 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1752 (Nov. 19, 1998),
available at 1998 WL 801399, at *1 (S.E.C.).
After a hearing, the NASD found that Hutton violated Article III, Section 1 of the NASD's
Rules of Fair Practice, which required NASD members to "observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade." E.F. Hutton Release, supra note 190, at *1;
Article III, Section 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice has since been redesignated as Rule 2110 of the
NASD's Conduct Rules. See NASD Manual, supra note 33, Rule 2110, at 4111. The only
sanction imposed against Hutton by the NASD was a letter of caution. E.F. Hutton Release,
supra note 190, at *1.
Hutton appealed the NASD's decision to the SEC, arguing that it had no obligation to execute
Manning's limit order. Id. at *1-2. The Commission found, however, that Hutton assumed a
fiduciary obligation to Manning by agreeing to act as his agent with regard to the limit order, and
therefore had an obligation not to give its own trade priority over Manning's order. Id. at *2-3.
The Commission also found that Hutton could have avoided this obligation by disclosing to
Manning that it intended to give its own proprietary position priority over his orders. Id. at *3.
However, no such disclosure had been made. Id. Hutton, backed by the Securities Industry
Association, which was allowed to express its views on appeal, argued that the NASD was
adopting a new interpretation of its rules, which could only be accomplished by rulemaking. Id.
at *4. The Commission, in sustaining the NASD decision, rejected this argument on the grounds
that the interpretation at issue was supported by "long-standing principles and prior decisions of
the courts" and the Commission. Id.
194. Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to
Members Handling of Customer Limit Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 26,824, 43 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 1382 (May 15, 1989), available at 1989 WL 257217, at *1 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter
May 1989 Proposal]. While the NASD has the authority to interpret its rules, subject to SEC
review, it has codified a large number of rule interpretations as "Interpretative Material,"
designated with a "IM" followed by a number. The Interpretative Material is generally
considered part of the rules, and when the NASD issues new Interpretative Material it seeks
Commission approval as it would for a change to the rules themselves. See id. at *2; see also
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
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would not have prohibited trading ahead of limit orders. Instead, under
the interpretation, an NASD member would not be deemed to have
violated the NASD rules of fair practice if it provided a statement to
customers describing the circumstances in which the firm accepted limit
orders and the policies and procedures followed in handling those
orders. 195 This proposal, however, never became final. The NASD
continued to study the issue, and in July 1993 the NASD decided that
trading ahead of customer limit orders should not be allowed even if
disclosed to customers. 196 Accordingly, the NASD withdrew the
proposed rule interpretation and filed a new proposed interpretation
under which market makers would be prohibited from trading ahead of
97
customer limit orders of their own customers. 1
The interpretation proposed by the NASD in July 1993 contained a
"Terms and Conditions" exception under which a broker-dealer could
negotiate the terms and conditions under which limit orders placed by
institutional accounts for 10,000 shares or more and valued at least
$100,000 would be executed. 198 In a release known as "Manning I," the
SEC approved the proposed interpretation in June 1994.199 In the
adopting release, however, the Commission stated that it believed that
the ban on trading ahead of limit orders should apply not only to orders
of a broker-dealer's own customers, but also to orders2 of customers of
other firms that are sent to a broker-dealer for handling. 00
After "Manning I," the NASD appointed a task force to further study
the practice of trading ahead of limit orders. 20 1 The task force
Relating to the Definition of "Public Offering" for Purposes of Nasdaq's Shareholder Approval
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 43,420, 73 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1192 (Oct. 6, 2000), available
at 2000 WL 1482926, at *3 (S.E.C.).
195. May 1989 Proposal, supra note 194, at *1.
196. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Relating to Handling of Customer Limit Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 34,279, 57
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 50 (June 29, 1994), available at 1994 WL 317387, at *1-2 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Handling of Customer Limit Orders].
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id. at *4; see also Notice of Filing of Amendment No. I to Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Limit Order Protection for Memberto-Member Limit Order Handling on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No. 35,391, 58 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 2167 (Feb. 16, 1995), available at 1995 WL 71417, at *1 (S.E.C.); NASD
Manual, supra note 33, at 4120. "Institutional Accounts" are defined in Rule 3110(c)(4) of the
NASD's Rules of Conduct, which was formerly designated as Article III, Section 21(c)(4) of its
Rules of Practice, to include banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, registered
investment companies, registered investment advisers, and any person or institution with total
assets of $50 million. Id. at 4891-92.
199. Handling of Customer Limit Orders, supra note 196, at *1.
200. Id. at *4.
201. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers,
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recommended that the ban on trading ahead of limit orders of customers
of other broker-dealers apply only if the trade occurred at a price better
than the limit order price. 20 2 The NASD proposed for member
comment an interpretation of its Rules of Fair Practice, under which a
market maker would not be allowed to trade ahead of a customer limit
order at a price equal to or better than the limit order price if the order
was for 1,000 shares or less, and at a price better than the limit order if
20 3
the order was for more than 1,000 shares.
Not satisfied with this compromise, the SEC proposed a rule of its
own which would prohibit broker-dealers from trading ahead of orders
of customers of other firms regardless of the size of the order. 204 The
NASD sensed the futility of seeking approval of its proposal, and the
rule change actually filed by the NASD, in November 1994, proposed to
limit the trading ahead of limit orders placed by customers of another
broker-dealer, without differing obligations based on the size of the
20 5
order.
The NASD's November 1994 filing also proposed to amend the
interpretation of the Rules of Fair Practice to limit the "Terms and
Conditions" exception to limit orders from institutional accounts,
whether from the broker-dealer's own customers or customers of
another firm, regardless of order size, and limit orders from noninstitutional accounts if the order is for 10,000 or more shares and has a
value of at least $100,000.206 The Commission approved the proposed
changes in May 1995, in a release known as "Manning 11.,,207 In
approving the change, the SEC noted that market makers are not
required to accept limit orders and are still permitted under NASD rules
to charge commissions for handling limit orders, as long as the
20 8
commission charges are fully disclosed to customers.

Inc. Relating to Limit Order Protection on Nasdaq, Exchange Act Release No. 35,751, 59 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 867 (May 22, 1995), available at 1995 WL 325939, at *2 (S.E.C.).
202. Id.
203. Id. For example, under this proposal, if a customer placed a buy order for 500 shares
with a limit price of 20, the broker-dealer could not purchase shares for its own account at a price
of 20 or lower without executing the customer's order. If the customer placed an order for 1500
shares at the same price, the broker-dealer could purchase the stock for its own account at 20
without executing the customer's order, but not at a lower price.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *3.
206. Id.
207. See id. at *12.
208. Id. at *10-12.
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C. Firm Quotes and OrderHandling
Since 1975, the Commission has made several revisions to its
regulations designed to improve order execution. Two of the major
regulatory revisions are discussed in this subsection. The first, the
adoption of the "Firm Quote Rule," was designed to allow investors to
be able to rely on quotations disseminated by market participants. The
second, the adoption of the Order Handling Rules, was intended to
ensure that all investors had access to the best national quotations for a
security.
1. The Firm Quote Rule
Before 1978, quotes disseminated on Nasdaq did not include "size"
or the number of shares to which the quote applied. In addition, quotes
disseminated by market makers on Nasdaq and by specialists on
exchanges were not required to be "firm," i.e., to obligate the market
maker or specialist to execute a transaction at the quoted price. In 1978,
the Commission remedied these perceived deficiencies by adopting
Rule 11 Ac l-1, the "Firm Quote Rule," which requires exchanges and
registered securities associations to establish procedures for collecting
quotations, including size, from broker-dealers and for making the
quotes available to quotation vendors. 209 The rule also requires brokerdealers who maintain quotes for a security to promptly disseminate the
quotes to the exchange or to Nasdaq and to honor the quotes by
executing transactions at the quoted prices and sizes. 210 The rule has
several minor exceptions that are generally designed to protect brokerdealers in the process of revising quotes and to prevent dual liability.2 1'
As originally adopted, Rule I IAc 1-1 required, for all securities, any
broker-dealer disseminating quotations to maintain such quotations
continuously during the trading day. 212 However, the Commission
found that this requirement imposed burdens on broker-dealers that

209. Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 14,415,
14 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 14 (Jan. 26, 1978), availableat 1978 WL 20053, at *17 (S.E.C.).
210. Id.at*18.
211. Rule 11Acl-I contains an exception to the firm quote requirement for situations in which
a broker-dealer communicates a revised quote before being presented with an order for execution
against the original quote. Id. at *6. In addition, broker-dealers are excepted from the firm quote
obligation with regard to any orders which are in the process of being executed when a second
order is received, but only to the extent the order in process is executed against the full size of the
quote. Id. For example, if a broker-dealer is quoting a bid price of $60 with a size of 500, and is
in the process of executing an order to ptyrchase 200 shares, it still must fill a second order of 300
shares unless it revises its quote before the second order is received.
212. Id. at *6-9.
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exceeded the benefits of the rule. 2 13 Accordingly, the Commission
eliminated these "mandatory quote" provisions for some securities. It
maintained them for the principal market for a security and for "Rule
19c-3 securities," i.e., securities that were not subject to exchange "offboard trading restrictions" prohibiting trading of exchange-listed
securities away from the floor of an exchange. 2 14 Rule 19c-3 securities,
securities which could be traded away
therefore, were exchange-listed
2 15
from the floor of an exchange.
2. Order Handling Rules
In September 1996, the Commission made major revisions to its rules
governing order display and execution by adopting the "Order Handling
Rules." 2 16 The Order Handling Rules were designed to improve the
transparency of markets, but also were prompted in large part by
concerns that the development of ECNs would lead to market
"fragmentation," that is, the dispersal of order executions among too
many different market centers.217 The Order Handling Rules actually
included, in addition to the adoption of a new rule, an amendment to the
Firm Quote Rule. 218 The perceived barrier to market transparency
addressed by the rules was the failure of market makers to routinely
display customer limit orders in their quotations.219 With the Order
Handling Release, the SEC adopted Rule 1 1Acl-4 (the "Display Rule"),
which requires market makers and specialists to display customer limit
at a price
orders, including their full size, when the orders are placed
220
quote.
public
specialist's
or
maker's
better than the market

213. Amendment of Quotation Dissemination Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 18,482, 24
S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 876 (Feb. 11, 1982), available at 1982 WL 35870, at *5 (S.E.C.).
214. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (2001). Rule 19c-3 did not apply to securities that were listed
on an exchange before April 26, 1979. Supra Part IV.C (discussing restrictions on "off-board"
trading).
215. These securities, because they satisfy exchange listing requirements, tend to be larger
companies in which the trading is more active than is trading in securities traded exclusively
over-the-counter.
216. See Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *2.
217. Id. at *5.
218. Id. at*2.
219. While the Manning releases prohibited broker-dealers from trading ahead of customer
limit orders, they did not require these orders to be displayed. Supra Part V.B. (discussing
prohibitions on trading ahead of customer limit orders). As a result, a customer who placed an
order with a broker-dealer could still, on some markets, see his or her order remain unexecuted
while an order was executed at an inferior price on the same market. See id.
220. Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *2. The Display Rule applies only to
"covered securities," which are Nasdaq or exchange-listed securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-4
(2001). The Commission believed that the amendment would improve the public markets by:

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

221
Specialists maintain only a single bid and single offer quotation.
Similarly, the current Nasdaq system only allows market makers to
enter a single bid or offer quotation into the system at any given point in
time. 222 Accordingly, as a practical matter, market makers or specialists
comply with the Display Rule by changing their own quote. 223 Since
implementation of the Order Handling Rules, quotations of market
makers and specialists may reflect the participant's own trading interest,
limit orders placed with the participant, or both.2 24 Under the Display
Rule, a broker-dealer that does not want to amend its quote upon receipt
of a customer limit order has two basic alternatives. One is to execute
the order. 225 The other alternative is to send the order to Nasdaq, an
exchange, an ECN, or a market maker that complies with the Display
6

Rule.

22

The fragmentation issue addressed in the Order Handling Rules gave
rise to the ECN's creation of a number of "hidden markets," where
broker-dealers could quote prices different from those quoted to retail
customers. 227 With the Order Handling Release, the Commission
adopted two amendments to Rule 1 lAcl-1, the Firm Quote Rule, to

. increasing quote competition and price discovery, by introducing more orders into
the market, which would potentially cause market makers to improve their quotes;
* narrowing quotation spreads; and
* for orders which are automatically executed at the best displayed quotes, improving
executions.
Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *6.
221. See N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59, Rule 79A.12, 1 2079A.15, Rule 104.10(4),
2104.10(4).
222. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 36, at *7.
223. Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *10; 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-4(b). For
example, if a market maker is quoting Cisco at 30 - 302 (1000 x 1000) and receives a customer
limit order to purchase 500 shares at 303/8 or better, the market maker must increase its quote to
303A - 302 (500 x 1000). Where a quotation is presented in the formats B - 0 (bs x os), B is the
quoted bid, 0 is the quoted offer, bs is the bid size, and os is the offer size. If a customer limit
order is placed at the market maker's or specialist's quote and this quote is at the NBBO, the
market maker or specialist must increase the size of his quote, unless the size of the limit order is
"de minimis." See Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *10; 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-4(b).
The size of a limit order will be considered de minimis if it is less than or equal to 10% of the size
being displayed by the market maker. Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *20. "NBBO"
means the national best bid or offer for a particular stock, when quotes from all market
participants are considered. See Concept Release, supra note 45, at *12, *14. If the above
market maker was quoting a bid for Cisco at 30
- 302 (1000 x 1000), and this quote
represented the NBBO, if the market maker received a limit order to buy 500 shares at 30 or
better it would be required to change its quote to 30 - 302 (1500 x 1000).
224. Id.
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-4(b).
226. Id.
227. See Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *26.
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The first, known as the "ECN
address fragmentation concerns.
Amendment," requires specialists and market makers who place orders
with an ECN at a price better than the firm's public quotation to make
the price publicly available. 228 However, the ECN Amendment
included the "ECN Display Alternative," under which the market maker
or specialist's obligation to make the price publicly available will be
deemed satisfied if the ECN, with which the order is placed, publicly
disseminates its prices and allows broker-dealers to execute against its
229
orders.
The second amendment to the Firm Quote Rule extended the
mandatory quote provisions beyond securities traded on their principal
market and 19c-3 securities. As a result of the amendment, the
mandatory quote provisions now apply to market makers or exchanges
that are responsible for one percent or more of the volume of non-19c-3
securities. 230 The Commission found that the growth in trading in non19c-3 securities had significantly reduced transparency for these
securities, and that disparate treatment of 19c-3 and non-19c-3
securities was no longer justified. 23 1 The one percent threshold was
intended to prevent broker-dealers who did not actively trade a security
from being subject to the cost burden of maintaining continuous
232
quotations.
VI. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND REGULATION ATS

By 1998, alternative trading systems, primarily ECNs, accounted for
more than twenty percent of orders for Nasdaq securities and almost
four percent of orders for exchange-listed securities. 233 As a result of
the increased volume of trading occurring on ECNs, the Commission
worried that these "private markets" were transforming the U.S.
securities markets in a manner inconsistent with the goals announced by
Congress in the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act. This situation
arose largely from the fact that the ECNs, which resembled exchanges,
were nonetheless regulated as broker-dealers.

228. Id. at *2; Rule I lAcl-, as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Ac-l.
229. Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *2.
230. Id. at *42.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *43.
233. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
40,760, 68 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2045 (Dec. 8, 1998), available at 1998 WL 849548, at *2
(S.E.C.) [hereinafter Reg. ATS Adopting Release].
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The Commission's primary concern about ECNs appears to have
been the ECNs' effect on the ability of public investors to receive best
execution of their orders. The simplest example of this effect was the
ability of market markers to quote prices on ECNs which were more
234
favorable than those available on Nasdaq or a national exchange.
The Commission was also concerned that ECNs were not subject to
adequate surveillance for market manipulation and fraud, and that ECNs
were not required to ensure that they had adequate systems to
accommodate large increases in volume. 235 The adoption of Regulation
ATS and related amendments to SEC Rules was intended to address
these concerns.
A. Definition of Exchange
At the same time it adopted Regulation ATS, the Commission
adopted Rule 3b-16 to clarify the definition of an "exchange." 236 The
adoption of Rule 3b-16 served the dual purposes of clarifying the
applicability of the definition of an "exchange" to electronic trading
systems and granting the Commission authority to exempt systems from
the definition. 237 Rule 3b-16 provides guidance on the types of entities
that will and will not be deemed to meet the definition of an exchange.
Generally, an entity will be considered an exchange if it brings together
buyers and sellers and establishes fixed rules for executing their

234. See id. at *2. As a result, an investor who placed a limit order to sell Cisco at 301/4 might
find his or her order executed at the limit price on Nasdaq while, unbeknownst to the investor, a
market maker was bidding 303/8
on an ECN.
235. Id.
236. Whether automated trading systems met the relatively broad definition of "exchange"
under Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act was an issue from their inception. When Instinet was
first being developed, the Commission recognized the definitional question and proposed Rule
15c2-10, which would have imposed certain filing requirements on such systems but which
would not have required registration as an exchange. Proposal to Adopt Rule 15c2-10, Exchange
Act Release No. 8,661 (Aug. 4, 1969), available at 1969 WL 19502, at *3 (S.E.C.). The
proposed rule would have required any broker-dealer operating an automated trading system to
file a plan with the Commission describing the system's rules of operations, technology and
record-keeping. Id. at *3-4. Rule 15c2-10 was never adopted and trading systems operated for
many years under formal or informal no-action positions taken by the Commission's Division of
Market Regulation. See, e.g., Instinet Corporation, SEC No-Action letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,997 (Sept. 8, 1986), available at 1986 WL 67657 (S.E.C.); POSIT, SEC No-Action
letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (July 28, 1997), available at 1987 WL 108131 (S.E.C.). In its
responses to the requests for no-action submitted by these systems, the Commission's Market
Regulation staff, as a condition to its grant of no action relief, typically required the systems to
provide data on a quarterly basis regarding their subscribers, denials of applications for
participation in the system, subscriber defaults, trading volume, and other items. See Instinet
Corporation, supra, 1986 WL 67657, at *37; POSIT, supra, 1987 WL 108131, at *8.
237. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *5.
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orders. 238 An entity will generally not be considered an exchange if it
routes orders to a 239
market for execution or operates a "crossing" or
"matching" system.
B. Exemption from the Definition of Exchange
With Regulation ATS, the Commission sought to impose new
regulations on electronic trading systems without subjecting them to the
rigors of registration as an exchange. It accomplished this goal by
adopting Rule 3al-1, which exempts from the definition of exchange
those systems that comply with Regulation ATS and do not exercise
self-regulatory responsibilities. 24 Subject to volume limitations, the
rule exempts a system from the definition of an exchange if it is
238. Under Rule 3b-16, an entity is considered an exchange if it:
(1) Brings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and
(2) Uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading
facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact with each other, and the
buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a)(1)-(2) (2000). "Non-discretionary methods" are procedures or rules
which govern order execution and from which there is generally no deviation. See Reg. ATS
Adopting Release, supra note 233, at * 11. For example, exchange rules that establish a priority
for the execution of orders in terms of price, time, or some other criteria are non-discretionary
methods. The purpose of making the institution of non-discretionary trading methods one of the
elements of the definition of an exchange was to exclude routine functions of broker-dealers from
the definition. See id. One such function is the operation of a block trading desk, in which
employees of the broker-dealer execute large customer orders but retain discretion in determining
how to fill the orders. See id.
239. Under Rule 3b-16, an entity can engage in any or all of the following activities without
being considered an exchange:
(1) Rout[ing] orders to a national securities exchange, a market operated by a
national securities association, or a broker-dealer for execution; or
(2) Allow[ing] persons to enter orders for execution against the bids and offers of a
single dealer; and
(i) As an incidental part of these activities, match[ing] orders that are not
displayed to any person other than the dealer and its employees; or
(ii) In the course of acting as a market maker registered with a self-regulatory
organization, display[ing] the limit orders of such market maker's, or other
broker-dealer's, customers; and
(A) Match[ing] customer orders with such displayed limit orders; and
(B) As an incidental part of its market making activities, cross[ing] or
match[ing] orders that are not displayed to any person other than the market
maker and its employees.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(b)(l)-(2)(ii)(B). A crossing system generally allows subscribers to enter
orders without designating a price, then "crosses" those orders at specified times using a price
obtained from another market. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *8 n.37.
Matching systems allow subscribers to enter priced limit orders, then matches buy and sell orders
which have the same limit price. Id. at *8 n.38.
240. See Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *822; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3all(a).
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operated by a national securities association, is in compliance with
Regulation ATS, or is exempt from Regulation ATS. 24 1
A trading system will no longer be entitled to an exemption from the
definition of an exchange if the system exceeds certain volume levels
and the Commission determines, after giving the system notice and an
242
opportunity to respond, that an exemption is not appropriate.
C. RegulationATS
The essential purpose of Regulation ATS 243 is to allow developing
systems with low volume to operate with minimal regulatory burdens
and to require systems with larger volume to comply with more
extensive regulation of their quotation dissemination and 244
access
standards, depending on the significance of their market presence.
1. Definitions and Exemptions
An "alternative trading system" is generally any organization or
system that meets the definition of an exchange but does not set rules
governing subscribers' conduct, other than trading conduct, and does
not discipline subscribers other than by prohibiting them from trading
on the system. 245 Rule 301 provides an exemption from Regulation
241. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al-l(a)(1)-(3).
242. The volume levels are as follows:
1. Fifty percent of the average daily trading volume in any single security and five
percent of the average daily trading volume for any class of security, such as equity
securities, listed options, or investment-grade debt; or
2. Forty percent of the average daily trading volume for any class of security. If a
system exceeds these levels for three out of four calendar quarters, the Commission
may, but will not automatically, seek to revoke the exemption.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al-l(b)(1)(i), (ii).
243. Regulation ATS consists of Rules 300 through 303.
244. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *5-6.
245. The term "alternative trading system" is defined in Rule 300(a) of Regulation ATS as:
any organization, association, person, group or persons, or system:
(1) That constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place of facilities for bringing
together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange within the meaning
of [Rule 3b-16]; and
(2) That does not:
(i) Set rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such
subscribers' trading on such organization, association, person, group of persons,
or system; or
(ii) Discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.
17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(1), (2)(i)-(ii). The definition excludes systems from the definition if they
perform self-regulatory functions because the Commission believes that any system exercising
any significant self-regulatory authority should be registered as an SRO. Reg. ATS Adopting
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ATS for some entities that are subject to a separate regulatory scheme,
either under the Exchange Act or banking laws, or which have been
granted an exemption from registration as an exchange based on limited
trading volume. 246 The Commission also has the ability to exempt a
trading system from some or all of the requirements of Regulation
ATS.2 47
2. Broker-Dealer Registration and Filings
Trading systems subject to Regulation ATS must register as brokerdealers. 248 In addition, they are required to file an initial operation
report, on Form ATS, at least twenty days before beginning operations
as a trading system. 249 The initial operation report is simply a notice
filing; no Commission approval is required. 250 A trading system must
amend its Form ATS if it proposes a material change to its operations, if
it learns the form was inaccurate when filed, or if the form was accurate
when filed but later becomes inaccurate.2 5 1 A trading system must also
file a "cessation of operations" report if it ceases to operate as an
alternative trading system. 252 Filings under Regulation ATS are treated
like other reports filed under the Exchange Act for purposes of liability
for false or misleading statements, but the filings are confidential.2 5 3
3. Display and Execution of Orders
The applicability of the provisions of Regulation ATS that govern the
public display and execution of orders by an alternative trading system
is controlled by the volume in a particular security, not the total volume
of the system. As a result, a trading system could be subject to the
requirements of Regulation ATS for some securities but not others. The
public display and execution provisions apply only to "covered
securities," which are exchange-listed or Nasdaq securities.25 4 For any
Release, supra note 233, at *26-27.
246. Rule 301 provides that a system does not have to comply with Regulation ATS if it is:
1. registered as a national securities exchange; 2. exempted by the Commission from registration
as an exchange based on limited trading volume; 3. operated by a national securities association;
or 4. registered as a broker-dealer, or is a bank, and limits the securities it deals in to specified
government securities and commercial paper. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(a)(l)-(4)(ii).
247. Id. § 242.301(a)(5).
248. Id. § 242.301(b)(1).
249. Id. § 242.301(b)(2).
250. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *34.
251. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(2)(ii), (iii), (iv).
252. Id. § 242.301(b)(2)(v).
253. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(a), 78r(a), 78ff(a) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(2)(vi), (vii).
254. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3); Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *37.
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securities for which the trading system displays orders, either to
subscribers or third parties, and had trading volume during four of the
previous six months of at least five percent of the total average daily
volume of the security, the system must supply the best prices to a
255
national securities exchange, or to Nasdaq, for public dissemination.
In addition, under Rule 301(b)(3) the system must provide registered
256
broker-dealers with an ability to execute against such orders.
4. Fair Access and Fees
A major issue surrounding alternative trading systems is their ability
to charge fees to non-subscribers. Alternative trading systems such as
257
ECNs generate revenue by charging access fees to their subscribers.
However, because Regulation ATS requires alternative trading systems,
in many cases, to make their orders available to broker-dealers that do
not subscribe to the system, Regulation ATS had to address the ability
of ECNs to charge fees to these non-subscribers. Rule 301(b)(4)
provides only that an alternative trading system may not charge a fee
that is "inconsistent with [the] equivalent access to the system" required
by Rule 301(b)(3).2 5 8 While the language of the rule is somewhat
vague, the Commission, in the adopting release, stated that any fees
charged by these systems should be similar to communications or
259
access fees charged by other markets.
A trading system subject to Regulation ATS must establish written
standards for granting access to its system, may not apply the standards
in a discriminatory or unfair manner, and must keep records and make
reports of access grants and denials for any security in which it has
twenty percent or more of the average daily volume. 260 Like the public
display and order execution provisions, the fair access provisions are
applied on a security-by-security basis, so that a trading system can
261
arbitrarily exclude access to trades in some securities but not others.
In adopting the fair access requirements, the Commission created an
exclusion from these requirements for systems which match customer
orders, without displaying them, at a price on or derived from an
262
automated quotation system or transaction reporting plan.
255. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3).
256. Id.
257. See supra Part II.D (discussing ECNs).
258. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(4).
259. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *46.
260. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5).
261. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *50.
262. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5)(iii)(A)-(C). For example, some systems match orders prior to
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5. System Capacity, Integrity, and Security

Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS establishes system capacity,
integrity, and security requirements for alternative trading systems that
meet certain volume thresholds. Like the fair access, public display and
order execution standards, the system capacity, integrity and security
requirements are applied on a security-by-security basis, although the
Commission recognized that, as a practical matter, if the requirements
apply to one security, the entire trading system would have to satisfy the
requirements. 263 The system capacity, integrity, and security provisions
contain an exclusion identical to that applicable to the fair access
264
standards for systems that match orders.
6. Record Keeping
Trading systems subject to Regulation ATS must satisfy extensive
record keeping requirements. 265 Trading systems subject to Regulation
the market opening and execute them at the opening price, or match unpriced orders at the bid
and offer. These systems are not subject to the fair access requirements. Reg. ATS Adopting
Release, supra note 233, at *50.
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(6); Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *50. The
volume threshold under Rule 301(b)(6) is twenty percent of the average daily volume for a
security in four of the preceding six months. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(6). Once the threshold is
satisfied, for systems that support order entry, order routing, order execution, transaction
reporting and trade comparison, the system must:
" establish reasonable capacity estimates;
" conduct capacity stress tests of critical systems;
" institute procedures to review its system development and testing methodology;
* review the vulnerability of its systems to hackers, physical hazards and natural
disasters;
" establish adequate contingency and disaster recovery plans;
" have an independent review performed of the system's controls, and have senior
management of the system review the report; and
. notify the SEC promptly of significant system outages and changes.
Id. § 242.301(b)(6)(ii).
264. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(6)(iii).
265. Rule 302 of Regulation ATS requires that the following records be kept:
1. A record of subscribers to the system;
2. Daily summaries of trading which include:
a. securities traded;
b. transaction volume for securities including number of trades, number of
shares traded, and dollar volume;
c. transaction volume for debt securities including number of trades and dollar
value;
3. Time-sequenced records of order information which include:
a. the date and time, to the second, that orders are received;
b. the identity of the security;
c. the number of shares or the principal amount of bonds;
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ATS must preserve certain records for at least three years, the first two
years in an "easily accessible place." 266 In addition to the records
required by Rule 302, some records that are not required must
nonetheless be retained for three years if created.2 67
For the entire period of its existence, a trading system must retain
copies of its organizational documents, such as articles of incorporation
and copies of reports filed with the Commission. 26 8 Records required
under Regulation ATS, like most records required to be kept by brokerdealers, can be kept electronically, and trading systems can use a third
party to maintain these records if certain procedures are followed.26 9
Any records kept under Regulation ATS are subject to examination by
270
the Commission.
Systems subject to Regulation ATS must also file quarterly reports on
Form ATS-R. 27 1 The reporting requirements of Form ATS-R are not
onerous. The form essentially requires the system to include the
volume of trading in each class of security traded on the system, such as
exchange-listed stocks, Nasdaq National Market and SmallCap stocks
d. a special identification if the order relates to a program trade or an index
arbitrage trade;
e. designation of the order as a buy or a sell;
f. designation of the order as a short-sale, if applicable;
g. designation of the type of order, such as market, limit, or stop loss;
h. a limit or stop price, if applicable;
i. the date at which the order expires or, for a day order, the time;
j. the time during which the order is in force;
k. any instructions to modify or cancel the order;
1. the type of account, such as retail, wholesale, employee, etc.;
m. the date and time, to the second, that the order was executed;
n. the price at which the order was executed;
o. the size of the executed portion of the order, in number of shares or, for
bonds, principal amounts;
p. the identity of the parties to the transaction.
Id. § 242.302.
266. Id. § 242.303(a)(1).
267. The following records must be retained if they are created:
" notices to subscribers;
" if the system is subject to the fair access standards, a copy of its access standards
and all documents relating to its grants or denials of access;
. all documents related to its compliance with the capacity, integrity and system
requirements.
Id. § 242.303(a)(1).
268. Id. § 242.303(a)(2).
269. Id. §§ 240.17a-4(f), 242.303(d).
270. Id. § 242.303(e).
271. Id. § 242.301(b)(9).
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and listed options, by share or other unit of trading and by dollars, and
information on denials of access to the system. 27 2 In addition,
Regulation ATS requires systems to establish procedures to protect
confidential trading information. 273 Finally, trading systems are not
allowed to use the word "exchange" or a similar term, such as "stock
274
market," in their names.
D. Growth of ECNs
When they first began to flourish following the adoption of the Order
Handling Rules, ECNs traded primarily in Nasdaq stocks. The major
advantage of ECNs was that they offered far cheaper trade execution
than Nasdaq because they allowed customer orders to interact with each
other without the participation of a market maker. ECNs charge access
fees, but even after payment of these fees, which are no more than $.015
per share and may be reduced based on a subscriber's volume,
275
execution costs are frequently far lower on ECNs than on Nasdaq.
Subscribers placing orders into ECNs include market makers, exchange
specialists, and institutional investors. 276 The ECN Amendment to the
Firm Quote Rule required orders for Nasdaq securities placed in an
ECN by exchange specialists and broker-dealers to be displayed on
Nasdaq. 277 After the adoption of Regulation ATS, orders by any
subscriber, even if not a market maker or specialist, also had to be
displayed on Nasdaq if they exceeded the volume thresholds established
by Regulation ATS.27 8
For any type of order, the access fees charged by ECNs raised an
issue regarding whether SEC regulations allowed ECNs to require non272. Form ATS-R, Federal Securities Laws (CCH) T 33,015, available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/sec255 l.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
273. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10).
274. Id. § 242.301(b)(1 1).
275. See Letter from John Oddie, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer,
Global Equities, Instinet Corporation, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Apr. 20, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sros/nd9953/oddiel.htm (on
file with author) [hereinafter Oddie Letter]; Letter from Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division
of Market Regulation, to Douglas M. Atkin, Chief Executive Officer, Instinet Corporation (Mar.
3, 2000) (on file with author); Letter from Cameron Smith, General Counsel, The Island ECN,
Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 22, 2000),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/sros/nd9953/smithl.htm (on file with author) [hereinafter
Smith Letter].
276. See Instinet Real-Time Trading Service, SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 21, 1997), available
at 1997 WL 18336, at *1 [hereinafter Instinet Real-Time Trading Service].
277. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing Order Handling Rules, including ECN Amendment).
278. See supra Part VI.C.2 (discussing order display and execution requirements of
Regulation ATS).
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subscribers, who would now be accessing their quotes through Nasdaq,
to pay an access fee. With regard to orders submitted by market makers
or exchange specialists, the Commission, through the grant of no-action
relief, effectively accepted the ECNs' view that the charging of access
fees would comply with the requirements of the Display Alternative and
that market makers and specialists could use their systems without
violating the Firm Quote Rule. 279 Regulation ATS, by requiring that
access fees be "reasonable," effectively sanctions their use for customer
orders, which are subject to Regulation ATS but not the Firm Quote
Rule. 280 As a result, ECNs can require non-subscribers to pay their
access fees. 28' By contrast, the Commission has interpreted the Firm
Quote Rule as prohibiting Nasdaq market makers from
charging access
282
fees with regard to quotes entered directly into Nasdaq.
ECNs did not initially trade NYSE stocks. While ECNs could be
treated similarly to Nasdaq market makers and, therefore, were
integrated relatively easily into the Nasdaq market, effective trading in
NYSE stocks requires the ability to include quotations in the CQS,
which combines quotes in exchange-listed stocks traded in different
markets. 283 However, ECNs were not allowed direct access to the CQS
because they were not registered exchanges. 284 It was proposed that
ECNs be granted indirect access to the CQS through Nasdaq's "Third
Market," in which exchange-listed stocks were traded using the CAES
automatic execution system. 285 Under this proposal, ECNs, like other
CAES participants, would then be linked to other markets through the

279. See, e.g., Instinet Real-Time Trading Service, supra note 276, at *6.
280. See supra Part VI.C.4 (discussing provisions of Regulation ATS relating to fair access
and fees).
281. See Instinet Real-Time Trading Service, supra note 276, at *2-3.
282. M.H. Meyerson & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 5, 1998).
283. See Mark Hendrickson, Can Island Succeed Trading Listed Stocks?, SEC. INDUS. NEWS,
Feb. 14, 2000; see also supra Part IV.B (describing systems for dissemination of transaction and
quotation information, including the CQS).
284. See Hendrickson, supra note 283; Island Unveils Plan to Bring Competition to NYSElisted Market, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 3, 2000.
285. See infra Part VII.A.] (describing Nasdaq's SOES, CAES and SelectNet Systems).
Though Nasdaq's Third Market is referred to as a system, it is not a distinct system in the
technological sense. Rather, it is a marketplace through which Nasdaq market makers can trade
NYSE-listed stocks using CAES. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to ECN/ATS Participation in the ITS/CAES
System, Exchange Act Release No. 42,353, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1164 (Jan. 20, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 63464, at *2 (S.E.C.). This marketplace will be referred to as "Nasdaq's
Third Market," to distinguish it from the "third market" which is the generic term for OTC listing
of listed securities. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the third market).
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Intermarket Trading System. However, ECNs were reluctant to accept
286
this proposal.
In March 2000, the SEC approved a Nasdaq rule proposal under
which ECNs and other alternative trading systems would be allowed to
participate in Nasdaq's Third Market, but only if they registered with
Nasdaq as "CAESITS Market Makers." 287 The Nasdaq rule change did
not address the majority of the ECNs' concerns regarding the trading of
exchange-listed stocks. For example, as CAES/ITS Market Makers,
ECNs must maintain two-sided quotes. However, Nasdaq did propose
to modify the CAES so that ECNs would not be subject to automatic
execution, which would eliminate the dual liability problem. 28 8 The
rule change did not immediately lead to the participation of ECNs in the
CAES/ITS system. 289 In June 2000, however, Nasdaq reached an
agreement with three ECNs, Bloomberg Tradebook, BRUT, and
MarketXT, to participate in Nasdaq's Third Market system, which was
renamed "InterMarket" at the time of the agreement. 290 However, it
was a fourth ECN, Archipelago, which was the first to trade exchangelisted stocks through the InterMarket system, in August 2000.291

286. ECNs opposed access through Nasdaq because they did not want to be dependent on
Nasdaq's technology, which they believe is outdated, and because ITS requires participants to
maintain a two-sided market, which could require ECNs to act as principals when their quotes
were accessed, despite their established practice of only acting as agents. See Island ECN, Inc.,
Tackling the Barriers to Trading NYSE Stocks, available at http://www.island.com/
MarketsForum/viewpoints/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Tackling the
Barriers to Trading NYSE Stocks]; Hendrickson, supra note 283. In addition, ECNs did not want
to be subject to ITS's trade-through rule, which effectively prohibited investors from choosing a
market for execution on any basis other than price. See Tackling the Barriers to Trading NYSE
Stocks, supra. Finally, ECNs were concerned that they would be subject to double executions
because any participants in CAES are subject to the system's automatic execution feature. See
Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to ECN and ATS Participation in the
ITS/CAES System, Exchange Act Release No. 42,536, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2088 (Mar. 16,
2000), available at 2000 WL 282348, at *2 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter ECN-ITS Release]. The
prospect of double execution could have arisen if, for example, an ECN displayed a customer buy
order through ITS and sell orders came into ITS and the ECN at the same time. Id. at *4 n.16.
The ITS sell order would be automatically executed against the ECN buy order, while the ECN
would be obligated under the Firm Quote Rule to also execute the sell order coming in through
the ECN. See id.
287. ECN-ITS Release, supra note 286.
288. Id. at *2.
289. Island, one of the major ECNs, continued to press for direct access to the CQS. Island
Unveils Plan to Bring Competition to NYSE-listed Market, supra note 284.
290. Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq InterMarket Forges Links with Major ECNs (June 13,
2000), at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2000/ne-section00_I 39.html.
291. Press Release, Nasdaq, Archipelago Begins Trading in Nasdaq InterMarket (Aug. 8,
2000), at http://www.nasdaqnews.connews/pr2000/nesection00_ 180.html.
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VII. THE EVOLUTION OF NASDAQ
The NASD has been at the center of much of the controversy
generated by electronic trading. The organization is in the unusual
position of acting as an SRO and owning Nasdaq, a dominant stock
market and unmistakably commercial enterprise. Even more troubling,
the NASD regulates ECNs, with which Nasdaq has competed from their
inception. To fully understand the NASD's and Nasdaq's unique role in
the current market structure dilemma, one needs to be familiar with the
development of Nasdaq.
When Nasdaq was originally established, it was merely an automated
extension of the OTC market, where dealers could disseminate bid and
292
offer quotes for securities but were not obligated to execute orders.
All actual transactions were agreed upon through telephone
communications. This section discusses Nasdaq's nearly-completed
evolution from a simple quotation system operated by an SRO into a
massive stock market. First, this section will discuss the development
of Nasdaq's SOES and CAES systems, which introduced automatic
executions to Nasdaq, and its SelectNet System, which allows electronic
communications. Next, it will discuss the market's SuperSOES system,
which is a preliminary step in turning the one-time OTC market into the
equivalent of a stock exchange. Finally, it will discuss the controversial
SuperMontage proposal, which will essentially complete the evolution
and, some believe, drive the ECNs out of business.
A. SOES, CAES and SelectNet Systems
1. Development of Systems
Nasdaq introduced its Computer Assisted Execution System
("CAES"), its first automatic execution system, in February 1981.293
When it was originally introduced, CAES was limited to listed
securities, or the so-called "third market." 294 Under CAES, market
makers who choose to utilize the system introduce quotes into it, which
can then be automatically executed by firms that participate in the
system as "order routing" participants. 295 Order routing participants

292. See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of Nasdaq).
293. A Monitoring Report on the Operation and Effects of Rule 19c-3 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 18,062, 23 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 650 (Aug.
25, 1981), available at 1981 WL 31171, at * 15 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Monitoring Report].
294. Monitoring Report, supra note 293, at *15 n.69; see supra Part IV.D (describing the third
market).
295. Monitoring Report, supra note 293, at *15.
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electronically deliver orders into CAES that can be directed to a
particular CAES market maker. These orders will automatically be
executed against the quote of the CAES market maker to whom the
order is directed, assuming the size of the order does not exceed the
market maker's quoted size. 296 An order routing firm that does not wish
to route an order to a particular CAES market maker marks the order
"undesignated. '29 7 CAES routes undesignated orders298to CAES market
makers for automatic execution based on time priority.
In 1985, Nasdaq instituted another automatic execution system
known as the Small Order Execution System ("SOES"). SOES was
designed to make it easier for small investors to obtain execution of
their orders. 299 Participation in SOES was initially voluntary.
However, once a market maker chose to participate in the system, it
could not withdraw without the consent of the NASD. 3° Initially, the
primary difference between CAES and SOES was that CAES was for
securities traded
in the third market and was not limited to orders of a
30 1
certain size.
In 1988, Nasdaq introduced SelectNet, which does not provide for
automatic executions but allows broker-dealers to negotiate transactions
through electronic communications. 30 2 Broker-dealers use SelectNet to
296. Id. at*15 n.70.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Define Professional Trader for Purposes of
the Small Order Execution System, Exchange Act Release No. 26,361, 42 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
601 (Dec. 15, 1988), available at 1988 WL 240144, at *1 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Definition of
Professional Trader]. As originally instituted, under the SOES system orders for up to 500 shares
were automatically executed at the inside bid or offer of market makers who participated in
SOES. Id.
300. Id. at *4.
301. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 21,742, 32 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 564 (Feb. 12, 1985), available at 1985 WL 61354, at *3 n.12 (S.E.C.). Later,
when SOES became mandatory for certain securities, an additional difference arose because
CAES remained voluntary. However, the difference relating to the types of securities traded
disappeared because CAES was later expanded to allow the trading of Nasdaq NMS Stocks. See
Receipt of Application for Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 18,398, 24 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 508 (Jan. 7, 1982), available at 1982 WL 31909, at *1 n.4 (S.E.C.). In June 1994,
participation in CAES was made mandatory for market makers trading listed securities, or "third
market makers," but remained voluntary for market makers trading in Nasdaq stocks. Order
Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change, as Amended, Exchange Act Release
No. 25,791, 41 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 91 (June 9, 1988), available at 1988 WL 239722, at *1
(S.E.C.).
302. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Modify the NASD's Small Order Execution
System and SelectNet Service, Exchange Act Release No. 42,344 (Jan. 14, 2000), available at

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

make offers for transactions at prices between the inside bid and
offer. 30 3 SelectNet was not intended to give rise to "liability orders, or
orders that market makers are obligated to execute." 30 4 However, when
the Firm Quote Rule was adopted in 1978, orders placed through
SelectNet effectively became liability orders because Nasdaq
interpreted the Quote Rule to require market makers to honor quotes
30 5
disseminated through SelectNet.
The market crash of 1987 led to a significant modification of the
SOES system. It was widely reported that during the crash Nasdaq
market makers did not answer their phones to avoid buying stock from
panicked investors. 3°6 As a result, the NASD modified the SOES
system to require market makers in Nasdaq National Market securities
to participate in SOES.30 7 In 1988, the NASD increased the maximum
SOES order size to 1,000 shares, then introduced a system under which
the maximum was either 200, 500 or 1,000 shares, depending on the
volume, price and number of market makers associated with a
security. 30 8 In addition, it increased the penalty for unexcused
withdrawals from the SOES system from a two-day suspension to a
39
twenty-day suspension. 0
2. SOES Bandits
As a result of the 1988 changes in the SOES system, a group of
traders, who came to be known as "SOES bandits," took advantage of
the system's automatic execution features to generate huge trading
profits at the expense of market makers. 3 10 The primary way in which
the SOES bandits generated profits was by placing orders in the SOES
31
system when a market maker did not update its quote quickly enough. '

2000 WL 44120, at *1 n.1 1 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter SuperSOES Adopting Release].
303. Id. at*l.
304. Id. at *2.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Rob Wells, What's Nasdaq? A Look Under the Hood at the Nation's SecondLargestStock Market, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1995, at 14D.
307. Definition of Professional Trader, supra note 299.
308. Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change, as Amended, Exchange
Act Release No. 25,791, 41 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 91 (June 9, 1988), available at 1988 WL
239722, at *2 (S.E.C.).
309. Id. at *2 n.9.
310. William Power, OTC Pros Aim to Keep what Small Investors Have, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
1988, at C 1.
311. Id.
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This failure usually occurred when market conditions
changed rapidly,
3 12
or following the release of news on a company.
The NASD, spurred on primarily by its market making firms,
engaged in an extended battle with the SOES bandits in an effort to
limit what was perceived as the SOES bandits' abuse of the SOES
system. 313 The NASD believed that the SOES bandits prevented small
investors from obtaining execution of their orders, and the NASD
therefore adopted several changes to the rules governing the SOES
system which were designed to curtail the activities of the SOES
bandits. In August 1988, the NASD adopted an interpretation to the
SOES rules to eliminate the practice of SOES bandits evading the
maximum order size requirement by "splitting" a single order into
several smaller orders below the maximum order size. 3 14 In December
1988, the NASD adopted a rule change under which trades originating
from a "professional trading account" could not be entered into the
SOES system. 3 15 In October 1991, the NASD proposed a set of rule
changes that included a broadening of the definition of "professional
trading account" by, among other things, allowing additional factors to
3 16
be considered in determining whether an account met the definition.
In addition, the amendments proposed in October 1991 instituted a
fifteen-second delay between executions by a particular market maker,

312. For example, if a broker-dealer was quoting Sun MicroSystems at 30 - 301/A and the
inside bid and offer fell to 292 - 293/4 before the broker-dealer updated its quotes, it might find
itself deluged with orders from SOES bandits "hitting" its bid of 30, i.e., placing orders that were
automatically executed at 30. As a result, the slow market maker would incur large losses at the
expense of the SOES bandits.
313. For a more complete discussion of the rise of the SOES bandits and the NASD's attempt
to control them, see Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2, at *213-55.
314. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2, at *220-21. Under the interpretation, two or more
trades would be considered a single order if they stemmed from a "single investment decision."
Id. at *221 n.153. This interpretation created a presumption of a single investment decision for
trades which occurred during a five-minute period in accounts controlled by the same individual.
Id.
315. Id. at *223. Under the new rules an account was considered a professional trading
account if:
. five or more "day trades," or purchases and sales of the same security in the same
day, were made in the account using the SOES system; or
. there was a professional trading pattern in the account, which would be indicated by
a pattern of day trades, a high volume of day trades compared with long-term
transactions, or a high volume of day trades in relation to the size of the account.
Id. at *223 n.155.
316. Id. at *224. These factors included an "excessive frequency" of short-term trading or
short-sales transactions, trading of discretionary accounts, or direct access to Nasdaq quotation
screens or SOES terminals. Id. at *225 n. 158.
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to give market makers time to update their quotes. 3 17 The Commission
approved all of the October 1991 proposed amendments, but the
expansion of the definition of professional trading account was
challenged in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit,
3 18
and repealed in the light of criticism by the court.
In June 1994, in an attempt to reduce SOES abuses, the NASD
proposed to adopt a system known as N*PROVE, which would
ultimately have replaced SOES, and to make interim modifications to
the SOES rules pending adoption of the N*PROVE system. 319 The
N*PROVE system never came into existence because the NASD
320
withdrew the N*PROVE proposal without any Commission action.
The Commission approved the interim SOES rules in December 1993,
but only for a one-year pilot period. 32 1 The Commission declined the
NASD's request for an extension of this one-year period, and the rules
were phased out. 322 The NASD actively sought to control the SOES
bandits by conducting frequent examinations in an effort to find
violations of the SOES rules, instituting numerous disciplinary actions
against SOES firms, and closely scrutinizing membership applications
323
of firms who seemed likely to abuse the SOES system.
B. SuperSOES
The Nasdaq's move toward the functional equivalent of an exchange
continued with a rule proposal, filed in February 1999 and approved in
January 2000, under which Nasdaq will create a new "SuperSOES"
system. 324 At the time the proposal was filed, the SOES rules, which
had been amended on numerous occasions, provided that the system
was mandatory for market makers in Nasdaq National Market securities

317. Id. at *227.
318. Id. at *225-26; Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
319. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2, at *223 n.155.
320. Id. at *228.
321. Id. at *230.
322. Id. at *235-36.
323. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2, at *237-55. The Commission later found that the
NASD devoted too much attention to the activities of the SOES bandits, while neglecting other
problems in the Nasdaq market. See infra note 406 and accompanying text (discussing SEC
disciplinary action against the NASD).
324. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302. The SuperSOES system was intended as
an interim step before the introduction of an even more radical change to Nasdaq known as
"SuperMontage." See id.; see also infra Part VII.C (discussing the SuperMontage proposal). The
implementation of SuperSOES is now not expected to occur until after Nasdaq has completed its
decimalization plan in April 2001. Mary Schroeder, Nasdaq Adds Second Pilot Date for PhaseIn of Decimals, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Jan. 22, 2001.
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325
and voluntary for market makers in Nasdaq SmallCap securities.
One of the problems with the SOES and SelectNet systems, which
operate separately, was that they frequently subjected market makers to
dual liability. 326 A market maker who executed a trade through
SelectNet might face dual liability if an order was automatically
executed against its quote at about the same time through SOES. 327
The new SuperSOES system, known more formally as the "Nasdaq
National Market Execution System," will provide for automatic
execution of orders for Nasdaq National Market securities of up to
999,999 shares. 328 The SuperSOES System will introduce a "reserve
size functionality" under which a market maker can display part of a
customer's order with the remainder held in reserve. The portion of the
order in reserve will not be displayed. The system will automatically
"refresh" the quote when it is executed against.32 9 The SuperSOES
system will maintain a penalty for market makers who do not refresh a
quote when an order is executed against it.330 Nasdaq market makers
will be required to participate in SuperSOES and to permit automatic
executions against their quotes. 33 1 The SOES system will remain
332
essentially unchanged for Nasdaq SmallCap securities.

325. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *1. The maximum SOES sizes for
National Market securities ranged from 200 to 1,000 shares, depending on the price and average
daily volume of the securities. See id.; NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 88-93 (June 22, 1988). The
maximum for SmallCap securities was 500 shares. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note
302, at * 1.
326. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *2.
327. See id.
328. Id. at *2; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. relating to Maximum Share Size Order
Parameters for the Nasdaq National Market Execution System, Exchange Act Release No. 43,575
(Nov. 16, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1720608 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter SuperSOES Amendment];
see also After Delays, Nasdaq Appears Ready to Announce New Timetable for SuperSOES, SEC.
WK., Nov. 6, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 4734136. The SuperSOES proposal as originally filed
by Nasdaq and approved by the SEC had a maximum order size of 9,900 shares. See SuperSOES
Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *2. Nasdaq later amended the rules governing the system to
increase the maximum order size to 999,999 shares. SuperSOES Amendment, supra.
329. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *3.
330. Id. at *4.
331. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. to Include UTP Exchanges in the Nasdaq National Market Execution Service,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,847, 72 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1247 (May 26, 2000), available at
2000 WL 690034, at *2 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter SuperSOES UTP Amendment]. The original
SuperSOES proposal would not have allowed UTP exchanges to provide or receive automatic
executions, but was later amended to allow specialists on UTP exchanges to choose to utilize the
automatic execution feature. Id.; see also supra Part IV.E (discussing UTPs).
332. SuperSOES UTP Amendment, supra note 331, at *2 n.15. In addition to having a
dramatically higher maximum automatic execution order size, SuperSOES will be a departure
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To eliminate the possibility of dual executions, in conjunction with
the implementation of SuperSOES, Nasdaq will modify the SelectNet
system to allow broker-dealers to negotiate trades through SelectNet
without being subject to the requirements of the Firm Quote Rule.
Nasdaq will accomplish this goal by requiring participants to deliver
only "oversized" orders to market makers publishing quotes on
SelectNet. 333 Stated another way, the system will prohibit liability
orders from being entered in SelectNet. 334 The idea behind requiring
oversized orders is to allow the quoting broker-dealer to choose to either
335
execute the order or negotiate with the party initiating the order.
Under SuperSOES, the prohibition on entering liability orders in
SelectNet will not apply to UTP exchanges that do not use the
336
automatic execution feature of SuperSOES.
The SuperSOES system will provide for both "order entry" and "full
participation" ECNs. Order entry ECNs will be obligated to fill orders
directed to them that match their quotes, but will not be subject to the
automatic execution requirement applicable to SuperSOES market
makers. 337 Order entry ECNs will, upon request, be able to receive

from the previous Nasdaq system for the following reasons:
. It allows, for the first time the size of a market maker's quote to be automatically
reduced when orders are executed against it. Nasdaq believed that the SOES' failure to
provide this automatic reduction discouraged market makers from displaying their full
quote size.
. It eliminates the "SOES preferencing" under which a party entering a SOES order
designates a particular market maker to whom the order should be routed.
. It imposes a fee of $.50 per side for each execution.
Id. at *3-4.
333. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *4.
334. Specifically, the system will prohibit broker-dealers from directing orders into SelectNet
unless they are either "all-or-none" orders of a size at least 100 shares greater than the market
maker's quote, or "minimum acceptable quantity" orders with a minimum acceptable quantity of
at least 100 shares greater than the quote. Id. The system will be programmed to reject orders
which do not satisfy these requirements. Id. For example, if a broker-dealer is quoting 50 - 501/
(1000 x 1000) in SelectNet, the system will reject an order to sell 1,000 shares at 50 which is
directed to the market maker. However, it will allow an order to be directed to the market maker
if it is an all or none order to sell 1,100 shares at 50, or if it is an order to sell 3,000 shares with a
minimum acceptable quantity of 1,100.
335. See id.
336. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *4.
337. Id. Even if the SuperSOES system did not require ECNs to honor quotes entered into the
system, they would be required to honor them under the Firm Quote Rule. See supra Part V.C. I
(discussing the Firm Quote Rule). There is a difference between being required to execute
transactions under the Firm Quote Rule and being subject to automatic executions because there
are exceptions to the Firm Quote Rule. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing
exceptions to the Firm Quote Rule). For example, an ECN will be allowed to decline a
SuperSOES order if it is in the process of executing an order received through the ECN when the
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Full
automatic executions from SuperSOES market makers. 338
participation ECNs will essentially be treated as SuperSOES market
makers. They will be subject to automatic executions, but other brokerdealers will 9be allowed to direct only oversized orders to them through
33
SelectNet.
C. SuperMontage
Nasdaq introduced a proposal to radically modify its systems in
October 1999. This proposal, known as "SuperMontage," was
approved by the SEC in January 2001, but the system modifications are
not expected to be completed until early 2 0 02. 340 Once the system is
operational, however, the evolution of Nasdaq into the equivalent of an
electronic stock exchange will be nearly complete, and the existence of
the ECNs will be threatened.
1. Deficiencies in Current Nasdaq System
The current Nasdaq system lacks some of the features offered by the
ECNs. One advantage for broker-dealers using ECNs is that they can
post quotations anonymously because their quotes are aggregated with
quotes of other market participants and appear in the Nasdaq system
under the MMID of the ECN.34 ' In addition, ECNs typically display
interest not only at the so-called "top of the market," i.e., the best bid
and offer, but at several price levels away. Displaying orders beyond
market.
the top of the market allows users to view the "depth" of the
342
only.
market
the
of
top
the
at
orders
displays
currently
Nasdaq
In addition to lacking some of the features of ECNs, Nasdaq has
other disadvantages for market participants. One of these is the
prospect of dual liability when orders are received near the same time
SuperSOES order is received. See id.
338. SuperSOES Adopting Release, supra note 302, at *5.
339. Id. "Like an order entry ECN, a full participant ECN may request order entry capability
in [SuperSOES], which will allow the ECN to obtain automatic executions against the quotations
of [SuperSOES] market makers." Id.
340. Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Plan to Upgrade Nasdaq Trading Passes the SEC, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at Cl, availableat 2001 WL-WSJ 2850758.
341. See Archipelago, The ARCA Advantage, at http://www.tradearca.com/company/the-arca
_advantage.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2001); Island, About Island, at http://www.island.coml
about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001). Displaying orders anonymously allows market
participants to execute large trades with less of a market impact than would be possible if their
identity were known.
342. Nasdaq displays market maker quotes which are not at the top of the market, but not
customer orders away from the top of the market. See Nasdaq Trader, Nasdaq Workstation II, at
http://www.nasdaqtrader.comltrader/tradingservices/productservices/productdescriptions/
nwiidescription.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
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on SelectNet and SOES.3 43 The SuperSOES system will reduce, but not
eliminate, this potential liability. 344 The Nasdaq system also makes it
difficult for market makers to comply with the Order Handling Rules
because a market maker which receives a customer limit order must
amend its quote to reflect the placement of the order if it improves or
increases the size of the quote.34 5
2. Summary of SuperMontage's Proposed Changes
Before the SuperSOES proposal was even approved, the NASD
proposed to eliminate the above disadvantages to its systems with a
radical modification that built upon the changes incorporated into
SuperSOES. The proposal was approved by the Commission on
January 10, 2001, and the system is expected to begin operations in the
first quarter of 2002.346 The new system, known as "SuperMontage,"
will expand the SuperSOES order display, and, unlike SuperSOES, will
be applicable to all Nasdaq securities, including National Market and
SmallCap securities. 347 Under the SuperMontage system, the Nasdaq
Workstation II display will still contain the "quotation montage"
containing the quotes and orders of market participants. 34 8 However,
the quotation montage will be amended slightly and will be
supplemented by the Nasdaq Order Display Facility, or
"SuperMontage," which will show, in addition to the best bid and offer
for a security, the trading interest two price levels away. 349 The trading
interest displayed will be of market makers, ECNs and exchanges with
350
UTPs for Nasdaq stocks ("UTP exchanges").
Another feature introduced with the SuperMontage system is the
ability of Nasdaq market makers and ECNs, collectively known in the
SuperMontage proposal as "Nasdaq Quoting Market Participants," to
display their trading interest anonymously. 35 1 As with the SuperSOES
343. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
344. SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at *9. SuperSOES will eliminate most of the
potential for dual liability by requiring most SelectNet orders to be "oversized." However, even
after SuperSOES is in place, UTP exchanges that do not accept automatic executions will be
allowed to enter orders into SelectNet which are not oversized, and market makers can therefore
still be subject to dual liability in connection with orders from these exchanges. See SuperSOES
UTP Amendment, supra note 331, at * 1.
345. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing compliance with Order Handling Rules).
346. Plan to Upgrade Nasdaq Trading Passesthe SEC, supra note 340.
347. See SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at *1.
348. See supra note 70 (illustrating layout of quotation montage).
349. See supra note 70.
350. See supra note 70; see also supra Part IV.E (describing unlisted trading privileges).
351. SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at * 1.
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system, Nasdaq Quoting Participants will be able to use "reserve size,"
which will not be displayed in the quotation montage or Order Display
Facility, but against which orders can be executed. The SuperMontage
system will also introduce an Order Collector Facility, which will
provide a central facility through which all orders will be channeled for
execution. Use of the SuperMontage system will be voluntary, and
Nasdaq will make an alternative system through which market
352
participants can enter quotations and report transactions.
3. Nasdaq Order Display Facility
The Order Display Facility introduced with the SuperMontage
System is designed to improve the depth of the displayed trading
interest while at the same time allowing market participants to display
orders anonymously. The quotation montage will still display the
quotes of market makers in priority of price and time. However, the
Order Display Facility, located in a separate section of the workstation
display, will show "trading interest," i.e., participant quotes or customer
orders, at not only the best bid or offer price but also at the two next
best prices. 35 3 In addition, market participants will be allowed to
designate quotes or orders as "attributable" or "non-attributable," and
will be able to designate a "reserve size." 354 Attributable quotes or
orders will always appear next to the MMID 355 of the market participant
in the quotation montage. If attributable orders are within the best three
price levels of the market, they will be included in the Order Display
Facility. 356 Non-attributable orders will also be placed in the Order
Display Facility, assuming they are within the best three price levels of
the market, but not next to the MMID of the Quoting Market Participant
in the quotation montage. 357 Instead, Nasdaq introduced a special
MMID, with the designation of "SIZE," on both the bid and offer sides

352. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 36, at *27-28. If this alternative facility
were not provided, SuperMontage would essentially be mandatory because over-the-counter
market participants, by virtue of Commission and NASD regulations, are effectively required to
publicly display their quotes and orders through the NASD. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.11
Acl-l(c)(1) (requiring broker-dealers to communicate quotes to NASD); supra Part VI.C.3
(describing order display requirements of Regulation ATS).
353. SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at *4.
354. Id. at *5. Market makers will, however, still be required to maintain a two-sided quote
attributable to their MMID. Id. at *37.
355. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing Nasdaq's operation).
356. SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at *5. However, in the Order Display Facility,
all attributable and non-attributable orders at a particular price on one side of the market would be
aggregated, without reference to their source. Id. at *5-7.
357. Id. at *5.
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of the market which, for purposes of display in the quotation montage,
will aggregate the total of all non-attributable trading interest in a
security. 358 Nasdaq believes that the SuperMontage System, by
allowing market makers to display customer orders in the Order Display
Facility, will enable them to comply with the Display Rule without
changing their quote each time they receive a customer order at a price
359
superior to their quoted price.
The SuperMontage System will retain the "reserve size" feature
introduced with SuperSOES. The reserve size feature will be available
360
to market participants who display size of at least 1,000 shares.
Reserve size will not be displayed in either the quotation montage or the
Order Display Facility. However, if the size of a Quoting Market
Participant's quote is reduced, or "decremented," to zero as a result of
an execution, the system will automatically replenish the displayed
size. 36 1 The SuperMontage system will include a data feed called
"NQDS Prime" which will provide, for a fee, real-time information on
the quotes in the Order Display Facility, including those two price
362
levels away from the NBBO.
4. Order Collector Facility
A central feature of the SuperMontage System is an "Order Collector
Facility," which will allow market participants to transmit multiple
363
quotes and orders, at different price levels, into the Nasdaq system.
The Order Collector Facility will also provide a single point of entry
through which market participants can gain access to quotes and orders
in either the Order Display Facility or the quotation montage, and
eliminate dual liability for market makers by creating a single forum in
which orders for automatic execution will be received. 36
Once
SuperMontage is implemented, a market participant who wishes to
place an order will enter a "non-directed" order into the Order Collector
Facility, which is an order not designated for a particular market maker

358. Id. at *6.
359. Id.
360. Id. The shares displayed could be either attributable or not-attributable. Id.
361. Id.
362. Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 8 to Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Establishment of Nasdaq Order Display
Facility and to Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 43,514
(Nov. 3, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1671418, at *46 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Amendment No. 8
Proposal].
363. Id. at *8.
364. Id.
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or ECN.365 The Order Collector Facility would then deliver the order
for automatic execution to a market maker or any ECN that participates
in the automatic execution feature, or as a liability order to any ECN
that does not elect to participate in the automatic execution feature. The
system will contain a feature under which the quotes of market
participants will be automatically reduced when orders are executed
against the quotes. 366 The SuperMontage system will require ECNs
which do not accept automatic executions to meet requirements on
responsiveness to orders, designed to ensure that they generally respond
367
to orders within five seconds.
5. Order Execution Algorithm
One of the more controversial aspects of the SuperMontage system is
the "Order Execution Algorithm," i.e., the set of rules that determine
how orders are routed to particular market participants.
The
SuperMontage system generally preserves the price/time priority of the
current Nasdaq system, under which non-directed orders are routed to
the best quote and, between two market participants quoting the same
price, to the participant whose quote was first in time. 368 However, the
SuperMontage has a major exception to the Order Execution Algorithm,
for orders entered by a Quoting Market Participant. These orders will
not be subject to the algorithm, and instead will be matched against the
Quoting Market Participant's own quote, or "internalized," if the
Quoting Market Participant is at the NBBO.3 69
As originally proposed, the Order Execution Algorithm gave priority
to the market maker whose customer placed the order, followed by
market participants who receive automatic executions, then ECNs.
After this priority was followed for the primary quotes of these market
participants, the system would have accessed their reserve size, in the
same priority. The quotes of UTP exchanges would have been last in
line, after both the primary quotes and reserve size of market makers,
365.
366.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *10- 11.

367. ECNs which do not accept automatic executions will have thirty seconds to respond to
any given order. See Amendment No. 8 Proposal, supra note 362, at *48. However, an ECN's
response time would be measured with regard to several orders, and the ECN will generally have
to respond to non-directed orders in five seconds. Id. If an ECN "regularly" fails to respond
within five seconds, Nasdaq will prevent the ECN from entering quotes into the system. Id. at
*49. The original SuperMontage proposal would have removed an ECN's quote from the system
if the ECN did not respond to a non-directed order in seven seconds. Id. at *48.
368. See id. at *12. The price/time priority is intended to reward market makers who
aggressively update their quotes.
369. See supra note 223 (defining NBBO); supra Part LX.A.2 (discussing internalization).
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automatic execution participants, and ECNs. 370 After following this
order, the system would have moved to the next price level.
The priority of order execution in the original SuperMontage
proposal would have effectively discriminated against ECNs that did
not accept automatic order executions, because these ECNs would have
lower priority than market makers and ECNs that accepted automatic
executions. 37 1 As some commenters opposed this favored treatment,
with Amendment No. 4 Nasdaq proposed to eliminate the distinction
between ECNs that accept automatic executions and those that do not,
but introduced a new distinction: ECNs that charge an access fee would
be last in line. 372 Nasdaq justified this treatment by stating that an
access fee "represents an increase in trading costs and [is] clearly an
373
inferior price."
The proposal to give lowest priority to ECNs that charge an access
fee was met with strong opposition from the ECNs, which emphasized
the fact that Nasdaq was preserving its own ability to charge a variety of
fees from market participants. 374 In addition, the ECNs disputed
Nasdaq's assertion that quotes of ECNs which charge an access fee
represent "clearly an inferior price." 375 A logical solution to the access
fee debate was to have the quotes of ECNs reflect the access fee. In
Amendment No. 6 to the SuperMontage proposal, Nasdaq asserted that
the move to decimalization would likely accomplish this objective and
proposed to give ECNs the same priority as market makers if their
376
quotes, after access fees, were equal to the quotes of market makers.
370. See supra note 223; supra Part IX.A.2.
371. See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 4 to Proposed Rule Change by National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Establishment of Nasdaq Order Display
Facility and to Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 42,573,
71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2214 (Mar. 23, 2000), available at 2000 WL 354359, at *22 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Amendment No. 4 Proposal].
372. See id.
373. Id.
374. See Smith Letter, supra note 275. All of the comment letters on the SuperMontage
proposal cited herein are available on the SEC's website. The website has an index of selected
SRO Rulemaking filings. See Index of Selected SRO Rulemaking Filings, at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2001). The index, which organizes the filings in reverse
chronological order, has a notation for many of the filings, including the SuperMontage proposal,
that "Comments received electronically are available for this notice," and a link to the comment
letters. Id.
375. See Oddie Letter, supra note 275; see also text accompanying note 362.
376. See Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 5, 6 and 7 to Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Establishment of Nasdaq Order
Display Facility and to Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading Platform, Exchange Act Release No.
34-43,138, 72 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2750 (Aug. 10, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1133152, at
*30 (S.E.C.).
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However, this proposal was dependent upon the ECNs developing the
technological ability to reflect access fees in their quotes.37 7 It did not
satisfy the ECNs, who noted that their access fees were less than one
cent per share, and were instituted on a sliding scale based on a
subscriber's volume in the system. 378 In Amendment No. 7, Nasdaq,
while rejecting these arguments, offered to allow ECNs, on an order-byorder basis, to indicate whether the price improvement offered by the
order exceeds the access fee. For example, an ECN order to buy at
$20.005 would receive the same priority as a market maker quote at $20
379
if the ECN charged an access fee of $.005 with regard to that order.
Nasdaq proposed to further amend the portion of the SuperMontage
proposal relating to the order execution algorithm with the eighth
amendment to the SuperMontage proposal, which was the last major
amendment. 380 As modified by Amendment No. 8, the system will
allow parties placing non-directed orders to exempt their orders from
the usual order execution algorithm used by the system. The usual
algorithm, though it distinguishes between market participants in some
ways, within a particular tier of market participants at a particular price
level calls for execution based on strict price/time priority. 38 1 The
proposal provides for three options for parties placing non-directed
orders. Under either of the first two options, the order will be exposed
to the following three tiers within the market, at a particular price level,
in order of priority: (i) quotes or orders of market makers and ECNs,
and UTP agency orders; (ii) reserve size of market makers and ECNs;
and (iii) principal quotes of UTP exchanges. 382 The first option will be
the "default option," to be used if neither of the other two options are
specified. 383 Under the first option, within each tier of the market,
orders will be executed in time priority. 384 Under the second option,
within a particular price level, orders will be executed within each tier
based on size/time priority.3 85 The purpose of this second option is to
allow parties placing large orders to attempt to obtain execution of as
much of the order as possible in a short period of time.

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *30.
See Amendment No. 8 Proposal, supra note 362, at * 1.
See id. at *11-12 (citing the language of proposed NASD Rule 4710(b)(l)(B)); id. at *43.
Id. at *43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Under the third order execution option, the party placing the order
will be allowed to give lower priority to ECNs charging separate access
fees, unless the ECN's quote or order is, after adding the access fee, still
equal to the best price in the market. 386 Accordingly, under this third
option, within a particular price level, orders will be executed in the
following priority: (i) quotes or orders of market makers, ECNs which
do not charge separate access fees, ECNs whose prices are equal to the
best market price after adding the access fee, and UTP agency orders, in
time priority; (ii) quotes of ECNs that charge a separate access fee
which, when added to the quote, makes the price inferior to the best
price in the market, in time priority; (iii) reserve size of market makers,
ECNs that do not charge a quote access fee, and ECNs whose quote
matches the best price after adding the access fee, in time priority;
(iv) reserve size of ECNs that charge an access fee which, when added
to the quote, makes the price inferior to the best price in the market, in
time priority; and (v) principal quotes of UTP exchanges, in time
priority. 387 If an order entered into the SuperMontage System cannot be
filled within the next two trading increments, or ten cents in a decimal
trading environment, the system will delay five seconds to allow market
388
makers time to update their quotes.
"Directed orders," i.e., orders sent to a specific market participant,
will generally have to be oversized to limit the potential for dual
liability.3 89 However, market participants may choose to receive
liability orders from the directed order system. 390 Nasdaq anticipates
386. Id. at *43-44.
387. Id.
388. See Amendment No. 4 Proposal, supra note 371, at *20-21. Under the original
SuperMontage proposal the system would have delayed five seconds each time it moved to a new
price level, but commenters thought this would cause orders to back up in the system.
SuperMontage Proposal, supra note 101, at *11-12; Amendment No. 4 Proposal, supra note 371,
at *20. The current provisions governing the delay were introduced with the fourth amendment
to the proposal. Amendment No. 4 Proposal, supra note 371, at *20-21.
389. Id. at *13. If directed orders were not oversized, they could lead to dual liability because
they are not routed in accordance with the Order Execution Algorithm. For example, if a market
maker was quoting a bid price of 25 (1000) and a sell order for 1,000 shares was directed to it at
the same time an order was automatically executed against its bid through operation of the Order
Execution Algorithm, the market maker would be obligated to purchase 2,000 shares despite only
quoting a bid size of 1,000.
390. This option was provided with the seventh amendment to the proposal, in response to
comments from ECNs who were concerned that their customers have an efficient way to direct
orders to them. See Notice of Filing of Amendment Nos. 5, 6 and 7 to Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Establishment of Nasdaq Order
Display Facility and to Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading Platform, Exchange Act Release No.
43,138 (Aug. 10, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1133152, at *30 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Amendment
Nos. 5, 6 and 7 Proposal].
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that the quotation montage will be used as a means of negotiation for
market makers. 39 1 If a market maker receives a directed order that it
wants to fill, it can cancel its displayed order to avoid double
execution. 392 The SuperMontage System will also allow "preferenced
orders," which will be automatically executed but which will not be
subject to the above order execution algorithms. 393 Preferenced orders
will be considered liability orders and will be processed with nondirected orders. 394 The party placing a preferenced order also will
designate the market participant to whom the order would be
delivered.39 5 A preferenced order will only be executed if the
participant to whom it was preferenced is quoting the NBBO. 396 If the
party to whom the order was preferenced was not at the NBBO, the
order will not be executed.39 7
6. Reaction of ECNs
The Commission received a large number of comments on the
SuperMontage proposal. In proposing the fourth amendment to the
proposal, Nasdaq expressed the overly sanguine view that "the
398
overwhelming majority of. . . comments were extremely positive."
It also stated, in a significant understatement, that "[a] few commenters
opposed the proposal in its entirety." 399 Comments from the ECNs,
who are the major competitors of Nasdaq after the NYSE, were highly
critical. Bloomberg L.P., which operates an ECN through its
Bloomberg Tradebook LLC subsidiary, accused Nasdaq of abusing its
regulatory power to establish a monopoly in connection with its plan to
become a for-profit entity. 4°° In addition, Nasdaq's required statement
391. Id. The negotiation process would be an alternative to the automatic execution process
described above. See supra Part VII.A.1 (discussing development of automatic execution
systems).
392. Amendment Nos. 5, 6 and 7 Proposal, supra note 390, at *30.
393. Id. at 46. Preferenced orders will differ from directed orders because preferenced orders
will be subject to automatic execution. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at *46.
397. Id. Amendment No. 8 had another alternative for preferenced orders under which these
orders would be executed at the quote price of the market participant to whom it was preferenced,
regardless of whether this market participant was at the NBBO. Id. This alternative was
withdrawn with the ninth and last amendment to the SuperMontage proposal. See SuperMontage
Adopting Release, supra note 36, at *1 n.14.
398. Amendment No. 4 Proposal, supra note 371, at *19.
399. Id.
400. Letter from Kevin M. Foley, Bloomberg L.P., to S.E.C. (Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Bloomberg Letter].
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regarding the effect of the proposal on competition was as follows:
"Nasdaq does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the [Exchange Act]."' 40 1 This conclusory
statement angered the ECNs, whose existence was threatened by the
proposal. 4 2 Though Nasdaq responded to many of the ECNs comments
by amending the SuperMontage proposal, even in its final form it was
40 3
strongly opposed by the ECNs.
VIII. FLAWS IN THE MARKETS AND SELF-REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The current self-regulatory structure for the nation's securities
markets has serious flaws, which have been exacerbated by Nasdaq's
growth, the increasing competition between Nasdaq and the NYSE, and
the emergence of ECNs. In the last five years disciplinary actions
brought by the SEC against both the NASD and the NYSE have
illustrated the dangers posed by the current system. In addition, a
market manipulation case fostered by trading on ECNs highlights the
SEC's concerns regarding the surveillance of trading on ECNs.
A. Nasdaq
Beginning in 1994, the Commission conducted an investigation into
trading on Nasdaq that was prompted in large part by a well-publicized
study that questioned the unusual quoting practices of Nasdaq market
makers. 4°4 The investigation, which concluded in 1996, uncovered
serious problems with the operation of Nasdaq and also illustrated some
of the deficiencies in the self-regulatory system. On August 8, 1996,
4 5
the Commission instituted an enforcement action against the NASD. 0
In addition, the Commission issued a "Section 21(a)" report detailing
the problems both with the Nasdaq market and with the NASD's
40 6
supervision of the market.
401. Amendment No. 4 Proposal, supra note 371, at *25.
402. Letter from Professional Investment Management, Inc., to S.E.C. (undated) (on file with
author).
403. See, e.g., Letter from Instinet Corporation, to S.E.C. (Dec. 6, 2000) (on file with author);
Letter from Island ECN, Inc., to S.E.C. (Dec. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
404. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid OddEighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994).
405. In re National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Exchange Act Release No. 37,538,
62 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996), available at 1996 WL 447193 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter National Association of Securities Dealers].
406. See Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2. A "Section 21(a)" report is issued pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act, which grants the Commission the authority to issue a report
detailing findings of violations of the securities laws in lieu of an enforcement action. See 15
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One of the more serious violations uncovered by the SEC in its
investigation, as detailed in the report, was a "pricing convention" under
which market makers in Nasdaq securities quoted stocks only in eveneighth prices. 407 The Section 21(a) report also detailed instances in
which certain market makers colluded with other market makers to
display quotations at prices at which they did not intend to trade. 408 In
addition, the Commission found that market makers frequently failed to
honor their price quotations and consistently reported their trades late to
Nasdaq. 4°9 Finally, the SEC found that the NASD had failed to
properly carry out its supervisory responsibilities by ignoring
substantial evidence of wrongdoing on the Nasdaq market.4 1 °
U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1994). The Commission has used its authority under Section 2 1(a) only on rare
occasions, typically where unusual circumstances dictate that an enforcement action is not
necessary. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 65 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1240 (Sept. 30, 1997), available
at 1997 WL 597984 (S.E.C.); Report of Investigation in the Matter of County of Orange,
California as it Relates to the Conduct of the Members of the Board of Supervisors, Exchange
Act Release No. 36,761, 61 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 382 (Jan. 24, 1996), available at 1996 WL
26755 (S.E.C.); Report of Investigation in the Matter of Cooper Companies, Inc. as it Relates to
the Conduct of Cooper's Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 35,082, 58 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 591 (Dec. 12, 1994), availableat 1994 WL 707149 (S.E.C.). In the NASD's case,
however, the Section 21 (a) Report supplemented an enforcement action.
407. Section 2 1(a) Report, supra note 2, at *4. Under the pricing convention, market makers
quoted bid and offer prices only at increments of 4, / or 3/4and not in "odd-eighths," such as 1/,
3/8or 5/8. Id. The pricing convention explained the practice of market makers avoiding odd-eighth
quotes originally noted in the Christie-Schultz Study. Id. at *26 n.26. Quoting stocks in oddeighths was known as making a "Chinese Market." Id. at *37 n.42. Traders making a Chinese
Market were subject to angry telephone calls and other harassment and other market markers
sometimes refused to trade with them. Id. at *67. As a result of the pricing convention, spreads
on Nasdaq stocks remained artificially wide. Id.
408. For example, in one notable instance, a market maker bid 184 for a stock, at which point
another market maker, which had a customer sell order, called the first market maker to request
that it lower its bid so that the second market maker could purchase stock from its customer at a
lower price. Id. at *53. The following is an excerpt from the taped conversation between traders
for the two market makers:
[Market Maker 2:] I just seen [sic] you go /4 bid. Without like going through a whole
bunch of, you know .... I know I got a bunch of these for sale at the opening. I would
rather buy them at 18, if you know what I'm saying. If there's a ticket to write, I will
write it with you [meaning I will sell some [of the stock in question] to you if you are
looking to buy some].
Id. at *53. Under basic principles of best execution, Market Maker 2 could not have purchased
stock from a customer at 18 when Market Maker I, the other party to the conversation, was
bidding 18/4. See supra Part V.A (describing a market maker's duty of best execution). In
response to the above request by Market Maker 2, Market Maker I dropped its bid to 18, and
Market Maker 2 bought 8,000 shares from its customer at 18. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2,
at *53. Market Maker 2 later sold 6,500 shares to Market Maker I at 18 /4. Id.
409. Section 21(a) Report, supra note 2, at *5.
410. For instance, in August 1989, the NASD became aware of a letter sent by the NYSE to a
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The primary purpose of the SEC's administrative proceedings against
the NASD, which did not impose any fine upon the organization, was to
require the NASD to comply with certain "undertakings" relating to its
41
composition and surveillance and enforcement functions. '
B. New York Stock Exchange
In June 1999, the Commission instituted an administrative
proceeding against the NYSE based on alleged supervisory failures in
connection with illegal conduct by independent floor brokers on the
exchange. 4 12 The alleged illegal conduct consisted of independent floor
brokers' trading for their own accounts, or sharing in others' trading
profits, which was considered the equivalent of trading for their own
account. 4 13 The allegedly illegal conduct resulted in an indictment and
a Commission enforcement action against numerous independent floor
Nasdaq-listed company in which the NYSE alleged that Nasdaq spreads were wider than NYSE
spreads. Id. at *67. In June 1990, the letter was discussed at a meeting of the NASD's Trading
Committee. Id. In early 1992, a senior NASD official prepared a memorandum where he
detailed the practice of market makers avoiding odd-eighth quotes. Id. at *69-70. This
memorandum was distributed to members of the NASD's executive management. Id. at *70. In
addition, the Commission found that the NASD ignored several other warning signs of these
serious problems in the Nasdaq market. Id. The Commission also found that the NASD was far
more concerned with combating the SOES firms than it was with policing market makers on
Nasdaq, and that it did not aggressively enforce the Firm Quote rule. See id. at *78-8 1.
Long before the SEC's investigation concluded, the NASD undertook a study of its structure.
Id. at *22-25. The "NASD Select Committee on Structure and Governance," which was known
less formally as the "Rudman Committee" after its Chairman, former United States Senator
Warren Rudman, conducted the study. Id. at *22. One of the primary recommendations of the
Rudman Committee was that the NASD reorganize so that Nasdaq and the regulatory branch of
the NASD were separate subsidiaries and that both the NASD and each of the two subsidiaries
have at least fifty percent public representation on their boards of governors or directors. Id. at
*23.
The NASD instituted these recommendations along with most of the other
recommendations of the Rudman Committee. id. at *23-24.
411. The NASD agreed to, among other things:
. implement and maintain at least 50% independent public and non-industry
membership on its board of governors and the board of governors or directors of each
of its subsidiaries and affiliates;
" provide for the autonomy and independence of the regulatory staff of NASDR;
" ensure that the organization has a substantial and independent internal audit staff;
" improve its surveillance and examination of order handling and trade reporting; and
" propose a rule interpretation prohibiting collusion among market makers.
National Association of Securities Dealers, supra note 405, at *3-5.
412. In re New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 41,574, 70 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 106 (June 29, 1999), available at 1999 WL 430863 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter In re
New York Stock Exchange].
413. Id. at *3. With some limited exceptions, Commission and NYSE rules prohibit exchange
members from trading for their own account while on the floor of the exchange. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1 la-1 (2000); NYSE Rules 90, 95 and 11 (1998), N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 59, IT 2090,
2095, 2111.
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brokers and broker-dealers. 4 14 At the time of the Commission
enforcement action against the NYSE, the charges against the
independent floor brokers and broker-dealers had not been resolved, and
the government's case later encountered some difficulties. 4 15 However,
the Commission enforcement action focused on the conduct of the
NYSE.
The Commission found that the NYSE failed to diligently carry out
its self-regulatory responsibilities in connection with the floor brokers'
alleged violations, in violation of Section 19(g) of the Exchange Act.
Specifically, the Commission found that the NYSE failed to diligently
seek information on the receipt of performance-based compensation by
independent floor brokers, a violation of Commission and NYSE rules.
In addition, the Commission found that the NYSE, without reasonable
justification, suspended its surveillance of floor brokers for extended
periods of time. 4 16 Like the enforcement action against the NASD, the
Commission's enforcement action against the NYSE did not impose a
fine, but required the NYSE to comply with various undertakings
relating to its market surveillance and its education of members and
4 17
their representatives.

414. In re New York Stock Exchange, supra note 412, at *3.
415. The Commission order contained the unusual statement that the Office of the United
States Attorney, "following consultation with the SEC and the NYSE, has stated that, as of April
30, 1999, there was probable cause to believe that 64 Independent Floor Brokers prior to
February 1998 had effected transactions on the NYSE floor for accounts as to which those floor
brokers received a share of the profits." Id. at *3. The later difficulties stemmed, in part, from
the disclosure that the NYSE had taken the position that in some situations, independent floor
brokers were allowed to share in profits from their trading. Greg Ip, New Issues Arise in NYSE
Trading Controversy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 2854688.
416. In re New York Stock Exchange, supra note 412, at *6. For example, the NYSE
suspended this surveillance from approximately August 1995 through December 1997. Id.
417. The undertakings included, among others, the NYSE's agreeing to:
. improve its regulation of independent floor brokers, specialist, and other exchange
members by, among other things, engaging in continuous surveillance of all members
on the floor of the exchange, ensuring that members of the exchange's regulatory staff
are present on the floor at all times during trading hours, and increasing its
enforcement staff;
. form an independent committee of the exchange's board of directors to draft
comprehensive procedures manuals detailing the objectives of the NYSE's surveillance
program governing members on the floor of the exchange;
. design and implement a mandatory education program for members on the floor of
the exchange; and
. continue the development of an electronic audit trail system.
Id. at *7-10.
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C. ECNs
Although no major disciplinary action has been brought against an
ECN, the Commission, in adopting Regulation ATS, expressed the view
that adequate market surveillance of alternative trading systems is
lacking. 4 18 In particular, the Commission found that alternative trading
systems can be used to facilitate market manipulations. In June 1998,
the Commission brought an enforcement action against two brothers for
taking advantage of the Display Rule to manipulate the price of several
stocks by placing limit orders that changed the bid or offer prices of the
stocks. 4 19 Though the Commission's order in the manipulation case
does not mention alternative trading systems, in the adopting release for
Regulation ATS the Commission stated that the manipulation was
420
carried out through orders placed on alternative trading systems.
While the alleged manipulation was hardly a success, 42 1 the
Commission apparently believed that the lack of market surveillance of
alternative trading systems created a risk of a larger scheme going
undetected.4 2 2
IX. MARKET STRUCTURE AND POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO BEST
ExECuTION

The rapid developments in electronic trading in recent years have
created concern on the part of the Commission about the quality of
order execution and the costs associated with trading. The Commission
release announcing the proposed rescission of NYSE Rule 390 also
served as a "Concept Release," under which the Commission requested
comment on fundamental market issues. 423 The Commission expressed
concerns with four trends that may damage the efficiency of securities
markets and the ability of investors to receive best execution: market
fragmentation, internalization, payment for order flow, and the costs of
market transaction and quotation information. This section first
examines these concerns. Next, it examines proposed solutions to the
perceived obstacles to best execution, beginning with recently-enacted
418. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *2.
419. In re Ian Fishman & Lawrence Fishman, Exchange Act Release No. 40,115, 67 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 783 (June 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 330901 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Ian
Fishman & Lawrence Fishman].
420. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *2 n.5.
421. The Commission found that the alleged manipulators reaped profits of only $662.50 and
that they lost money on one of the five series of trades described in the Commission's order. Ian
Fishman & Lawrence Fishman, supra note 419, at *2 n.5.
422. Reg. ATS Adopting Release, supra note 233, at *2, *4.
423. Concept Release, supra note 45, at * 1-3.
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Commission rules designed to improve the quality of disclosure relating
to order execution. It then discusses proposals designed to combat the
negative effects of market fragmentation and to ensure that fees charged
for market information are fair to investors and related to the costs of
generating the information.
A. Commission Concerns
1. Fragmentation
While the Commission strongly encouraged the elimination of offboard trading restrictions, it also recognizes that their elimination
increased the possibility of market fragmentation, or the execution of
orders on multiple market centers, as opposed to a central exchange or
system. 424 The SEC believes that market fragmentation may reduce
quote competition and liquidity. 425 At its most fundamental level,
market fragmentation creates these concerns because orders executed in
different market centers do not interact with each other. 426 Under
current regulations, while markets are linked, broker-dealers are not
required to route customer orders to the market displaying the best
price.4 27
2. Internalization
Internalization, a broker-dealer's practice of routing orders to its own
market making desk or to an affiliate for execution, increases
fragmentation. 428 The Commission is concerned that internalization
inhibits "quote competition," or the raising or lowering of bid and offer
prices by dealers to attract orders. For example, the theory behind the
Nasdaq market is that dealers who want to attract sell orders, either to
fill a customer buy order or simply to increase their market making
activity, will increase their bid prices. Similarly, broker-dealers are
required to post limit orders to the Nasdaq system if they improve the
best bid or offer. 429 However, broker-dealers are allowed to trade with
their own customers, i.e., "internalize" orders, as long as they match the
best price in the market. As a result, investors placing limit orders may

424.
425.
426.
on one
427.
428.
429.

Id. at *7.
Id.
For example, a customer limit order to sell a stock at 60 / or better may be filled at 601/
market while on another market a limit order to buy at 60 goes unfilled. See id.
Execution Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *5.
Id.
See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing the Display Rule).
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help set the market price, yet not have their orders executed. 4 30 The fact
that broker-dealers are required only to match the best price in the
market is also thought to reduce opportunities for price improvement.4 3 '
3. Payment for Order Flow
Internalization occurs when a broker-dealer has a large base of retail
customers which generate order flow. Many market makers that do not
have a significant number of retail customers engage in a practice
known as "payment for order flow," in which they provide
compensation to another broker-dealer in exchange for the other brokerdealer's sending orders for execution. Parties are willing to pay for
order flow because of the revenues they generate from executing large
volumes of customer orders. Payment for order flow may take many
forms other than cash. For example, a firm may offer clearing services
432
to the party directing orders to it.
The Commission solicited comment on the practice of payment for
order flow in 1992 in connection with the Division of Market
Regulation's Year 2000 study, which was completed in 1994.
Opponents of payment for order flow argue that it can prevent
customers from receiving best execution of their orders. 43 3 If the
430. For instance, assume that the inside bid of Cisco Systems is 25 and the inside offer is
25 /. If a customer of one broker-dealer placed a limit order to purchase 1,000 shares at 2518, the
broker-dealer would be required to display this order, as it would represent the new best price in
the market. However, if a second broker-dealer held a market sell order for 1,000 shares, it would
not be required to route this order to the first broker-dealer. Instead, it could purchase the shares
itself at 251/8. The limit order of the customer of the first broker-dealer would then not be filled,
which might reduce the incentive of customers to place limit orders which improve the price in
the market. See id. A similar situation would occur where a market maker raises its bid to attract
shares, but instead witnesses sell orders executed at this improved price without itself receiving
order flow.
431. See Concept Release, supra note 45, at *5.
432. Rule 1Ob-10(d)(9) under the Exchange Act defines payment for order flow as:
any monetary payment, service, property, or other benefit that results in remuneration,
compensation, or consideration to a broker or dealer from any broker or dealer,
national securities exchange, registered securities association, or exchange member in
return for the routing of customer orders by such broker or dealer to any broker or
dealer, national securities exchange, registered securities association, or exchange
member for execution, including but not limited to: research, clearance, custody,
products or services; reciprocal agreements for the provision of order flow; adjustment
of a broker or dealer's unfavorable trading errors; offers to participate as underwriter in
public offerings; stock loans or shared interest accrued thereon; discounts, rebates, or
any other reductions of or credits against any fee to, or expense or other financial
obligation of, the broker or dealer routing a customer order that exceeds that fee,
expense or financial obligation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(d)(9) (2000).
433. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 33,026, 55 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
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market to which an order is directed executes the order automatically at
the NBBO, 4 34 the customer placing the order may be denied the
opportunity for price improvement. 435 This lost opportunity results
from the failure of the party executing the order to expose the order to
other orders in the marketplace. This exposure could result in an
execution at a price better than the NBBO. Opponents argue that
brokers in control of the orders have a strong incentive to direct orders
to firms that pay for order flow, rather than firms that provide the best
43 6
execution.
The Commission issued a rule proposal governing payment for order
flow in 1993 that discussed various alternatives ranging from a
complete ban to varying degrees of required disclosure. Ultimately, the
Commission decided not to ban the practice completely, opting instead
to require enhanced disclosure concerning the practice. Specifically, the
Commission adopted Rule 1 lAcl-3, which requires that certain
to customers when a new account is opened and
disclosures be made
437
annually thereafter.
At the same'time it adopted Rule 1 lAcl-3 the Commission amended
Rule lOb-10, which governs customer confirmations of securities
transactions, to require disclosure of payment for order flow. 4 3 8 As
amended, Rule l Ob-10 requires disclosure on confirmations of payment
for order flow received by the broker-dealer and a statement that the
source and nature of the compensation in connection with the particular

411 (Oct. 6, 1993), available at 1993 WL 403286, at *5 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Payment for Order
Flow].
434. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (describing the NBBO).
435. Payment for Order Flow, supra note 433, at *5.
436. One commentator asserted that the practice violates the federal bribery statute. See id. at
*5 n.33.
437. The following are the disclosures required by Rule I IAcl-3:
* whether the broker-dealer receives payment for order flow;
* "a detailed description of the nature of the compensation received"; and
* a description of the broker-dealer's policies with regard to how it routes customer
orders for which no specific instruction is given, including a statement regarding
whether these orders can be executed at prices better than the NBBO.
17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-3; see also Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34,902,
57 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2315 (Oct. 27, 1994), available at 1994 WL 587790, at *5-7 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter Rule I 1Ac 1-3 Adopting Release].
438. The Commission had proposed requiring disclosure on confirmations of the amount of
compensation received in connection with the specific transaction which was being confirmed,
but dropped this requirement in the face of substantial opposition from broker-dealers, who
claimed that quantifying the compensation in connection with particular transactions would be
nearly impossible. See Rule 1 Acl-3 Adopting Release, supra note 437, at *7.
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transaction will be furnished upon written request. 439 Both the new
Rule 1 lAcl-3 and the amendment to Rule lOb-10 apply to exchangelisted, Nasdaq National Market, SmallCap, and bulletin board
0
securities.44
4. Market Data Fees
Fees for market data, which includes transaction and quotation
information, are a massive source of revenue for securities markets. 44 1
Their magnitude has long made them a source of controversy. 442 The
current controversy pits the users of the information, led by discount
broker Charles Schwab, against the securities markets, led by the
NYSE. Both sides have a clear economic interest. 443 The NYSE claims
an ownership interest in market data and argues that it should be free to
sell the information.' 4 Schwab disputes this ownership claim and
argues that the fees are excessive and greatly exceed the costs of
gathering the information. 445 In addition, Schwab argues that the excess
revenues are improperly used to fund the surveillance function of the
markets. 446 Moreover, Schwab believes that the fees discriminate
against online firms." 47 The NYSE claims that the expenses of
gathering market data exceed its market data revenues, a claim critics
believe is the result of extremely creative cost accounting. 448 In June
1999, Schwab filed a petition seeking a rule change that would, among

439.
*7.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(7)(iii); Rule I lAcl-3 Adopting Release, supra note 437, at

440. As originally proposed, they would have applied only to exchange-listed and Nasdaq
National Market Securities. Id. at *4.
441. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *21-23.
442. ld. at *1I1-13.
443. The exchanges received a total of about $414 million in market data fees in 1998, and
Schwab, which like most brokerage firms absorbs market data costs for its customers, paid a total
of about $20 million to the NYSE alone in 1998. See David Ignatius, Putting a Meter on the
Flow of Information, WASH. POST, June 30, 1999, at A31, availableat 1999 WL 17011561.
444. See id.
445. See id.; The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.
1858 Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer
Prot., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Carrie Dwyer, Executive Vice President for Corporate
Oversight, Charles Schwab & Co.) [hereinafter Dwyer Testimony].
446. See Dwyer Testimony, supra note 445.
447. Under the current structure, brokers must pay either a fixed fee or a per quote charge for
each online customer. Id. Schwab considers this discriminatory because traditional brokers can
pay a fixed terminal fee regardless of the number of quotes their telephone representatives
deliver. Id.
448. See Mike McNamee, I'm Not Gonna Pay a Lot for this Stock Quote, Bus. WK., Dec. 20,
1999, at 148, available at 1999 WL 27296865; Sandra Sugawara, Market Data Fees an Online
Bonanza, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 30307107.
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other things, require market data fees to be tied to the costs incurred in
generating these fees.449 At the other extreme, the NYSE has repeatedly
expressed its desire to dissolve the CTA and replace it with a system
under which each market would provide its own data stream to
vendors. 4 50 As a means of generating some sort of consensus on the
an advisory
controversial market data issue, the SEC has created
45 1
issue.
the
on
recommendations
develop
to
committee
B. ProposedSolutions
1. Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices
The Commission adopted rules in November 2000 designed to
improve execution practices while avoiding direct regulation of market
structure. At the time the rules were adopted, the Commission remained
concerned about market fragmentation's impairment of the quality of
order execution, but it stopped short of mandating enhanced linkages
between markets or additional regulation of routing practices. 452 The
release, which will be referred to as the "Disclosure Release," adopted
two new rules that together require both markets and broker-dealers to
make extensive disclosures regarding order routing and execution. The
Commission believes that the rules will allow brokers to make more
informed comparisons among market centers when determining where
to route customer orders. 453 Investors would then, in the Commission's
view, be better able to evaluate the performance of their brokers in
454
connection with order executions.
New Rule 1 1Acl-5, which was adopted with the Disclosure Release,
requires "market centers" to make specified information available to the
public on a monthly basis in electronic form. 455 The rule only applies to
"National Market System" securities, which are exchange-listed and

449. Mark Hendrickson, Schwab Petitionsfor Fee Revamp, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, July 19, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 24067131.
450. See Mark Hendrickson, NYSE Still Wants out of "Unnecessary" CTA, SEC. INDUS.
NEWS, Oct. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4050440; see also supra Part IV.B (discussing
CTA).
451. Seligman Focuses on Consolidation, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Nov. 13, 2000, available at
2000 WL 4050555.
452. Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590
(Nov. 17, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1721163, at *2 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Disclosure Release].
453. See id. at *39.
454. id. at *40.
455. "Market centers" generally include exchange specialists, market makers in OTC
securities, and alternative trading systems, including ECNs. Id. at * 13.
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Nasdaq National Market securities. 456 In addition, it only applies to
"covered orders," which are orders received when a national
"consolidated best bid and offer" is disseminated; this would exclude
market opening orders. The rule does not apply to orders such as short
sales for which special handling was requested.4 5 7
Under Rule 1 lAcl-5, information regarding, among other things,
speed of execution and "average realized spread" must be included in
market centers' reports for all covered orders for each security. 45 8 The
"realized spread" for an order is defined as double the difference
between the execution price of an order and the midpoint of the
consolidated best bid and offer thirty minutes after the time of
execution.

459

The rule requires specified information regarding, among other
things, speed of execution, degree of price improvement and "average
46
effective spread" for market orders and marketable limit orders only. 0
Id. at * 16.
Id. at "13-14.
The following is the information required for all covered orders:
total number of covered orders;
total number of shares for covered orders;
o
total number of shares for covered orders cancelled before execution;
• total number of shares executed at the market center originally receiving the order;
" total number of shares executed at a market center other than that originally
receiving the order;
• the number of shares for covered orders executed within five specified categories
based on the time elapsed between receipt and execution, such as zero to nine seconds
and ten to twenty-nine seconds; and
* the "average realized spread" for covered orders.
Id. at *4347.
459. Id. at *43-47.
460. The following is the information required for market orders and marketable limit orders
only:
• the "average effective spread" for covered orders;
o
the total number of shares for covered orders executed with price improvement;
• for shares executed with price improvement, the average price improvement,
weighted by number of shares;
. for shares executed with price improvement, the average time between order receipt
and execution, weighted by number of shares;
" the number of shares executed at the quote;
• for shares executed at the quote, the average time from order receipt to execution,
weighted by number of shares;
" the number of shares executed outside the quote;
" for shares executed outside the quote, the average amount the prices were outside
the quote, weighted by number of shares; and
o for shares executed outside the quote, the average time from order receipt to
execution, weighted by number of shares.
456.
457.
458.
"
•
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The effective spread for an order is defined as double the difference
of the consolidated best
between the execution price and the midpoint
46 1
receipt.
order
of
time
the
at
bid and offer
The use of the average effective spread for marketable limit orders
and market orders is intended simply as a measure of the price
improvement, or lack thereof, associated with these orders. 462 Stated
another way, it measures the "liquidity premium" associated with
placing orders that are immediately marketable. 6 3 The average realized
spread is intended to have different significance for non-marketable and
marketable orders. For non-marketable limit orders, the average
realized spread is intended to measure "adverse selection" costs, or the
extent to which limit orders tend to "be executed when the market is
moving significantly against them." 464 The Commission believes that
adverse selection costs are increased by local traders on exchange floors
and OTC market makers "stepping ahead" of limit orders. 465 For
market orders and marketable limit orders, the average realized spread
is intended to measure the routing of "informed" and "uninformed"
orders. 466 Informed orders are orders placed by parties with better
information than generally available in the marketplace, and market
centers are believed to have an incentive to attract uninformed orders,
which are considered to have less risk.46 7 A market center with a
positive average realized spread would be presumed to have attracted
informed orders, and a market center with a negative average realized
spread would be presumed to have attracted uninformed orders.
With the Disclosure Release, the Commission also adopted Rule
1 lAcl-6, which requires broker-dealers to make disclosures to
customers regarding the broker-dealer's order routing practices. In
addition to the exchange-listed and Nasdaq National Market securities
covered by Rule llAcl-5, the rule applies to Nasdaq SmallCap
securities and to listed options. 468 Under the rule, broker-dealers would
Id.
461. The "quote" is the NBBO. Id. at *45 (citing Rule I Acl-5(a)(10)). Accordingly, "at the
quote" means, for a buy order, at the national best offer and, for a sell order, at the national best
bid. id.
462. Id. at *20.
463. Id.
464. Id. at *19.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at *23. The rule applies only to "customer orders," defined as orders not for the
account of the broker-dealer that have a market value of less than $50,000, in the case of options,
or $200,000, in the case of other securities. Id.
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not be required to provide order routing disclosures with regard to
orders which a customer directs to a specific market center. 469 Rule
l lAcl-6 requires broker-dealers to disseminate quarterly reports
containing additional statistical information on their order routing
practices.470

Rule 11 Ac 1-6 also requires a discussion of the material aspects of the
broker-dealer's relationship with each of the market centers to which it
has sent orders, including a description of any payment for order flow or
profit-sharing arrangements. 47 1 The rule expands on the disclosures
required by Rule lOb-10 and Rule llAcl-3.4 7 2 The final disclosure
required by Rule 1 lAcl-6 is a discussion and analysis by the brokerdealer of its order routing practices, including the "objectives" affecting
its order routing practices, the results obtained by them, a comparison of
the execution quality of the market centers to which the broker-dealer
routes orders to that of other market centers, and a statement as to
whether the broker has made or intends to make significant changes in
473
its order routing practices.
The reports required under Rule 1 lAcl-6 need not be distributed to
the broker-dealer's customers, but must be made "publicly available,"
by posting on a web site, furnishing a written copy on request, and
notifying customers at least once per year that the report will be
furnished on request. 474 Under the rule, in addition to making the
quarterly reports available, broker-dealers are required to furnish, upon

469. Id.
470. Rule I1Acl-6 requires broker-dealers to disseminate quarterly reports containing the
following statistical information on their order routing practices:
.
"non-directed orders," or customer orders which were not directed to a particular
market center, as a percentage of total customer orders;
. the percentages of non-directed orders which were market orders, limit orders and
"other" orders; and
. for each of the various market centers to which the broker-dealer sent non-directed
orders, the percentage of non-directed orders sent to the market center, along with the
percentage of non-directed market orders, non-directed limit orders, and non-directed
"other" orders sent to the market center.
Id. at *47-48.
471. Id.
472. Rule lOb-10 requires a broker-dealer to disclose on its confirmation only that payment
for order flow that was received and to furnish details upon written request, and Rule 1 lAcl-3
requires broker-dealers to disclose to new customers and annually to existing customers its
"policies" on payment for order flow and order routing. See id.; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b10(a)(2)(i)(C), 240.1 IAcl-3(a) (2001); see also supra Part IX.A.3 (discussing payment for order
flow).
473. Disclosure Release, supra note 452, at *47-48.
474. Id.
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customer request, the name of the market center or centers to which the
customer orders were routed in the six months preceding the request,
whether the orders were directed or non-directed and, for any executed
orders, the time of execution. 475 Broker-dealers also have to notify
customers at least annually that this additional detail is available upon
request.47 6
2. Prohibition of or Restrictions on Internalization
As noted above, it is argued that internalization reduces the incentive
for customers to place limit orders and reduces opportunities for price
improvement. 477 A complete ban on internalization was not one of the
options discussed by the Commission in the Concept Release, and
therefore seems unlikely. A less extreme alternative proposed by the
NYSE at the time it sought rescission of Rule 390, however, seems to
be receiving serious consideration. 478 Under the NYSE proposal,
broker-dealers would be prohibited from
internalizing customer orders
479
unless they offered price improvement.
3. Trade-through Rule
One of the reasons fragmentation is believed to be harmful to
investors is that even if markets are linked, orders do not have to be
routed to the market offering the best price. 480 A solution that has been
proposed to remedy this situation is the adoption of a "trade-through"
rule, under which broker-dealers executing customer orders would be
required to ensure that a customer's order executed on a particular
market center does not receive a price inferior to that it would have
received on another market center at the same time. 48 1 A trade-through
rule could contain an exception under which a broker-dealer's customer
agrees to allow the broker-dealer to use its own judgment in achieving
best execution, rather than being obligated to achieve the best price.

475. Id.
476. Id.
477. See supra Part IX.A.2 (discussing internalization and its potential inhibition of quote
competition).
478. See Concept Release, supra note 45, at *5.
479. See id. at *6.
480. See supra Part IX.A. I (discussing market fragmentation).
481. Execution Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *7.
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4. Decimalization
From the inception of trading in the United States securities markets,
prices have been quoted in fractions. 482 The U.S. markets retained this
antiquated system of trading in fractions long after the other major
markets in the world had begun trading stocks in decimals. 483 The
move to decimal trading began only after Commission announcements,
public debate, the threat of Congressional action, and some industry
resistance. 484 While the NYSE initially announced that it would begin
decimal trading by January 2000, industry preparations for the year
2000 delayed the transition to decimals. 485 On January 28, 2000, the
Commission issued an order requiring the exchanges and other market
participants to begin the transition to decimal trading, with some
decimal trading to begin by July 3, 2000.486 The Commission later
extended this deadline, but on June 8, 2000, it ordered the industry to
develop a phase-in plan to begin decimal trading in exchange-listed
securities and options by September 5, 2000. A pilot program of
decimal trading for seven stocks began on August 28, 2000, and
decimal trading began with about fifty-seven NYSE stocks on
September 25, 2000.487 In accordance with the plan submitted by the
industry, decimal trading for all exchange-listed securities options and
Nasdaq securities was completed by April 9, 2001.488
482. This is a practice stemming from the status of the Spanish dollar in the late eighteenth
century as one of the more stable currencies. Editorial, Bid Farewell to an Eighth, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 2000, at 18, available at 2000 WL 3705374; Paul Bomberger, Introducing a New Way of
Looking at Your Stock Prices, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, Penn.), Aug. 22, 2000, at B6,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Intelligencer Journal File. The Spanish dollar was physically
divisible into "pieces of eight," so stocks were quoted and traded in eighths. Bomberger, supra.
As the U.S. markets developed, most established minimum trading increments, which, if not an
eighth, were another fraction. Securities and Exchange Commission, Market 2000 Report,
Introduction and Executive Summary, available at 1994 SEC LEXIS 130, at *51-52 (Jan. 1994).
483. Order Directing the Exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to
Submit a Decimalization Implementation Plan Pursuant to Section 1 A(a)(3)(B) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 42,360, 71 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1274 (Jan.
28, 2000), availableat 2000 WL 91915, at *1 (S.E.C.).
484. Id. at * 1-2.
485. Id. at *2.
486. Order Directing the Exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to
Submit a Phase-in Plan to Implement Decimal Pricing and Equity Securities and Options,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,914, 72 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1493 (June 8, 2000), available at
2000 WL 816861, at *1 (S.E.C.).
487. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by the NYSE,
Inc. Relating to Decimal Pricing, Exchange Act Release No. 43,230, 73 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
337 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1238790, at *1 (S.E.C.); NYSE to Add to Decimal
Stocks Next Month, SEC. WK., Nov. 13, 2000, at 4.
488. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Decimal Pricing for Listed Securities,
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Decimal trading is widely expected to reduce spreads and save
investors large sums of money. However, decimal trading may actually
make it easier for broker-dealers to engage in a practice known as
"stepping ahead" of investor limit orders, which could harm
investors. 489 Early returns have indicated that traders' "stepping ahead"
of orders has been a major problem for institutional investors, but that
49
individual investors have largely benefitted from decimalization. 0
5. Market Data Fees
In December 1999, the SEC undertook a comprehensive review of
market data fees and their role in funding the operations of selfregulatory organizations ("SROs"). 49 1 At the same time, it sought
public comment on a variety of proposals designed to ensure that
market information is readily available to the public and that the
revenues from such data are allocated in a way that furthers the
objectives of the national market system.49 2 The Commission indicated
that it was considering increasing its involvement in the regulation of
market data fees, which were historically determined by a consensus
between the SROs and the rest of the industry. 493 The Commission
proposed a cost-based approach that would be a significant departure
from the current system, under which revenues are generally allocated
based on the SROs' percentage of transaction volume. Under the
proposed approach, which is reminiscent of rate-fixing for utilities, the
percentage of the SROs' share of market data revenues would be tied to
the portion of their costs related to the generation of the market
information. 494 The Commission has indicated that these related costs

Exchange Act Release No. 43,232, 73 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 345 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at
2000 WL 1238788, at *1 (S.E.C.).
489. Walter Hamilton, Ways to Limit the Risk of Trading in Pennies, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
2000, at C6, available at LEXIS, News Library, Los Angeles Times File. In a fractional trading
environment where the normal trading increment was 1/8,if the stock was trading at 20 - 201/4, and
an investor placed a limit order to sell at 2018, to prevent the sell order from interacting with a
buy order, a professional trader would have to place an order at a price of 20, or 1/8better than the
customer's order. However, if the same stock were trading in a decimal environment, and the
quotes were 20.00-20.50 and the investor placed a sell order at 20.25, a professional trader could
"step ahead" of the order by entering a sell order at 20.24.
490. Jeff D. Updike & Gregory Zuckerman, Decimal Move Brings Points of Contention from
Traders, WALL ST. J., Feb.12, 2001, at C1.
491. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *2; supra Part III (describing the history of selfregulation and the structure and operations of self-regulatory organizations).
492. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *28-29.
493. Id. at *29.
494. Id. at *29-30.
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would not necessarily be limited to direct costs such as technological
5
costs.

49

X. DEBATES ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION

Improvements in technology have fostered the development of ECNs
and improvements to the NYSE's and Nasdaq's systems. As additional
trading systems have developed, a long-standing debate of the merits of
the two primary types of markets, agency and auction, has intensified.
In addition, the debate has expanded to include the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative trading systems, particularly ECNs.
Moreover, the current system for regulating these systems has been
called into question by the planned demutualization of the NYSE and
Nasdaq. This section summarizes the debate surrounding the structure
of the United States securities markets, and then discusses the planned
demutualization of the NYSE and Nasdaq and its effect on selfregulation.
A. Centralized or FragmentedMarket
Part of the difficulty the SEC faces in regulating the manner in which
orders are executed is the uncertainty as to the structure the markets will
take in coming years. The Commission has consistently expressed
concerns that fragmentation may prevent investors from receiving best
execution. As one possible solution to this perceived problem, the
Commission has considered the creation of a central limit order book
("CLOB"). A CLOB would aggregate all orders in a single location and
provide automatic executions based on price-time priority. 496 The socalled "MGM" alliance of Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter has supported a CLOB.4 97 The MGM alliance
proposed a "hard CLOB," which would be mandatory for all market
participants.4 98
Nasdaq's SuperMontage proposal, as currently
499
structured, would be a "soft CLOB" because it would be voluntary.
One of the stated advantages of a CLOB is that it would improve order
495. For example, the Commission considers market regulation costs related to the generation
of market information because they improve the quality of the information. See id. at *35.
496. Ian Springsteel & Michelle Celarier, The ECN Dilemma: Blasting Fragmentation,Wall
Street Calls for a Centralized Market Structure that Threatens the Upstarts, INVESTMENT
DEALERS DIG., Mar. 6, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 4666837.
497. Laura Santini, Key Congressman Demands Details on SuperMontage, INVESTMENT
DEALERS DIG., July 3, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4667054.
498. Peter Chapman, Fragmented Dealing Under Fire, TRADERS MAG., May 1, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 11133579.
499. Id.
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execution, as all limit orders would interact in a central forum to
provide maximum liquidity, transparency, and opportunity for price
improvement. A CLOB is also thought to provide substantial cost
savings because it would be a single system and would have only one
self-regulator.
Opponents of a CLOB argue that it would stifle innovation in the
securities markets and threaten stability of the markets because it would
provide a single point of failure. 500 If a hard CLOB were implemented,
it would presumably include, at the very least, all exchange-listed and
Nasdaq National Market securities. If the technology supporting the
CLOB failed, all trading in these securities would come to a halt. In
addition, opponents of a CLOB argue that mandating executions based
on price-time priority would eliminate an investor's choice in
determining how an order should be executed.5 °1
B. Auction or DealerMarket
Proponents of the auction market model used by the NYSE and
several other exchanges argue that it produces the best execution
because orders interact with each other in a central location. For
example, auction markets theoretically offer more opportunities for
price improvement because of the exposure of orders to the trading
crowd.5 °2 In addition, because of the involvement of the specialist,
auction markets have historically been more stable in times of extreme
volatility, such as market crashes. The NYSE has long argued that the
50 3
exposure of orders to the crowd results in lower spreads.
The NYSE's claims of superior execution notwithstanding, observers
have cited several flaws with the NYSE's model. For instance,
exchange specialists earn enormous profits, primarily from trading for
their own accounts, which raises questions as to whether they are
helping investors or profiting at the investor's expense. 50 4 Much of the
500. Id.
501. Springsteel & Celarier, supra note 496. For instance, small investors may be willing to
forego the opportunity for price improvement in exchange for certainty of execution. Similarly,
institutional investors seeking execution of large orders may be willing to accept a price slightly
lower than the NBBO if it allows them to quickly acquire or dispose of a large block of stock.
502. NYSE MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 49, at 20-22.
503. This position seems to be supported by an SEC study of Nasdaq and the NYSE. Greg Ip,
SEC Study May Hurt NASDAQ Image, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at CI, available at 2000 WLWS 26619587; Office of Economic Analysis, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Report on the Comparison of Order Executions Across Equity Market Structures,
available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/ordrxmkt.pdf.
504. See John A. Byrne, The Decline and Fall of the NYSE Empire?, TRADERS MAG., Feb. 1,
2000, available at 2000 WL 11133510 (quoting one institutional investor which views specialists
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specialist's profit is unquestionably tied to the risk they assume in
committing their own capital to trades that increase liquidity.5 °5
However, the magnitude of their profits raises a question as to whether
the liquidity provided by specialists is worth the costs to investors.
Some observers believe that the NYSE is such a liquid market not
because of the service provided by the specialists, but simply because it
is where the overwhelming majority of the orders for NYSE-listed
stocks are sent. 50 6 In addition, specialists have unique access to highly
valuable information because they are the only parties who can view the
order books for the stocks for which they have responsibility. 50 7 This
access creates the opportunity for specialists to engage in proprietary
trading for their own benefit at the expense of investors.50 8 While
specialists are generally required to engage in proprietary trading only
as necessary to maintain fair and orderly markets, it would be extremely
difficult to demonstrate that a specialist's proprietary trades were made
for some other purpose. Critics of the exchanges also argue that a floorbased system is antiquated and that too many individuals handle orders,
resulting in excessive trading costs.
Proponents of the dealer system argue that dealers provide much
needed liquidity for the market, particularly in less active stocks.
Critics of the dealer system assert that because investors must pay a
spread in every transaction, they receive worse execution than in an

as competitors in addition to facilitators of trading); Smart Gamble, U.S. BANKER, Sept. 2000, at
12, available at 2000 WL 17705070 (noting that NYSE specialists had an average return on
equity of approximately 30% in 1999) [hereinafter Smart Gamble]. In 1999, an analyst estimated
that the average operating margin for NYSE specialists was 55%. Carol Vinzant, Do We Need a
Stock Exchange?, FORTUNE, Nov. 22, 1999, at 259, available at 1999 WL 27633093. While
details are scarce on specialists' operations, one publicly-traded specialist reported that
proprietary trades accounted for only 30% of its number of trades, but 75% of its revenue. Id.
505. When specialists buy stock to provide liquidity, they are inevitably buying in a declining
market. However, they almost always can unload their purchased shares at a profit when the
market reverses direction. See Andrew Feinberg, Blown Away by Black Monday, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1987, § 6, at 39, available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Neil
Weinberg, The Big Board Comes Back from the Brink, FORBES, Nov. 13, 2000, at 274, available
at 2000 WL 25963943.
506. See The Battle for Efficient Markets, EcON., June 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL
8142447.
507. Id.
508. See id.; Smart Gamble, supra note 504. In one extreme example, on November 22, 1963,
when word of President Kennedy's assassination reached the NYSE floor, causing a major
market decline, some specialists sold stock rather than maintaining order in the market by buying.
Feinberg, supra note 505, at 12. However, during the crash of 1987, a specialist firm was forced
to sell its business after exhausting all of its financial resources attempting to maintain an orderly
market. Id.
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auction market.50 9 Opponents of the dealer system would also assert
that the intervention of a dealer in every trade results in a larger number
of transactions, and attendant costs, than is needed to execute a
customer order.
C. Nasdaq versus ECNs
The battle between Nasdaq and the ECNs began when ECNs
flourished following the adoption of the Order Handling Rules in
1996. 5 10 Over the next four years, ECNs attracted thirty percent of
Nasdaq's business 51 1 due to superior technology and their ability to
provide investors with the opportunity to achieve best executions
through the matching of orders on an agency basis, rather than
transactions with a market maker acting as principal. In addition,
ECNs, unlike Nasdaq, displayed order interest at multiple levels and not
only at the best bid and offer prices. Nasdaq launched what many
consider to be the death blow to the ECNs with its SuperMontage
proposal in late 1999.512 The SuperMontage proposal effectively will
create a massive ECN while preserving the role of the market makers.
5 13
It therefore will neutralize many of the advantages of ECNs.
While Nasdaq and the ECNs clashed over several provisions of the
SuperMontage proposal, the proposal undeniably improves the Nasdaq
market. In one sense, Nasdaq has merely responded to competition by
installing features on its trading system that have been employed by
ECNs for several years. The real questions are whether Nasdaq has
abused its monopoly power, whether the re-engineered Nasdaq will
drive the ECNs out of business and, if so, whether this is fair. ECNs
have argued that Nasdaq has operated as a government-protected
monopoly for several years, and has built its strength by collecting
massive fees which only it, as an SRO, is allowed to assess. 514 The
ECNs have also claimed that they and other market participants have
devoted significant resources to promoting the Nasdaq brand name, and

509. NYSE MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 49, at 22. Once decimal trading comes
to Nasdaq, spreads are expected to narrow significantly, and dealers may begin charging
commissions. Laura Santini, Nasdaq's Dealers Mull Commissions, Worrying Investors,
INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Jan. 8, 2001, at 12.

510.
511.
512.
513.
best bid
514.

Supra Part V.C.2 (discussing the Order Handling Rules).
Disclosure Release, supra note 452, at *26.
Supra Part VII.C (discussing the SuperMontage proposal).
For example, after the SuperMontage proposal, Nasdaq will display order interest at the
and offer and two price levels away.
See Bloomberg Letter supra note 400; Smith Letter, supra note 275.
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that this brand name will give Nasdaq an unfair advantage when it
5 15
becomes a for-profit entity.
While the ECNs have succeeded in attracting much of Nasdaq's order
flow, the current regulatory structure essentially preserves a role for
Nasdaq because the Commission, to address fragmentation concerns,
mandated that most orders for Nasdaq stocks be exposed to the Nasdaq
market. Although the Order Handling Rules allowed ECNs to flourish,
the Order Handling Release also amended Rule l lAcl-1, the Firm
Quote Rule, to prohibit market makers and specialists from transmitting
quotes to an ECN unless the ECN provided access to its quotes through
an exchange or Nasdaq. 516 In addition, if a market maker or specialist
wants to transmit quotations to an ECN to comply with Rule 1 1Acl-4,
the Display Rule, the ECN must provide access to its quotes through an
exchange or Nasdaq. 5 17 Moreover, under Regulation ATS, an ECN
must transmit its quotes to an exchange or Nasdaq for any security in
which it has had five percent of the average daily volume in four
months during any six-month period.5 18 As a result, ECNs are
effectively forced to use Nasdaq's systems and to pay its fees.
The only way for an ECN to avoid disseminating quotes to Nasdaq or
a national securities exchange is to itself become a national securities
exchange. 519 Obtaining exchange registration, however, is a slow
process. One of the major barriers to obtaining registration is the
requirement that the exchange be able to fulfill its self-regulatory
responsibilities. While an exchange can contract out its self-regulatory
function to another exchange or to the NASD, this is not a viable option
given the intense competition between the ECNs, the exchanges, and
Nasdaq, which is still majority-owned by the NASD.

515. See Letter from Douglas M. Atkin, President, Instinet Corporation, to S.E.C. (Dec. 6,
2000), availableat http://www.instinet.comlnews/comment-letters/comm-letters.shtml.
516. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.11 Ac1-1(c) (2000); Order Handling Release, supra note 79, at *2;
supra Part V.C.1 (discussing amendment to Firm Quote Rule).
517. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.11 Acl-4(c); see also supra Part V.C.2 (discussing the Display
Rule).
518. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3); see also supra Part VI.C (discussing Regulation ATS).
519. Two of the major ECNs have taken steps to become exchanges. Archipelago merged
with the Pacific Exchange, and Island has applied to become registered as a national securities
exchange. Alex Berenson, Big Board Tries to Move the Battle Lines in its Fight with Nadsaq,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at C1, available at 2000 WL 32000148; John Sandman, Archipelago
Set to Certify FIX for Trading Partners,SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Nov. 13, 2000, available at 2000
WL 4050536.
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D. For-ProfitExchanges and Conflicts With Roles as Self-Regulators
Within the space of a few weeks in the summer of 1999, both Nasdaq
and the NYSE announced potential plans for public offerings which
would make them for-profit entities. In the summer of 2000, the NASD
sold about forty percent of Nasdaq to investors in a private placement of
securities. 520 The purposes of changing from a mutual to a stock form
of ownership, or "demutualization," is to streamline the decision
making process and to raise capital more easily. As the SEC quickly
recognized, however, it also raises serious questions concerning the
self-regulatory role of the markets. In July 1999, the SEC issued a
warning to both markets, in the form of a letter from Chairman Levitt,
stating that they would need to be careful not to allow their for-profit
status to interfere with a strong self-regulatory function.5 2 1 The rise of
ECNs raises concerns about the current self-regulatory structure
because the ECNs are regulated by an affiliate of a competitor. 522 The
proposed demutualization of Nasdaq and the NYSE ignited a debate on
523
the form of self-regulation for the U.S. securities markets.
XI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The SEC must make several critical decisions in the months and
years ahead regarding the structure and the regulation of the U.S.
securities markets. Due in large part to the way in which Nasdaq
evolved from a simple quotation system operated by the NASD to a
massive securities market, these issues are intertwined.5 24 In addition,
both Nasdaq and the NYSE are seeking to change their form of
ownership to become for-profit entities. The Commission faces the

520. See Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Completes the First Phase of its Private Placement,
40 Percent of Nasdaq Sold to Over 2,800 Investors, Over $330 Million Raised (June 28, 2000),
available at http://www.nasdaq.com/reference/sncompletes-Istphase_000628.stm. The NASD
completed a second private placement of shares in Nasdaq in January 2001 which reduced its
percentage ownership to about 41%. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 36, at *11;
Press Release, Nasdaq Completes Private Offering and Expands Board (Jan. 25, 2001), available
at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/pr-private-offering-012501 .stm.
521. Thomas S. Mulligan, Market Savvy Levitt Warns NYSE, NASD to Maintain Oversight
Integrity, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1999, at C4, available at 1999 WL 2180830.
522. The NASD has committed to divest itself of its remaining shares of Nasdaq, but this
could be as late as June 30, 2002. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 36, at * 12.
523. For a more complete discussion of the self-regulation problem, including a summary of
the advantages of six different regulatory models, see A White PaperPreparedby the SIA entitled
Reinventing Self-Regulation, available at http://www.sia.com/demutualization/pdf/selfreg.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
524. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (tracing Nasdaq's evolution). For
example, NASDR, a sister company of Nasdaq, regulates Nasdaq's competitors, the ECNs.
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unenviable task of allowing vigorous competition in the securities
markets while still preserving a strong regulatory structure.
A. Market Structure
The SEC should resist the temptation to involve itself too deeply in
the debate on market structure. In particular, it should refrain from
mandating, or even encouraging, the development of a CLOB.52 5 While
the idea is conceptually appealing, over the long-term it would impose a
severe cost on the national markets in the form of stifled innovation. A
single CLOB, run by a single entity, would have no incentive to develop
new technology or methods of trading. True innovations can only result
from competition. For example, in promulgating the SuperMontage
proposal, Nasdaq acknowledged that it was prompted by the rise of
ECNs. 526 It is unlikely that the proposal, which will improve the
efficiency of Nasdaq, would have been made, or made as quickly, if not
for the presence of ECNs.
For the same reasons that it should not sanction the creation of a
CLOB, the Commission should not let fragmentation concerns lead to a
central market of any type. 527 Some commentators would argue that
528
concerns regarding fragmentation are misplaced in the first place.
Viewed from a different angle, fragmentation can be called competition.
Competition between the exchanges, Nasdaq, and the ECNs will
ultimately strengthen the markets and improve order executions.
Excessive fragmentation, which might indeed be harmful, is unlikely to
occur because all of the existing ECNs will not be able to survive after
implementation of the SuperMontage proposal. 529 The costs of
fragmentation are more obvious and readily measurable than the costs
of centralization, but the costs of centralization are potentially greater.
Any type of central marketplace would be in effect a governmentprotected monopoly, with little incentive to innovate or improve order
executions.
Upon adoption of Nasdaq's SuperMontage proposal, former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, the longest-serving chairman in the SEC's
history, stated that during his tenure as chairman there had been "no

525. See supra Part X.A (discussing CLOBs).
526. See supra Parts VII.C (discussing the SuperMontage proposal), VI.D (discussing the
growth of ECNs).
527. See supra Part IX.A. I (discussing fragmentation).
528. See Mark Klock, The SEC's New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market
FragmentationAhead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753 (1999).
529. See supra Part VII.C (discussing the SuperMontage proposal).
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more time-consuming, controversial or divisive" proposed rule change
than SuperMontage.5 30 The SuperMontage regulatory debacle occurred
largely because the Commission, in an effort to combat market
fragmentation, has mandated that ECNs expose their orders to the
public using a competitor's systems.5 31 Providing true competition
among securities markets, while limiting the negative effects of
fragmentation, would be a relatively simple matter from a regulatory
perspective. The Commission must mandate that ECNs and other
components
alternative trading systems have fair access to the primary
5 32
of the national market system-the CTA, CQS and ITS.
There is no logical reason that ECNs should be excluded from the
facilities of the national market system, and, at least with respect to the
CQS, the Commission has emphasized its commitment to the inclusion
of ECN quotes in the system. 533 However, the current system for
linking ECNs to the ITS, through Nasdaq, is intolerable because it
requires ECNs to depend on Nasdaq technology and requires ECNs to
maintain two-sided quotes, which is inconsistent with the fundamental
nature of their marketplaces. 534 Moreover, Regulation ATS has
effectively mandated ECN participation in the national market system
but imposed barriers to their access to the system by535requiring that
quotes be disseminated through the exchanges or Nasdaq.
The barriers to ECN participation in the facilities of the national
market system are artificial and unnecessary. In large part they stem
from the archaic system under which competitors must create an
association or other organization and then agree upon a joint plan
governing system operations. Even getting competitors to formulate a
plan has usually involved years of delays, squabbling and Commission
prodding. 536 An overhaul of all of these national market facilities is
530. Opening Statement on NASD's Proposed SuperMontage and Streamlining the SEC
Review Process for SRO Filings by Chairman Arthur Levitt (Jan. 10, 2001), available at 2001
WL 47348 (S.E.C.); see also supra Part VII.C (describing numerous modifications to
SuperMontage system designed to address issues created by ECNs' participation in the system).
531. Much of the acrimony surrounding the rule change was also due to the NASD's
regulating the ECNs, Nasdaq's competitors, while also owning Nasdaq. This problem is
addressed in infra Part XI.C, which recommends the creation of a single SRO for the securities
industry.
532. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.F (describing the CTA, CQS and ITS).
533. Execution Disclosure Proposing Release, supra note 16, at *27-28.
534. See supra Part VI.D (discussing ECN access to ITS through Nasdaq).
535. See supra Part VI.C.3 (discussing requirements of Regulation ATS relating to order
display and execution).
536. See, e.g., supra note 122 (describing approval of CTA Plan); supra notes 174-80 and
accompanying text (describing development of joint industry plan for granting unlisted trading
privileges); supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (describing development of ITS).
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needed. Rather than continuing to seek industry consensus on the
operations of these facilities, the Commission should provide for the
creation of one or more for-profit organizations to take over their
operations. The Commission could then mandate that exchanges and
ECNs participate in these facilities by disseminating quotes and
allowing executions through them. 537 The organizations operating the
national market facilities would establish the rules governing their
operations, subject to Commission oversight. 3 8
Organizations
proposing to operate the facilities could bid on a contract to provide the
necessary equipment and services to be awarded by the Commission or,
if a single SRO is created, the SRO. 5 39 The organizations would be
regulated, but would not be SROs, and the Commission could require
that their rules provide for fair access to their systems. Such a system
would allow all market centers with volume above the Regulation ATS
thresholds to be part of the national market system, which would
alleviate fragmentation concerns but allow vigorous and fair
competition between markets.
Other than improving the linkages between the markets, the
Commission does not need to take any further action toward the
development of a national market system. The Commission does not
need to implement any regulations addressing fragmentation because,
with the Disclosure Release, the Commission has already taken steps
that will lessen undesirable side effects of fragmentation by allowing
investors to make a more meaningful comparison between markets on
the basis of quality of order execution. 540 Accordingly, the pieces are
already in place to allow the forces of competition to determine the
most preferable structure. Given the adoption of the Disclosure
Release, 54 1 even a trade-through rule is not necessary. 54 2 If such a rule
were passed, it would need to have an exception to allow brokers to
exercise judgment in determining best execution, with their customers'
consent.

537. In the case of ECNs, this mandatory participation should be limited to those securities
that are subject to the order execution and access requirements of Regulation ATS.
538. While there would undoubtedly be some controversy involved in the rule filings of such
organizations, the markets would be limited to expressing their comments to the Commission,
which would be the final arbiter of the fairness and effectiveness of the rules. This would be a
major improvement over the current system under which amendments to the plans require
unanimous consent of all plan participants.
539. See infra Part XI.C (recommending creation of a single SRO).
540. See supra Part IX.B.1 (describing the Disclosure Release).
541. See supra Part IX.B.I.
542. See supra Part IX.B.3 (describing a trade-through rule).
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Without a single central marketplace, the U.S. market system will
probably evolve to a point where, on a national level, the NYSE,
Nasdaq, and one or two ECNs could compete for order flow. Each
market will be able to trade stocks listed on other markets. All of the
markets will be either linked under a more reliable version of the ITS 543
or
will be accessible through systems operated by broker-dealers.
Under such a system, investors will choose the markets that offer the
most reliable and least expensive execution. Competition will force
these markets to improve their systems and develop new systems.
Debates have raged for years on market structure issues such as whether
an auction market or dealer market is preferable 544 and whether
electronic exchanges will replace floor-based exchanges. If direct
regulation of market structure is avoided, the forces of competition,
rather than the SEC, will determine which type of market is most
efficient.
B. Market Data Fees
The SEC's well-intentioned proposal to impose a "flexible, costbased" system for regulating market data fees would introduce
confusion and more intensive oversight into a highly regulated
industry. 545 Worse, it is unclear whether the system would even solve
the deficiencies in the current system for transmitting market data. In
an era where even industries traditionally subject to rate-fixing are
moving towards deregulation, installing the Commission as the
regulator of market fees would be unnecessary and unwise.
Direct Commission involvement in ratemaking would be unworkable.
The debate over whether to include market regulation costs, which is
the most controversial aspect of the computation, illustrates the
impracticality of direct ratemaking. The Commission seems to believe
that it would be appropriate under a cost-based system to include market
regulation costs in market data fees. The theory behind this cost
allocation is that market regulation reduces the likelihood of
manipulation or fraud, so that quote or transaction information is
reliable or, in the words of the SEC, not "tainted by manipulation or

543. See supra Part IV.F (discussing the ITS). Some commentators have argued that the ITS
or similar linkages are no longer necessary because broker-dealers either have or are developing
systems which link to each of the markets and allow the broker-dealers to immediately access the
market with the best quote. Alex Berenson, A Nasdaq Plan to Trade Big Board Stocks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2000, at C12, available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File.
544. See supra Part X.B (discussing the debate on auction versus dealer markets).
545. See supra Part IX.B.5 (discussing the SEC's proposal regarding market data fees).
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fraud. 54 6 The statement illustrates the strained reasoning that is
prevalent in the market data fee debate. The direct benefit of market
regulation is the improvement in the quality of the markets themselves;
the fact that the resulting information is "untainted" is merely a side
benefit. Moreover, even if one accepts the argument that the costs of
market regulation directly enhance the value of market information, as
the Commission concedes in the Market Data Release, these costs
5 7
should not be borne solely by the users of market data. 4
The tenuous connection between the costs of market regulation and
market data supports one radical alternative in connection with market
data fees: eliminating them altogether. This alternative would involve a
direct refutation of the markets' claims that they "own" market data.
The proposition that the markets own the data is not as clear, either
legally or logically, as the markets would suggest. Eliminating market
data fees would have the inevitable result of raising transaction,
membership and listing fees, the other major sources of the markets'
revenues. Yet this would be a benefit, as the costs of effecting a
transaction on an exchange would be more directly reflected in its fees.
Under the current system, market data fees reduce transaction costs but
make it more difficult for investors to compare the true cost of using a
particular market. The disadvantages of eliminating market data fees
would be that, while logical, it would also be anticompetitive and would
likely precipitate an extended battle between the Commission and the
548
exchanges.
At the other extreme, the Commission could allow markets to set
their prices for market data without the need for a consensus among all
markets. This alternative would seem to undermine the movement
toward a national market system by restricting access to transaction and
quotation information. However, another aspect of the national market
system will prevent this limitation on access to market data from
occurring. Trading of securities away from their primary market has
slowly increased. While ECNs have long traded Nasdaq stocks and
have begun trading NYSE stocks, because the ECNs are not exchanges,

546. Market Data Release, supra note 122, at *35.
547. See id. at *27 (stating that the Commission "preliminarily believes" that "an appropriate
percentage" of market regulation costs should be funded by market data fees).
548. The Commission takes the position that any ownership interest the exchanges may have
in market data is subordinated to the Congressional mandate for the development of a national
market system, of which widely-distributed market information is a critical part. See id. at *1516. However, if the Commission completely eliminated market data fees, the exchanges might
pursue a claim that this action constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See id. at * 13.
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they are still hampered by their dependence on Nasdaq's technology
and the competitive disadvantage of regulation by Nasdaq's parent, the
NASD. As discussed above, the best means of eliminating the
technological barriers to competition among market centers is to allow
ECNs to access the facilities of the market system. 549 Once the ECNs
have more freedom to trade both Nasdaq and exchange-listed securities,
they will become true competitors to the established exchanges. Once
this system is in place, market data fees can be completely deregulated
because this competition will provide a check on a market charging
access fees that are so high as to effectively deny access to quotes.
A workable system for consolidating market information without
regulating its costs would allow each market to negotiate its own fees
with the users of market information. A central processor, preferably
chosen by competitive bidding, would perform the consolidation
function, with the costs being passed through this processor but
negotiated directly between the exchanges on one side and brokerdealers and large investors on the other. If this system is not instituted
until the ECNs are free to participate in the national market system,
550
competitive factors will determine the appropriate amount of fees.
C. Self-Regulation
A system in which several securities markets co-exist, whether the
markets resemble current exchanges, ECNs or Nasdaq, will provide the
most long-term benefits to investors.
The Commission is
understandably concerned, however, about the regulation of these
numerous markets. The most practical solution for the self-regulation
of exchanges is the creation of a single regulator that has no corporate
affiliation whatsoever with any exchange. The NASD could fulfill this
function, with separate divisions regulating both the markets and
broker-dealers. The exchanges and ECNs could retain rulemaking
authority, subject to SEC oversight.
Given the manner in which the various securities markets have
evolved, the current self-regulatory structure poses several problems.

549. See supra Part IX.A (proposing improvements to current structure of U.S. securities
markets). An alternative approach would be to reduce the regulatory barriers to ECNs becoming
exchanges. This reduction could occur through the creation of a single self-regulator, which
would eliminate the need for each market to maintain its own regulatory staff. See infra Part
XI.C (proposing creation of a single SRO).
550. For example, the NYSE may charge larger fees because it has a larger share of volume
and promotes itself as the fairest and most stable market. However, if these fees are unreasonably
high, market participants will direct their business in NYSE-listed stocks to other markets as a
means of reducing or avoiding these fees.
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One major problem is that the NASD owns one securities market while
regulating the competitors of this market. 55 1 These competitors, the
ECNs, consider this grossly unfair.
On the other hand, some
commentators believe that the ECNs have a "free-ride" on both the
exchanges and Nasdaq by not paying their fair share of the cost of
552
regulatory oversight.
The demutualization of the securities markets will only magnify
current deficiencies in the self-regulatory structure. 55 3 Allowing forprofit exchanges to continue to act as self-regulators would pose
significant dangers to the integrity of the markets. Self-regulation
always involves an inherent conflict, as the enforcement actions against
the NYSE and NASD illustrate. 554 The best argument for allowing
market centers to continue to regulate themselves is that they will have
even stronger incentives to preserve their reputations as fair and
prestigious markets.5 55 This is undoubtedly true with regard to the
passage of rules, such as listing standards and rules governing trading.
However, a single SRO system could preserve the markets' authority to
adopt these rules, subject only to SEC approval.55 6 Moreover, with
regard to enforcement, the actual and apparent conflicts inherent in a
for-profit exchange are too great to allow a for-profit entity to fulfill a
self-regulatory function. Given the often vicious competition for order
flow and the need to generate consistent profits for shareholders, the
551. The effect of this conflict will be either partially alleviated or eliminated when the NASD
fully directs itself of its ownership in Nasdaq, depending on the degree of control Nasdaq market
makers have over the NASD.
552. James Cox, Brands vs. Generics: Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 15, 18 (2000).
553. See supra Part X.D (discussing the demutualization of the securities markets).
554. See supra Parts VIII.A-B (discussing the enforcement actions against the NASD and
NYSE). In addition, the proposed demutualization of Nasdaq illustrated the potential conflicts
that exist whenever a regulator is controlled by members of the same industry it regulates. A
group of market makers opposed Nasdaq's demutualization plans based on concerns relating to
the NASD's self-regulatory role. The members were concerned that the staff of NASDR
conducted lengthy examinations on busy trading days and demanded, among other things, a
"regulatory bill of rights" for NASD employees and member firms, and an "office of member's
advocate." William Hoffman, Washington Watch: Firms' Legal Steps to Block Nasdaq Sale;
Dissidents Attach NASD for Silence as Historical Deal Approved, TRADERS MAG., May 1, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 11133567. The connection between the traders' complaints and
demutualization was unclear; it appears that the demutualization debate merely provided an
opportunity for the traders to be heard. In any event, the traders' action illustrates the pressure on
self-regulatory organizations to be a less intrusive, which could mean a less effective, regulator.
This pressure would likely increase if the complaining parties were shareholders rather than
members.
555. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should There be a Single SRO?, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Law Journal File.
556. See supra Part II (discussing SROs).
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incentive to spend funds on technology and marketing at the expense of
regulation will be clear.
The disciplinary failures of the NASD and the NYSE that led to SEC
actions resulted not from simple neglect of the enforcement process but
from misplaced priorities. In the NASD's case, at least, this resulted
from market makers exerting excessive influence over the disciplinary
process. Given the ability of relatively small groups of shareholders to
exercise control over a corporation, the potential for undue influence
once the exchanges are for-profit is immense. One can imagine the
pressures that the regulatory arm of an exchange would face in
determining whether to bring a disciplinary action against a major
shareholder or group of shareholders. In addition, there is a risk that
markets will cut costs relating to their self-regulatory function in the
interest of improving profits, or that markets will compete on the basis
557
of the most lenient regulations.
An alternative to the creation of a single self-regulatory organization
would be a separate regulator for the marketplaces. However, a single
SRO would be preferable because the relatively small number of
members of a marketplace SRO would give rise to conflicts between the
interests of the board of governors and the regulated exchanges. 558 An
additional advantage of a single regulator would be that it would ease
the financial burden on markets seeking exchange status. These
markets could utilize the services of the single SRO in exchange for a
fee, rather than developing their own self-regulatory system. Moreover,
a single SRO could oversee the adoption and administration of any joint
industry plans that are needed between the markets, reducing some of
the squabbling and delays that have characterized most such plans in the
past.
XII. CONCLUSION
The technological advances in the securities industry since 1975 have
been astounding. In at least one respect, however, the industry has not
changed significantly in the past quarter century. The Commission
observed in 1974 that "while most industries study problems to death,
557. The NASD is ahead of the exchanges in seeking to eliminate the conflict between forprofit status and the exercise of self-regulatory functions because of its eventual divestiture of its
interest in Nasdaq. However, none of the exchanges have planned similar moves.
558. For example, if the board of governors of an SRO consisted of exchange officials,
conflicts would arise in almost every disciplinary or rule-making proceeding. If the board
consisted of representatives of brokerage firms, which would use the services or many or all of
the exchanges, and members of the public, as the NASD's board of governors is currently
constituted, the conflict would be significantly lessened.
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the securities industry studies solutions to death."55 9 As a result,
conclusions on the structure of the markets and their oversight have
lagged behind technological developments.
Commission
implementation of the suggested changes would allow a national market
system to develop without the rigidity of a CLOB or other governmentmandated structure. The forces of competition have done a remarkable
job of spurring innovations and developments in technology, and they
should be allowed to continue. Moreover, continued competition will
allow investors and not the government or the operators of the various
markets to decide which markets are superior. Most importantly, these
operators will have the continued incentive to provide the best and most
efficient execution of investor orders. As most or all exchanges become
for-profit entities, there is a danger that the markets will not devote the
same energy to regulation as they do to improving performance. A
single self-regulator, unaffiliated with any of the markets and subject to
Commission oversight, would help ensure that the United States
securities markets are the most advanced and fairest in the world.

559. Fixed Commission Rates on Exchange Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 11,093,
5 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 439 (Nov. 8, 1974), availableat 1974 WL 18573, at *8 (S.E.C.).

